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- 1. Competitive Rivalry and Competitive Dynamics Robert E. Hoskisson Michael A. Hitt R. Duane Ireland Chapter 6
- 2. Chapter 2 Strategic Leadership Chapter 4 The Internal Organization Chapter 6 Competitive Rivalry and Competitive Dynamics Chapter 9 International Strategy Chapter 1 Introduction to Strategic Management Chapter 3 The External Environment Chapter 5 Business-Level Strategy Chapter 8 Acquisition and Restructuring Strategies Chapter 11 Corporate Governance Strategic Intent Strategic Mission Chapter 7 Corporate-Level Strategy Chapter 10 Cooperative Strategy Chapter 12 Strategic Entrepreneurship Strategic Analysis Strategic Thinking Creating Competitive Advantage Monitoring And Creating Entrepreneurial Opportunities The Strategic Management Process Chapter 5 Business-Level Strategy Chapter 6 Competitive Rivalry and Competitive Dynamics
- 18. A Framework of Competitor Analysis Market Commonality High Low Low High Resource Similarity The shaded area represents degree of market commonality between two firms Resource endowment B Resource endowment A KEY I II III IV
- 40. Gradual Erosion of a Sustainable Competitive Advantage Returns from a Sustainable Competitive Advantage Time (Years) Launch Exploitation Counterattack 0 5 10
- 42. Obtaining Temporary Advantages to Create Sustained Advantage Returns from a Series of Replicable Actions Time (Years) Launch Exploitation Counterattack Firm has already moved to next advantage 0 5 10 15
Notas del editor
- Competitive Rivalry and Competitive Dynamics Instructor notes contained here for Chapter 6 include: • Competitive Rivalry, which begins on the slide titled “From Competitors to Competitive Dynamics” • Competitor Analysis, which begins on the slide titled “A Model of Competitive Rivalry” and includes discussions of • Market Commonality • Resource Similarity • Resource Dissimilarity • Reputation • Competitive Dynamics, which begins on the slide titled “Competitive Dynamics: Slow- Cycle Markets.” This discussion includes both slow-cycle and fast-cycle markets.
- From Competitors to Competitive Dynamics Competitive Rivalry (Supplements discussion of rivalry on pp. 174ff) Firms use a variety of tactics to draw out and assess the competition. For example, rivals frequently signal their “rules of engagement,” which involves letting the competition know one’s intentions and to draw the competition out and examine how it responds. To examine how the competition responds, or to test its counter moves, a firm can always bluff. Signaling and rules of engagement in the airlines industry are rather clear and common. As an example, Delta was known for briefly lowering fares significantly on a particular route, say Atlanta to Los Angeles, in response to another carrier lowering the fares on the same route. The signal: “If you want to lower fares on this route, you are in for a bloody battle.” The other airline most often responded by raising fares along this route because Delta had the resources to enter into a long and grueling fare war on the route. If, on the other hand, rivals reacted by lowering fares even further, Delta had to interpret this signal as “they wished to compete with us for business along this route.” Of course, not all types of signaling are legal, but here are a couple of common signals: price movements, prior announcements (“we’ll meet or beat any competitor’s price”), media (press releases), counter attacks/moves, announcement of results, and litigation. (Continued on next slide.)
- From Competitors to Competitive Dynamics (cont.) Competitive Rivalry (Supplements discussion of rivalry on pp. 174ff) (cont.) Strategists must also note that firms might get into competitions that are not economically driven, but rather are personality driven. These competitive rivalries are based on an initial competition for resources or revenues—but that over time can become personal battles between CEOs. Sony and Matsushita have been battling for world dominance in the consumer electronics industry for decades. The rivalry has become so personal between the two CEOs that they refuse to attend the same dinner parties or events. It escalated to the point where in 1989, after Sony’s Akio Morita closed the deal to purchase Columbia Pictures for $3.4 billion, Matsushita’s Masaharu Matsushita, not willing to be one-upped by his rival, responded by purchasing MCA for $6.1 billion less than a year later. Understanding competition is important as research shows that intensified rivalry within an industry may results in decreased industry average profitability. As discussed in the textbook, in 2001, Dell launched an intense price war in the PC and server business, causing prices to drop by as much as 50%. Profit margins declined for all firms, including Dell. CEO Michael Dell believed that his direct sales model would enable Dell to better endure its own reduced profitability than rivals who seek economies of scale could. Competitors, however, responded to Dell’s pricing competitive action. For example, to increase their advantage from economies of scale and scope, Hewlett-Packard’s merged with Compaq Computer Corporation. While it remains to be seen whether the new HP would be able to sustain the intense rivalry Dell’s strategy may contribute to its ability to outperform its rivals. Indeed, it has been suggested that Dell sets the pace for the PC industry, reflecting the strength of its direct sales strategy, and its superior cash flow management.
- A Model of Competitive Rivalry Competitor Analysis (p. 175) Firms with high market commonality and highly similar resources are direct and mutually acknowledged competitors. However, direct rivals do not always intensify their competition. The drivers of competitive behavior—as well as the likelihood that a competitor will initiate competitive actions or reactions—influence the intensity of rivalry, even for direct competitors. Market Commonality is concerned with the number of markets with which the firm and a competitor are jointly involved and the degree of importance of the individual markets to each. For example, McDonalds and Burger King compete against each other in multiple global fast-food markets, while Prudential and Cigna (financial/insurance) compete against each other in several market segments (institutional and retail) as well as product markets such as life insurance and health insurance. Airlines, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals are other industries in which firms often simultaneously engage each other in multiple market competitions. More recently AOL and Microsoft entered into a stiff competition for Internet Service Provider (ISP) dominance. The key to ISP profits is in selling add-ons and auxiliary products and services to its customers. AOL has a significant size advantage with 31 million subscribers to Microsoft’s 7 million. The rivalry between the two firms for customers is becoming increasingly intense. When AOL increased rates Microsoft responded by holding its rates and offering three free months to new subscribers. AOL responded by initiating negotiations with PC manufacturers to install AOL on new PC desktops. The two firms also compete for the instant messaging application market. While AOL pioneered the concept, Microsoft developed many added features and optimized its application. In an effort to capture even greater market share Microsoft began to bundle MSN Messenger with its newest Windows operating system, Windows XP. While research suggests that market commonality and multimarket competition may occur by chance, once it begins, the rivalry becomes intentional and oftentimes intense. (Continued on next slide.)
- Competitive Rivalry Resource Similarity Resource Similarity is the extent to which the firm’s resources are comparable to a rival’s in terms of both type and amount. Firms with similar types and amounts of resources tend to have similar strengths and weaknesses—and use similar strategies. The rivalry between CVS and Walgreen demonstrates these expectations in the retail pharmacy business. These firms are using the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy to offer relatively low-cost goods with some differentiated features, such as services. Resource similarity (net income of $746 million for CVS vs. $776.9 million for Walgreen; 4,133 CVS stores in 34 states vs. 3,165 Walgreen stores in 43 states) suggests that the firms might suffer from strategy convergence and industry orthodoxy. Resource Dissimilarity Resource Dissimilarity also influences competitive actions and responses between firms. For example, Wal-Mart initially used its cost leadership strategy to compete only in small communities (population of 25,000 or less). Using logistics systems and extremely efficient purchasing practices as competitive advantages, Wal-Mart created what was at that time a new type of value—wide selections of products at the lowest competitive prices— for customers in small retail markets. Local stores lacked the ability to marshal resources at the pace required to respond quickly and effectively. However, even when facing competitors with greater resources or ability, firms should respond, no matter how daunting doing so seems. Choosing not to respond can ultimately result in failure (or greater failure), as happened with many local retailers who didn’t respond to Wal-Mart’s competitive actions.
- Competitive Analysis Reputation (p. 187) Competitors are more likely to respond to strategic and tactical actions taken by market leaders. For example, Home Depot—the world’s largest home improvement retailer and the second largest U.S. retailer (behind Wal-Mart)—is known as an innovator in the home improvement market and for its ability to develop new store formats (EXPO Design Centers and Villager’s Hardware Stores). As such, Home Depot knows that its rivals study its strategic actions and respond to them. For example, watching Home Depot, Lowe’s has transformed from a chain of small stores into a chain of home improvement warehouses, thus increasing the similarity of its store design with Home Depot’s. Similarly, evidence shows that successful strategic actions are quickly imitated, almost regardless of the actor’s reputation. For example, although a second mover, IBM committed significant resources to enter the PC market. When IBM succeeded in this endeavor, rivals (Dell, Compaq, and Gateway) responded with strategic actions (imitation) to enter the market. IBM’s reputation as well as its successful strategic action strongly influenced entry by these competitors. Thus, in terms of competitive rivalry, IBM could predict that responses would follow its entry to a market if that entry proved successful. In addition, IBM could predict that those competitors would try to create value in slightly different ways, such as Dell’s direct sales and built-to-order rather than to use storefronts as a distribution channel.
- Competitive Dynamics Slow-Cycle Markets (p. 189) Slow-Cycle Markets are markets in which competitive advantages are shielded from imitation for longer periods of time and/or where imitation is costly. Historical conditions, causal ambiguity, social complexity, copyrights, location, patents, and proprietary information could all lead to one-of-a-kind advantages. Walt Disney Co. continues to extend its proprietary characters, such as Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, and Goofy. These characters have a unique historical development. Because patents shield it, the proprietary nature of Disney’s advantage in terms of animated characters protects the firm from imitation by competitors (e.g., the company once sued a day-care center, forcing it to remove the likeness of Mickey Mouse from a wall of the facility). Once a patent expires, a firm is no longer shielded from competition. For example, in 2002 Merck got rocked by the loss of revenue as the patent protection for leading drugs, such as gastroesophageal reflux soother Prilosec, cholesterol drug Mevacor, and hypertension medication Prinivil, expired.
- Competitive Dynamics (cont.) Fast-Cycle Markets (p. 189) Fast-Cycle Markets are markets in which competitive advantages are not shielded from imitation and where imitation happens quickly and somewhat inexpensively. Competitive advantages are not sustainable in fast-cycle markets. The pace of competition in fastcycle markets is almost frenzied as companies rely on ideas and the innovations resulting from them as the engines of their growth. Because prices fall quickly in these markets, companies need to introduce new or improved product faster. For example, rapid declines in the prices of Intel’s and Advanced Micro Devices’ (AMD) microprocessor chips made it possible for PC manufacturers to continuously reduce their prices to end users. Imitation of many fast-cycle products is relatively easy. Dell and Gateway have imitated IBM’s initial PC design to create their own PCs. Continuous declines in the costs of parts, as well as the fact that the information and knowledge required to assemble a PC isn’t complicated and is readily available, made it possible for additional competitors to enter this market without significant difficulty.