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Mobile Early Warning, Intervention and
   Response to Nuclear Terrakts

                                 October 19, 2004


                                 Washington
TETRAD i3 Inc.                   Boca Raton
                                    Moscow
Our Starting Points
•   Terrorism is a network phenomenon, not only a “hydra” but a culture with viral
    attributes

•   Technology must be assumed to be completely available to the terrorist and is no
    longer an issue of “can it come from former WMD centers or supplies” or is it being
    done in a rogue state camp. US, CA, UK, NL, FR, DE, RU, JP are not “rogue
    states” but have been basing and staging operations for techno-terrorists.

•   Radiation terrorism and the “RDD” is a very attractive modality because it is one of
    the most effective for social-economic-political (SEP) destabilization
    EVEN IF THE BOMB KILLS NO ONE

•   The likeliest targets for an RDD are those with the highest SEP disruption value

•   The likeliest process of assembling an RDD involves multiple trips, parts,
    components and is absolutely unlikely to be a classic single-source for the
    radioactive component

•   The most effective and deployed preventive countermeasures should also provide
    first-responder value and vice versa


                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                            2
Nomad Eyes™ and Asymmetric Thinking
          Applied to Asymmetric Threats

•   Applying the model and methods of terrorism thinking and principles of action
    INVERSELY to develop countermeasures that are:

•   rapidly and easily deployable (today, not after two years of $$ R&D)
•   robust but very flexible and fault-tolerant
•   low-cost, low-tech, easy-to-use, disposable technology where it counts - in the
    street and neighborhoods
•   engages and uses the victims themselves (the general population, “us”)
•   extensible and reconfigurable as new sensing capabilities evolve (e.g., chem, rad)
•   usable today as a testing platform in the real-world to build better
    countermeasures in the future
•   disruptive and unpredictable in the eyes of the terrorists - an “enemy in the dark”
    to which they cannot know where, when, or how to respond




                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                          3
Examination of Terrorist Methods “inside out”
        and Means of Employing the Victims and Targets for Defense

                                                                          You can’t take this on a plane or into
                                                                                    many buildings




You can take these almost anywhere.
So do they.
THIS was the key weapon for 9-11
and for АВТОЗАВОДСКАЯ
It is also one of the key defenses.
                                        When These
                                      Turn Into Those.




                                          Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                     4
Value of Mobile Wireless Portable and Handheld Nets
          for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System


For Rad Terrorism but also for other
types and necessarily looking for all,
not only one
                                           Mobile units using both cellular and
                                           wireless internet/intranets


     Freeform but adhering to industry
     standards
                                                  Incorporating the General Public

            Incorporating the commercial sector
            (advertising and consumer products)


                      Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion

                               Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                         5
Terrorism and Hunting Elephants
1. It is hard to miss hitting an elephant even with a
poor weapon
2. It is hard to kill one with inadequate technology
3. When the son or grandson of some unfortunate
hunter grows up, he will seek out the Big One with a
vengeance, for a trophy-kill born out of revenge for his
father’s demise
4. He will take the time to consider innovative
technology and tactics


America and Russia are classic examples of
“Elephant” Targets for Rad and other Substance-
Based Terrorism
Extensive Surface, Open Borders despite border-control
countermeasures
Extensive Commerce that cannot be halted or curtailed
Different types of open traffic to and within
Extensive non-reducible non-military nuclear industry
Well-established in-country operating front-line enemy bases
Open, non-reducible communications infrastructure available
for the enemy
                                                  Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.   6
But where are the likely targets and means?

         In the public mind’s-eye and Angst

         And the less-likely form for many reasons



                                          Psycho-Shock is the Aim and
                                          Nuclear Radiation is Powerful
                                          even in non-lethal doses




             Mass-dispersion with
             uncertain contact and
             degree will create the
             most widespread fears

                Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                         7
Targets

              Consider only the two main targets


   OBJECTIVES similar/different
   MOTIVES different but complementary
   TARGETS different/similar



Harm an ethnic enemy                                                       Disrupt economy
Harm largest numbers                                  Create dramatic shocks that diminish
                                                      confidence in govt’s ability to protect
Create fear in the largest numbers
                                                 Create logistic/information network havoc
Disrupt mass transportation
                                                        Create electorate unrest, instability
Destabilize government
                                                                    Destabilize government
Focus on popular (transport)
infrastructure                                            Focus on economic infrastructure




                                 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                  8
RDD in the context of conventional attacks

Considering SEP Disruption and Destabilization as the “prime-directive” of
terrorist organizations capable/active in planning RDD and chem-bio tactics


•   Most likely choice is with massive dispersion through conventional+inflammatory
    attack

•   Spread the most compounds in the most uncertain paths among the largest
    number of possible affected victims

•   Affect the maximum number of structures including transportation routes

•   Aim for closure and disruption of normal use/traffic - it does not have to be for
    years, just months or weeks

•   Multiple small disruptive attacks easier and more effective than one block-buster


                               Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                            9
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I)

Prevention by Detection of the Planning Operation
Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances
Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events
“Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind -
         Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable
         Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches”
         Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling
         Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful
           in an RDD
Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys
Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities




                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                      10
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II)

                                                                     EVENT !



      Class (x) objects received by servers results
     in generation of n graphs representing
     hypothetical x      y… relational maps; the
     majority are discarded, but events of interest
     trigger feedback to both autonomous and
     human-based nodes for additional collection
     and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes
     is reliant and the whole may be considered as
     a dynamic-geometry cellular automata.




                                                      EVENT !




                                     Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.             11
MIMD, ETL, ADaM, MENE, Gaming

Data collection and sensor communication based upon classic MIMD parallel processing
     ♦ Fault tolerance, fail-safe
     ♦ Load balancing
     ♦ Doesn’t communicate? Go to the next/nearest available

     Agent-enabled Extract-Transfer-Load processing from classic VLDB technology
           ♦ Up to 2K rows/sec, 80M rows/day
           ♦ Graph-theoretic architecture adapts well with semantic maps, topic maps, fuzzy logic
           ♦ Agents trigger DB queries in DW, others DBs, notifications to authorities, public

           MENE - Morphic Exploratory Navigational Environments
                 ♦ For authorities and responders - high-res 3D Adobe Atmosphere VR worlds
                 ♦ For the general public - reduced-scale/detail navigation via cell phones
                 ♦ GPS-enabled or not

                 Turning self-protection and communal security into a Game to get People Active
                       ♦ Implicit, subtle educational-value mobile phone games with contests
                       ♦ MIT collaborators - Comparative Media Studies (Klopfer, Jenkins et al)
                       ♦ Get attention, participation, and free pertinent data with Positive Reinforcement

                                      Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                          12
ADaM is Fast
                  16000



                  14000



                  12000                                                                                                                                                         T yp ica l F a stlo a d
                                                                                                                                                                                T yp ica l T p u m p
                                                                                                                                                                                T yp ica l M ixe d
                  10000
                                                                                                                                                                                P e a k F a stlo a d
R o w s /S e c




                                                                                                                                                                                P eak T pum p
                   8000                                                                                                                                                         P e a k F stld & T p u m p
                                                                                                                                                                                T ra n sp a re n t F a stL
                                                                                                                                                                                T ra n sp a re n t T p u m p
                   6000
                                                                                                                                                                                S p e cia l F a stL
                                                                                                                                                                                "K itch e n S in k"
                   4000                                                                                                                                                         P eak E T L



                   2000



                         0




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                                                                                           Copyrights2004eTETRAD I3 Inc.
                                                                                                  T e t T yp
                                                                                                                                                                                          13
And This is Why
                                      P_graph of ETLS (2)
                                                                                                        -                 -

                                                                                                                  +
                                                                                                            0
                                                                                                    -                 0           -
                                       -                       -

                                               +                                                                  0
                                           0
Actor objects                     -                    0            -
(nodes)
                                                   0

                                                                                                        ETLPs (with                                       ETL Set (with
                                                                                                            actors)                                       ETLPs)



                                                                                                                                      -               -                      -               -
              ETL Set (with                                                                                                                   +                                      +
              ETLPs)                                                                                                                      0                                      0
                                                                                                                                  -               0       -              -               0       -

                                                                                                                                              0                                      0
                                                                                                                P_graph of ETLP (5)
                                                                            -               -
          -               -                                                         +
                                                                                0
                  +                                                     -               0       -                                     -                       -
              0                                                                                                                                                       P_graph of Exec
      -               0       -        -                                                                                                                              (1)
                                                           -                        0
                                                                                                                                                  +
                  0                            +                                                                                          0
                                           0                                                                                  -                       0           -   ADaM exec
                                  -                0           -                                                                                                      (program)

                                               0                                                                                                  0

                                                                   Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                                                                                 14
Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (I)




        Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.   15
Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (II)
 Port Name       Tons (1,000's) [2002 stats]
 Norfolk Harbor 27,901,354
 Newport News          11,300,962

            7,400 of @ 400K importers account for more than 80% of imports to USA
            Prior to 9/11/2001, less than 2% of 6,000,000 containers inspected



Dual Vulnerability, Dual Terrakt Strategies
(1) Ship-in, use elsewhere (e.g., NYC, Washington)
(2) Disrupt the Port


                   Suez-class cranes, @ 70m length
        Forty 50-ton containers per hour - capacity


                                    Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                   16
Port of Baltimore




                                    > 30M tons per year, mainly containers


2M+ residents in Baltimore and surrounding urban center
Main East-Coast rail and interstate highways traverse region

                 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                     17
Today’s consumer-class RAD components




    Our simple conversion with Nomad Eyes™
                                                       Existing mobile phone
Li-ion    A/D logic                Nomadiks                     logic
                                      or
                                     other
  Rad-sensor element                mProc                Interface logic to
                                                          wireless internet

                       Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                      18
Deployment - Where and How
•   Static but ad-hoc
     – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles
     – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration


•   Pseudo-random

•   Personal mobile units
     – Assigned to staff personnel
     – Personal cell phones


•   Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders
     – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass”
     – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears


•   Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous


                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                  19
More on Compound Eyes

                                      Multiple TYPES of sensor data
                                      Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES


                                      INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging:
                                      the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of
                                      known or deducible behaviors


                                      USING
                                      •Abductive rules
                                      •Bayesian probabilistic inference
                                      •Fuzzy inference
                                      •Heuristics and “common sense” rules

For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference:
Requests for building or water/sewer line plans          Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people
“Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials     Unusual change in shipping order or pickup

                                         Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                        20
Our Technology Focus:
         Inverse, Nonlinear, Counter-Intuitive (sometimes)




Source




     The Object causes diffusion and scattering of the Beam but the laws governing propagation and movement in
     different media are known or can be ascertained. Working backwards from the Result, one computes and
     estimates the Object on the bsais of how the Beam must have changed in order to produce the Result instead of a
     pattern, computable, for what there would have been if no Object had been present. Now, transfer this Inverse
     Model ought of imaging and into the world of semiotics and intensions. Now, one can do inverse thinking from
     something Sensed and Observed, in actuality, to determine what were some of the intervening steps and processes
     out of the usual and ordinary process that would have produced something different, most likely less complex.

                                         Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                                 21
Making Sense of the Data (I)

•   Basic diffusion equation - usable as starting point for inverse problems

             ∂ 2u 1 ∂u




                                                                                               Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT
                  =                u( x ,0) = f ( x )           u(0, t ) = u(a, t ) = 0
             ∂x 2
                    k ∂t
•   Time-transition is accomplished in Fourier domain
                ∞
                           x                         2 a            x
        f ( x ) = ∑ fn sin πn                    fn = ∫ f ( x ) sin πn dx
                  n =1     a                         a 0            a
                                 ∞
                                                               n
                      u( x , t ) = ∑ fne   −k ( πn a ) t
                                                     2
                                                           sin π 
                                n =1                           a
•   Transition backwards in time requires amplification of high frequency
    components - most likely to be noisy and skewed



                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                22
Making Sense of the Data (II)
•   Heuristic and a priori constraints needed to maintain physical realism and
    suppress distortions from inverse process

•   First-pass solution best match or interpolation among a set of acceptable




                                                                                      Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT
    alternatives

      ˆ
      x = arg min Ax − y                             s.t.        x∈X
                      x

•   Final solution may minimize the residual error and the regularization term

                                              2                     2
         ˆ
         x = arg min Ax − y 2 + λ L( x − x ) 2
                          x

       Regularization offers fidelity to the observed data and an
    a priori determined (e.g., higher-scale-observed) solution model

                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                      23
Making Sense of the Data (III)


                     •   Diffusion _ Attraction
                     •   Modeling situations and schemas




                                                                    Particular credits - J. P. Thirion, INRIA
                         as composite “images” in n-D
                     •   Iterative process with
                         exploration of parallel tree paths
                           – Speculative track; not required
                             for Nomad Eyes sensor fusion
                             to be useful to analysts
                           – Purpose is to enable automation
                             of the analysis and forecasting
                             post-collection process
                           – Area of active current research




       Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                           24
Making Sense of the Data (IV) - I3BAT

                                                                    •      Multiple modalities
           Sensor 1                         Sensor 2                        – Acoustic, EM, Optical, Text,
                                                                              NLP, SQL, AI-reasoning…
                                                                    •      All looking at the same topic of
                                                                           interest (aka “region”)
                                                                    •      Each sensitive to different
                                          Property 3                       physical/logical properties
                                                                            –   “Trigger” data
                                                                            –   Contiguity (space/time)
                                         Property 2                         –   Inference relations
      Property 1
                                                                            –   “Hits” with conventional DB
                                                                                queries (immigration, known
                                        Background                              associations, other
                                                                                investigations)
                                                                    •      Compare with Terrorist Cadre
Particular credits - Eric Miller, NEU
                                                                           Tactic models (schemas, maps)

                                           Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                              25
Public involvement, education, gaming

                                                       Educational Games
                                                                Children, adults
                                                                Individual, team
Citizen Corps concept
       Volunteer Activists




   Flexible E-Paper (FOLED)                         Commerciali$m
           Public kiosks, signs                              Contests, ads, prizes
                                                             related to games


                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                           26
First Responder Capability as well


                             Notify Maximum Numbers of People ASAP after Terrakt
                                    Redirect Survivors
                                    Keep Other People Away
                                    Assist People Finding Loved Ones
                                    Provide Essential Life-Saving Information Real-Time




Coordinate and Inform First-Responder Teams
     Locations of People
     Active Sensor Array including useful data from public
     Coordinate with volunteers




                                  Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                           27
Current Status
    Corporate-partnerships
    IRAD program
        I3BAT Phase 1
        ADaM prototype completed
        OpenNet prototype completed
        Collaboratory prototype completed
    Developments with US federal, state homeland security programs

Nomad Eyes Global “Peace Proliferation”




                 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                       28
Acknowledgements



•   J. P. Thirion (INRIA, France)
•   Roger Dufour (MIT, USA)
•   Eric Klopfer, Henry Jenkins (MIT, USA)
•   Eric Miller (NEU, USA)
•   Center for Surface and Subsurface Imaging
    and Sensing
•   ST Microelectronics, SA
•   Adobe Corporation




          Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.         29
A tetrahedron is the strongest and most
stable natural geometrical structure


                                                                         1+1+1+1 = More
                                                                          -----------------
                                          Homeland                       The S4 Synergy
                                           Security
                                         Nomad Eyes             I3
                                                           Integrative
                       Personal                              Inverse
                        Health                            Intelligence
                       BioScan



                                                   Healthcare
                              Clinical            Disease Mgt
                              Therapy             HealthNVest
                               I3DIT




                                                        In business and finance as well
                                                        as in math and science
                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                               30
Contacts
•   Martin J. Dudziak, PhD (Technology)
     – (954) 545-4500
     – +7-926-530-1211 or +7-095-172-6369 Moscow (GMT +3)
     – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com)


•   Brent A. Kish (Contracts)
     – (954) 545-4500
     – (954) 614-4172
     – brent@forteplan.com

•   Tamara F. Koval, MD (Project Mgr; Int’l Relations)
     – (804) 647-0374
     – tamara@forteplan.com


TETRAD I3 Inc., 1206 NW 45 St., Pompano Beach FL 33064

                   Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.            31

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Radterrorism Spb Oct04

  • 1. Mobile Early Warning, Intervention and Response to Nuclear Terrakts October 19, 2004 Washington TETRAD i3 Inc. Boca Raton Moscow
  • 2. Our Starting Points • Terrorism is a network phenomenon, not only a “hydra” but a culture with viral attributes • Technology must be assumed to be completely available to the terrorist and is no longer an issue of “can it come from former WMD centers or supplies” or is it being done in a rogue state camp. US, CA, UK, NL, FR, DE, RU, JP are not “rogue states” but have been basing and staging operations for techno-terrorists. • Radiation terrorism and the “RDD” is a very attractive modality because it is one of the most effective for social-economic-political (SEP) destabilization EVEN IF THE BOMB KILLS NO ONE • The likeliest targets for an RDD are those with the highest SEP disruption value • The likeliest process of assembling an RDD involves multiple trips, parts, components and is absolutely unlikely to be a classic single-source for the radioactive component • The most effective and deployed preventive countermeasures should also provide first-responder value and vice versa Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 2
  • 3. Nomad Eyes™ and Asymmetric Thinking Applied to Asymmetric Threats • Applying the model and methods of terrorism thinking and principles of action INVERSELY to develop countermeasures that are: • rapidly and easily deployable (today, not after two years of $$ R&D) • robust but very flexible and fault-tolerant • low-cost, low-tech, easy-to-use, disposable technology where it counts - in the street and neighborhoods • engages and uses the victims themselves (the general population, “us”) • extensible and reconfigurable as new sensing capabilities evolve (e.g., chem, rad) • usable today as a testing platform in the real-world to build better countermeasures in the future • disruptive and unpredictable in the eyes of the terrorists - an “enemy in the dark” to which they cannot know where, when, or how to respond Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 3
  • 4. Examination of Terrorist Methods “inside out” and Means of Employing the Victims and Targets for Defense You can’t take this on a plane or into many buildings You can take these almost anywhere. So do they. THIS was the key weapon for 9-11 and for АВТОЗАВОДСКАЯ It is also one of the key defenses. When These Turn Into Those. Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 4
  • 5. Value of Mobile Wireless Portable and Handheld Nets for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System For Rad Terrorism but also for other types and necessarily looking for all, not only one Mobile units using both cellular and wireless internet/intranets Freeform but adhering to industry standards Incorporating the General Public Incorporating the commercial sector (advertising and consumer products) Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 5
  • 6. Terrorism and Hunting Elephants 1. It is hard to miss hitting an elephant even with a poor weapon 2. It is hard to kill one with inadequate technology 3. When the son or grandson of some unfortunate hunter grows up, he will seek out the Big One with a vengeance, for a trophy-kill born out of revenge for his father’s demise 4. He will take the time to consider innovative technology and tactics America and Russia are classic examples of “Elephant” Targets for Rad and other Substance- Based Terrorism Extensive Surface, Open Borders despite border-control countermeasures Extensive Commerce that cannot be halted or curtailed Different types of open traffic to and within Extensive non-reducible non-military nuclear industry Well-established in-country operating front-line enemy bases Open, non-reducible communications infrastructure available for the enemy Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 6
  • 7. But where are the likely targets and means? In the public mind’s-eye and Angst And the less-likely form for many reasons Psycho-Shock is the Aim and Nuclear Radiation is Powerful even in non-lethal doses Mass-dispersion with uncertain contact and degree will create the most widespread fears Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 7
  • 8. Targets Consider only the two main targets OBJECTIVES similar/different MOTIVES different but complementary TARGETS different/similar Harm an ethnic enemy Disrupt economy Harm largest numbers Create dramatic shocks that diminish confidence in govt’s ability to protect Create fear in the largest numbers Create logistic/information network havoc Disrupt mass transportation Create electorate unrest, instability Destabilize government Destabilize government Focus on popular (transport) infrastructure Focus on economic infrastructure Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 8
  • 9. RDD in the context of conventional attacks Considering SEP Disruption and Destabilization as the “prime-directive” of terrorist organizations capable/active in planning RDD and chem-bio tactics • Most likely choice is with massive dispersion through conventional+inflammatory attack • Spread the most compounds in the most uncertain paths among the largest number of possible affected victims • Affect the maximum number of structures including transportation routes • Aim for closure and disruption of normal use/traffic - it does not have to be for years, just months or weeks • Multiple small disruptive attacks easier and more effective than one block-buster Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 9
  • 10. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I) Prevention by Detection of the Planning Operation Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events “Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind - Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches” Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful in an RDD Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 10
  • 11. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II) EVENT ! Class (x) objects received by servers results in generation of n graphs representing hypothetical x y… relational maps; the majority are discarded, but events of interest trigger feedback to both autonomous and human-based nodes for additional collection and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes is reliant and the whole may be considered as a dynamic-geometry cellular automata. EVENT ! Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 11
  • 12. MIMD, ETL, ADaM, MENE, Gaming Data collection and sensor communication based upon classic MIMD parallel processing ♦ Fault tolerance, fail-safe ♦ Load balancing ♦ Doesn’t communicate? Go to the next/nearest available Agent-enabled Extract-Transfer-Load processing from classic VLDB technology ♦ Up to 2K rows/sec, 80M rows/day ♦ Graph-theoretic architecture adapts well with semantic maps, topic maps, fuzzy logic ♦ Agents trigger DB queries in DW, others DBs, notifications to authorities, public MENE - Morphic Exploratory Navigational Environments ♦ For authorities and responders - high-res 3D Adobe Atmosphere VR worlds ♦ For the general public - reduced-scale/detail navigation via cell phones ♦ GPS-enabled or not Turning self-protection and communal security into a Game to get People Active ♦ Implicit, subtle educational-value mobile phone games with contests ♦ MIT collaborators - Comparative Media Studies (Klopfer, Jenkins et al) ♦ Get attention, participation, and free pertinent data with Positive Reinforcement Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 12
  • 13. ADaM is Fast 16000 14000 12000 T yp ica l F a stlo a d T yp ica l T p u m p T yp ica l M ixe d 10000 P e a k F a stlo a d R o w s /S e c P eak T pum p 8000 P e a k F stld & T p u m p T ra n sp a re n t F a stL T ra n sp a re n t T p u m p 6000 S p e cia l F a stL "K itch e n S in k" 4000 P eak E T L 2000 0 " L d p L p d d p nk tL st p e ET a a m um ix as Si um m lo tlo Fa pu pu st ak Tp lM Tp tF as l en lT Fa tT ca ia Pe ak en lF ca h ec & pi en ak ar itc pi Pe ca tld Ty ar Sp Pe pi sp "K Ty Fs sp Ty an ak an Tr Tr Pe Copyrights2004eTETRAD I3 Inc. T e t T yp 13
  • 14. And This is Why P_graph of ETLS (2) - - + 0 - 0 - - - + 0 0 Actor objects - 0 - (nodes) 0 ETLPs (with ETL Set (with actors) ETLPs) - - - - ETL Set (with + + ETLPs) 0 0 - 0 - - 0 - 0 0 P_graph of ETLP (5) - - - - + 0 + - 0 - - - 0 P_graph of Exec - 0 - - (1) - 0 + 0 + 0 0 - 0 - ADaM exec - 0 - (program) 0 0 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 14
  • 15. Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (I) Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 15
  • 16. Tidewater -- Newport-Norfolk (II) Port Name Tons (1,000's) [2002 stats] Norfolk Harbor 27,901,354 Newport News 11,300,962 7,400 of @ 400K importers account for more than 80% of imports to USA Prior to 9/11/2001, less than 2% of 6,000,000 containers inspected Dual Vulnerability, Dual Terrakt Strategies (1) Ship-in, use elsewhere (e.g., NYC, Washington) (2) Disrupt the Port Suez-class cranes, @ 70m length Forty 50-ton containers per hour - capacity Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 16
  • 17. Port of Baltimore > 30M tons per year, mainly containers 2M+ residents in Baltimore and surrounding urban center Main East-Coast rail and interstate highways traverse region Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 17
  • 18. Today’s consumer-class RAD components Our simple conversion with Nomad Eyes™ Existing mobile phone Li-ion A/D logic Nomadiks logic or other Rad-sensor element mProc Interface logic to wireless internet Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 18
  • 19. Deployment - Where and How • Static but ad-hoc – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration • Pseudo-random • Personal mobile units – Assigned to staff personnel – Personal cell phones • Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass” – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears • Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 19
  • 20. More on Compound Eyes Multiple TYPES of sensor data Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging: the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of known or deducible behaviors USING •Abductive rules •Bayesian probabilistic inference •Fuzzy inference •Heuristics and “common sense” rules For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference: Requests for building or water/sewer line plans Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people “Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials Unusual change in shipping order or pickup Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 20
  • 21. Our Technology Focus: Inverse, Nonlinear, Counter-Intuitive (sometimes) Source The Object causes diffusion and scattering of the Beam but the laws governing propagation and movement in different media are known or can be ascertained. Working backwards from the Result, one computes and estimates the Object on the bsais of how the Beam must have changed in order to produce the Result instead of a pattern, computable, for what there would have been if no Object had been present. Now, transfer this Inverse Model ought of imaging and into the world of semiotics and intensions. Now, one can do inverse thinking from something Sensed and Observed, in actuality, to determine what were some of the intervening steps and processes out of the usual and ordinary process that would have produced something different, most likely less complex. Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 21
  • 22. Making Sense of the Data (I) • Basic diffusion equation - usable as starting point for inverse problems ∂ 2u 1 ∂u Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT = u( x ,0) = f ( x ) u(0, t ) = u(a, t ) = 0 ∂x 2 k ∂t • Time-transition is accomplished in Fourier domain ∞  x 2 a  x f ( x ) = ∑ fn sin πn  fn = ∫ f ( x ) sin πn dx n =1  a a 0  a ∞  n u( x , t ) = ∑ fne −k ( πn a ) t 2 sin π  n =1  a • Transition backwards in time requires amplification of high frequency components - most likely to be noisy and skewed Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 22
  • 23. Making Sense of the Data (II) • Heuristic and a priori constraints needed to maintain physical realism and suppress distortions from inverse process • First-pass solution best match or interpolation among a set of acceptable Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT alternatives ˆ x = arg min Ax − y s.t. x∈X x • Final solution may minimize the residual error and the regularization term 2 2 ˆ x = arg min Ax − y 2 + λ L( x − x ) 2 x Regularization offers fidelity to the observed data and an a priori determined (e.g., higher-scale-observed) solution model Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 23
  • 24. Making Sense of the Data (III) • Diffusion _ Attraction • Modeling situations and schemas Particular credits - J. P. Thirion, INRIA as composite “images” in n-D • Iterative process with exploration of parallel tree paths – Speculative track; not required for Nomad Eyes sensor fusion to be useful to analysts – Purpose is to enable automation of the analysis and forecasting post-collection process – Area of active current research Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 24
  • 25. Making Sense of the Data (IV) - I3BAT • Multiple modalities Sensor 1 Sensor 2 – Acoustic, EM, Optical, Text, NLP, SQL, AI-reasoning… • All looking at the same topic of interest (aka “region”) • Each sensitive to different Property 3 physical/logical properties – “Trigger” data – Contiguity (space/time) Property 2 – Inference relations Property 1 – “Hits” with conventional DB queries (immigration, known Background associations, other investigations) • Compare with Terrorist Cadre Particular credits - Eric Miller, NEU Tactic models (schemas, maps) Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 25
  • 26. Public involvement, education, gaming Educational Games Children, adults Individual, team Citizen Corps concept Volunteer Activists Flexible E-Paper (FOLED) Commerciali$m Public kiosks, signs Contests, ads, prizes related to games Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 26
  • 27. First Responder Capability as well Notify Maximum Numbers of People ASAP after Terrakt Redirect Survivors Keep Other People Away Assist People Finding Loved Ones Provide Essential Life-Saving Information Real-Time Coordinate and Inform First-Responder Teams Locations of People Active Sensor Array including useful data from public Coordinate with volunteers Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 27
  • 28. Current Status Corporate-partnerships IRAD program I3BAT Phase 1 ADaM prototype completed OpenNet prototype completed Collaboratory prototype completed Developments with US federal, state homeland security programs Nomad Eyes Global “Peace Proliferation” Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 28
  • 29. Acknowledgements • J. P. Thirion (INRIA, France) • Roger Dufour (MIT, USA) • Eric Klopfer, Henry Jenkins (MIT, USA) • Eric Miller (NEU, USA) • Center for Surface and Subsurface Imaging and Sensing • ST Microelectronics, SA • Adobe Corporation Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 29
  • 30. A tetrahedron is the strongest and most stable natural geometrical structure 1+1+1+1 = More ----------------- Homeland The S4 Synergy Security Nomad Eyes I3 Integrative Personal Inverse Health Intelligence BioScan Healthcare Clinical Disease Mgt Therapy HealthNVest I3DIT In business and finance as well as in math and science Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 30
  • 31. Contacts • Martin J. Dudziak, PhD (Technology) – (954) 545-4500 – +7-926-530-1211 or +7-095-172-6369 Moscow (GMT +3) – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com) • Brent A. Kish (Contracts) – (954) 545-4500 – (954) 614-4172 – brent@forteplan.com • Tamara F. Koval, MD (Project Mgr; Int’l Relations) – (804) 647-0374 – tamara@forteplan.com TETRAD I3 Inc., 1206 NW 45 St., Pompano Beach FL 33064 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 31