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Chapter 31 Network Security Copyright © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Permission required for reproduction or display.
31-1  SECURITY SERVICES Network security can provide five services. Four of these services are related to the message exchanged using the network. The fifth service provides entity authentication or identification. Message Confidentiality Message Integrity Message Authentication Message Nonrepudiation Entity Authentication Topics discussed in this section:
Figure 31.1  Security services related to the message or entity
31-2  MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY The concept of how to achieve message confidentiality or privacy has not changed for thousands of years. The message must be encrypted at the sender site and decrypted at the receiver site. This can be done using either symmetric-key cryptography or asymmetric-key cryptography.  Confidentiality with Symmetric-Key Cryptography Confidentiality with Asymmetric-Key Cryptography Topics discussed in this section:
Figure 31.2  Message confidentiality using symmetric keys in two directions
Figure 31.3  Message confidentiality using asymmetric keys
31-3  MESSAGE INTEGRITY Encryption and decryption provide secrecy, or confidentiality, but not integrity. However, on occasion we may not even need secrecy, but instead must have integrity.  Document and Fingerprint Message and Message Digest Creating and Checking the Digest Hash Function Criteria Hash Algorithms: SHA-1 Topics discussed in this section:
To preserve the integrity of a document, both the document and the fingerprint are needed. Note
Figure 31.4  Message and message digest
The message digest needs to be kept secret. Note
Figure 31.5  Checking integrity
Figure 31.6  Criteria of a hash function
Can we use a conventional lossless compression method as a hashing function? Solution We cannot. A lossless compression method creates a compressed message that is reversible. You can uncompress the compressed message to get the original one. Example 31.1
Can we use a checksum method as a hashing function? Solution We can. A checksum function is not reversible; it meets the first criterion. However, it does not meet the other criteria. Example 31.2
Figure 31.7  Message digest creation
SHA-1 hash algorithms create an N-bit message digest out of a message of  512-bit blocks. SHA-1 has a message digest of 160 bits (5 words of 32 bits). Note
Figure 31.8  Processing of one block in SHA-1
31-4  MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION A hash function per se cannot provide authentication. The digest created by a hash function can detect any modification in the message, but not authentication.  MAC Topics discussed in this section:
Figure 31.9  MAC, created by Alice and checked by Bob
Figure 31.10  HMAC
31-5  DIGITAL SIGNATURE When Alice sends a message to Bob, Bob needs to check the authenticity of the sender; he needs to be sure that the message comes from Alice and not Eve. Bob can ask Alice to sign the message electronically. In other words, an electronic signature can prove the authenticity of Alice as the sender of the message. We refer to this type of signature as a digital signature. Comparison Need for Keys Process Topics discussed in this section:
A digital signature needs a public-key system. Note
Figure 31.11  Signing the message itself in digital signature
In a cryptosystem, we use the private and public keys of the receiver; in digital signature, we use the private and public keys of the sender. Note
Figure 31.12  Signing the digest in a digital signature
A digital signature today provides message integrity. Note
Digital signature provides message authentication. Note
Figure 31.13  Using a trusted center for nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation can be provided using a trusted party. Note
31-6  ENTITY AUTHENTICATION Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one party prove the identity of another party. An entity can be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity whose identity needs to be proved is called the claimant; the party that tries to prove the identity of the claimant is called the verifier.  Passwords Challenge-Response Topics discussed in this section:
In challenge-response authentication, the claimant proves that she knows a secret without revealing it. Note
The challenge is a time-varying value sent by the verifier; the response is the result of a function applied on the challenge. Note
Figure 31.14  Challenge/response authentication using a nonce
Figure 31.15  Challenge-response authentication using a timestamp
Figure 31.16  Challenge-response authentication using a keyed-hash function
Figure 31.17  Authentication, asymmetric-key
Figure 31.18  Authentication, using digital signature
31-7  KEY MANAGEMENT We never discussed how secret keys in symmetric-key cryptography and how public keys in asymmetric-key cryptography are distributed and maintained. In this section, we touch on these two issues. We first discuss the distribution of symmetric keys; we then discuss the distribution of asymmetric keys. Symmetric-Key Distribution Public-Key Distribution Topics discussed in this section:
Figure 31.19  KDC
A session symmetric key between two parties is used only once. Note
Figure 31.30  Creating a session key between Alice and Bob using KDC
Figure 31.21  Kerberos servers
Figure 31.22  Kerberos example
In public-key cryptography, everyone has access to everyone’s public key; public keys are available to the public. Note
Figure 31.23  Announcing a public key
Figure 31.24  Trusted center
Figure 31.25  Controlled trusted center
Figure 31.26  Certification authority
Figure 31.27  PKI hierarchy

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Chapter 31

  • 1. Chapter 31 Network Security Copyright © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Permission required for reproduction or display.
  • 2. 31-1 SECURITY SERVICES Network security can provide five services. Four of these services are related to the message exchanged using the network. The fifth service provides entity authentication or identification. Message Confidentiality Message Integrity Message Authentication Message Nonrepudiation Entity Authentication Topics discussed in this section:
  • 3. Figure 31.1 Security services related to the message or entity
  • 4. 31-2 MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY The concept of how to achieve message confidentiality or privacy has not changed for thousands of years. The message must be encrypted at the sender site and decrypted at the receiver site. This can be done using either symmetric-key cryptography or asymmetric-key cryptography. Confidentiality with Symmetric-Key Cryptography Confidentiality with Asymmetric-Key Cryptography Topics discussed in this section:
  • 5. Figure 31.2 Message confidentiality using symmetric keys in two directions
  • 6. Figure 31.3 Message confidentiality using asymmetric keys
  • 7. 31-3 MESSAGE INTEGRITY Encryption and decryption provide secrecy, or confidentiality, but not integrity. However, on occasion we may not even need secrecy, but instead must have integrity. Document and Fingerprint Message and Message Digest Creating and Checking the Digest Hash Function Criteria Hash Algorithms: SHA-1 Topics discussed in this section:
  • 8. To preserve the integrity of a document, both the document and the fingerprint are needed. Note
  • 9. Figure 31.4 Message and message digest
  • 10. The message digest needs to be kept secret. Note
  • 11. Figure 31.5 Checking integrity
  • 12. Figure 31.6 Criteria of a hash function
  • 13. Can we use a conventional lossless compression method as a hashing function? Solution We cannot. A lossless compression method creates a compressed message that is reversible. You can uncompress the compressed message to get the original one. Example 31.1
  • 14. Can we use a checksum method as a hashing function? Solution We can. A checksum function is not reversible; it meets the first criterion. However, it does not meet the other criteria. Example 31.2
  • 15. Figure 31.7 Message digest creation
  • 16. SHA-1 hash algorithms create an N-bit message digest out of a message of 512-bit blocks. SHA-1 has a message digest of 160 bits (5 words of 32 bits). Note
  • 17. Figure 31.8 Processing of one block in SHA-1
  • 18. 31-4 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION A hash function per se cannot provide authentication. The digest created by a hash function can detect any modification in the message, but not authentication. MAC Topics discussed in this section:
  • 19. Figure 31.9 MAC, created by Alice and checked by Bob
  • 20. Figure 31.10 HMAC
  • 21. 31-5 DIGITAL SIGNATURE When Alice sends a message to Bob, Bob needs to check the authenticity of the sender; he needs to be sure that the message comes from Alice and not Eve. Bob can ask Alice to sign the message electronically. In other words, an electronic signature can prove the authenticity of Alice as the sender of the message. We refer to this type of signature as a digital signature. Comparison Need for Keys Process Topics discussed in this section:
  • 22. A digital signature needs a public-key system. Note
  • 23. Figure 31.11 Signing the message itself in digital signature
  • 24. In a cryptosystem, we use the private and public keys of the receiver; in digital signature, we use the private and public keys of the sender. Note
  • 25. Figure 31.12 Signing the digest in a digital signature
  • 26. A digital signature today provides message integrity. Note
  • 27. Digital signature provides message authentication. Note
  • 28. Figure 31.13 Using a trusted center for nonrepudiation
  • 29. Nonrepudiation can be provided using a trusted party. Note
  • 30. 31-6 ENTITY AUTHENTICATION Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one party prove the identity of another party. An entity can be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity whose identity needs to be proved is called the claimant; the party that tries to prove the identity of the claimant is called the verifier. Passwords Challenge-Response Topics discussed in this section:
  • 31. In challenge-response authentication, the claimant proves that she knows a secret without revealing it. Note
  • 32. The challenge is a time-varying value sent by the verifier; the response is the result of a function applied on the challenge. Note
  • 33. Figure 31.14 Challenge/response authentication using a nonce
  • 34. Figure 31.15 Challenge-response authentication using a timestamp
  • 35. Figure 31.16 Challenge-response authentication using a keyed-hash function
  • 36. Figure 31.17 Authentication, asymmetric-key
  • 37. Figure 31.18 Authentication, using digital signature
  • 38. 31-7 KEY MANAGEMENT We never discussed how secret keys in symmetric-key cryptography and how public keys in asymmetric-key cryptography are distributed and maintained. In this section, we touch on these two issues. We first discuss the distribution of symmetric keys; we then discuss the distribution of asymmetric keys. Symmetric-Key Distribution Public-Key Distribution Topics discussed in this section:
  • 40. A session symmetric key between two parties is used only once. Note
  • 41. Figure 31.30 Creating a session key between Alice and Bob using KDC
  • 42. Figure 31.21 Kerberos servers
  • 43. Figure 31.22 Kerberos example
  • 44. In public-key cryptography, everyone has access to everyone’s public key; public keys are available to the public. Note
  • 45. Figure 31.23 Announcing a public key
  • 46. Figure 31.24 Trusted center
  • 47. Figure 31.25 Controlled trusted center
  • 48. Figure 31.26 Certification authority
  • 49. Figure 31.27 PKI hierarchy