1. How did Britain, who initially supported the Arab
desire for national state in the Middle East, become the
only public proponent of the Zionist cause?
Rebecca Kaplan
February 21, 2006
Thomas

2. How did Britain, who initially supported the Arab desire for national state in the
Middle East, become the only public proponent of the Zionist cause?
Section A: Plan of the Investigation
When the Ottoman Empire began its final stages of collapse during WWI, France
and Britain took swift action to gain power in the Middle East by signing the Sykes-Picot
Agreement to carve up territory and spheres of influence in the region. Britain’s new
sphere of influence in the region turned their attention to the question of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine as the Zionist movement was concurrently gaining strength. Their
support for such a homeland would ultimately be manifested in the Balfour Declaration.
The British, however, seeking to gain Arab neutrality, or even favor during WWI, first
got involved in the Middle East through discussions with Emir Hussein of Mecca about
the creation of an independent Arab Asia.1 How, then, did the Britain become the only
public proponent of the Zionist cause?
This investigation will show how Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann’s influence in
the British government2 and the sympathies of many top bureaucrats such as Foreign
Secretary Lord Balfour pushed the British government to assert suzerainty in Palestine.
The works A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin and Jehuda Reinharzs’ Chaim
Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman, will be analyzed, in addition to other modern
scholarship on British policy in the middle east. Other more primary sources will be used
1
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. (New York: Henry Holt, 1989). 173-4.
2
Segev, Tom. One Palestine, Complete. (New York: Henry Holt, 1999). 44.
Weizmann developed a method to get acetone from maize, which was needed for artillery shells.
This discovery brought him recognition within the government and made leaders such as Lloyd
George and Balfour aware of his name.
2

3. such as Weizmann’s autobiography and the original texts of the Sykes-Picot Agreement
and the Balfour Declaration.
Section B: Summary of Evidence
The Sykes-Picot Agreement
The question of an independent Arab state in the Middle East arose in the British
government before that of a Jewish homeland. In fact, Sir Mark Sykes, assistant secretary
for the war cabinet who handled Middle East Policy, was very pro-Arab.3 Having been
told that an Arab revolt hinged upon a British invasion of Syria and Palestine, Sykes
began talks with French representative Francois Georges Picot about a possible invasion
or an agreement dividing up the Middle East.4
In February of 1916, the British and French governments concluded a secret
agreement known as the Sykes Picot Agreement5 to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and
create British and French protectorates and/or spheres of influence in the Middle East.
Various parts of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine were carved up into
3
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 181.
In the Autumn of 1915 an Ottoman deserter by the name of Sharif al Faruqi turned himself over to
the British with the claim that he was a representative of secret Arab society al-‘Ahd seeking
British support for an independent Arab state in return for the promise that he could bring about an
Arab rebellion on behalf of the British. 3 He manipulated the British government into drawing up a
map with proposed borders for an independent Arab state. British Agent Sir Gilbert Clayton was
able to convince Sir Mark Sykes that the creation of an independent Arab state was worth
pursuing. Thus, upon returning to Britain, Sykes proposed and led the creation of an Arab Bureau
in December of 1915.
4
Ibid., 187-189.
5
The agreement is often called the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov agreement as it was signed with the consent of
Russia.
3

4. Russian, French and British spheres of influence.6 Vague promises of a British and
French controlled Arab state were made, and the area of Palestine would be ruled by a
vaguely defined international organization.7
The Question of a Jewish Homeland
While Sykes was in Russia presenting the proposal to Sazanov, his hosts
persuaded him that the Russian Zionist Jews were quite powerful, and he decided to win
their favor. In April 1916 he met Dr. Moses Gaster8 to learn about Zionism to ultimately
form some sort of British-French cooperation as patrons of Arabs and Jews.9 Sykes
would also become acquainted with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann. Weizmann’s
permanent goal was to put Palestine under a British protectorate, which would allow the
Jews to establish a homeland.10
6
The Avalon Project: The Sykes-Picot Agreement. Comp. William C. Fray. 1996. The Yale Law School.
10 Dec. 20, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm
Per the agreement, Russia would receive the Armenian provinces of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and
Bitlis, in addition to some southeast Kurdish territory. France would gain control of Lebanon and
exert authority over Aintab, Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakır, and Mosul, parts of Syria that bordered on
the new Russian territory. Britian would receive Baghdad and the Mediterranean ports of Haifa
and Acre, in modern-day Israel. The British and French would allow for a confederation of Arab
states or a single independent Arab state over which they would have spheres of influence. The
port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) would be made free.
7
The Avalon Project: The Sykes-Picot Agreement. Comp. William C. Fray. 1996. The Yale Law School. 2
Dec 2006.
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm>.
8
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 197.
Dr. Gaster was the Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic Jewish Community and Influential Zionist.
9
Ibid.
10
Sanders, Ronald. The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the
British Mandate for Palestine. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983). 439 & 512.
Weizmann’s goal never changed during the entire process. In a meeting with Lloyd George, he
defended his rejection of the possibility of an international control over Palestine as it would cause
4

5. Sykes wanted a Jewish-Arab-Armenian alliance with the Anglo-French Entente11,
but when Weizmann was elected President of the British Zionist Federation (BZF) in
February 1917, he was able to formally request that the British government show its
support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.12 In the February 7, 1917 meeting between
Zionist leaders13 and Sykes, the Zionists opposed a condominium arrangement or any
international control over Palestine, but rather proposed British suzerainty over the area.14
Knowing this would require French cooperation, Weizmann arranged for Rothschild to
suggest that Sokolow speak with Picot, effectively ending Gaster’s career as a Zionist
diplomat.15 On June 4, 1917 he secured a letter from Jules Cambon, Director-General of
the French Foreign Ministry, demonstrating a friendly attitude of the French towards the
creation of a Jewish homeland.16
On April 24th, prior to the Cambon Letter, Weizmann met with Lord Robert Cecil,
acting Foreign Secretary while Lord Balfour was away. He admitted that if Weizmann
were able to provide more evidence of worldwide Jewish support for Zionism, the
confusion. At first he seemed to accept the possibility of joint Anglo-American control, but
ultimately rejected that idea. He truly wanted a British protectorate.
11
Rehovot, Israel. Weizman Archives (Sledmere Papers. August 14, 1917)
12
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 291.
13
Reinharz, Jehuda, Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press,
Inc, 1993). 116.
Attending the conference at Rabbi Moses Gaster’s house were Moses Gaster, Lord Walter
Rothschild and his kinsman James de Rothschild, Nahum Sokolow, Herbert Samuel, Joseph
Cowen, Herbert Bentwich, Harry Sacher and Chaim Weizmann. Sykes was also present, but in a
private capacity.
14
Ibid.
At this point the Sykes-Picot Agreement was still a secret, and Sykes did not divulge any
information about it in the meeting.
15
Ibid., 117
16
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 292-3.
Sokolow was able to convince the French to lend their support by not directly addressing who
would be the protectorate of Zion.
5

6. Foreign Office would be much more likely to promise suzerainty.17 Weizmann was able
to raise American support with the help of US Justice Louis Brandeis.18 A possibility of
German support for Zionism19 helped to change the attitude in Weizmann’s June 11th
meeting with Sir Ronald Graham in the Foreign Office. In light of Weizmann’s promise
of growing support as well as the Cambon Letter, Balfour was then advised to issue a
public statement demonstrating a British commitment to the creation of a Jewish
Homeland. Balfour invited Weizmann and Rothschild to be a part of the negotiations20
which resulted in the November 2nd Balfour Declaration of British support for a Jewish
homeland.21
Section C: Evaluation of Sources:
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Henry Holt, 1989)
17
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 137.
18
Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. (New York:Harper
Brothers, 1949). 193-4.
Brandeis’ influence in the US was very strong, which helped to speed up the American reaction of
support in favor of a British-administered Palestine.
19
Sanders, The High Walls of Jerusalem, 539-541.
On May 2, 1917, a Berlin newspaper Der Reichsbote, printed an article by Gustav von Dobeler,
right-wing publicit, entitled “A Jewish Republic in Palestine.” He contended that a German-
controlled Jewish Palestine would be helpful to the Central Powers.
20
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 150.
21
The Avalon Project: The Balfour Declaration. Comp. William C. Fray. 1996. The Yale Law School. 2
Dec 2006.
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm>.
The actual declaration, in a letter to Lord Rothschild, stated:
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
6

7. David Fromkin is a professor of International Relations at Boston University and
has written seven books, including A Peace to End All Peace, which was shortlisted for
the Pulitzer Prize. His other works have been published in scholarly publications such as
Foreign Affairs.22
The book aims to demonstrate collaborative efforts of all of the great powers in
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The work of Chaim Weizmann is not a major focus
of his section on British policy, but seems to attribute much of Britain’s focus on
Palestine to Sykes and Sokolow.
The book is useful for a broad overview of European involvement in the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire and some detail in matters of negotiations, such as the ones that
occurred in 1916 and 1917 in Britain, but much of Weizmann’s more nuanced
statesmanship and influence in the British government that is vital to understanding his
role in British policy is lost.23 Many details that are key to an in depth understanding of
an event are sacrificed for broad content. Fromkin utilizes extensive primary sources and
books published in the last 40 years for a blend of original fact and historical hindsight.
The endnotes are used entirely for citations, but there are occasional footnotes throughout
the book with explanatory notes.
22
“Fromkin, David.” Boston University Faculty. <http://bu.edu/faculty/history/fromkind.htm>
23
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 288.
Fromkin gives credit to Sokolow for his skill in negotiations with the French about British interest
in Palestine and to Sykes for having the necessary contacts to allow Sokolow an audience, but
does not recognize that it was Weizmann’s influence with Rothschild that earned Sokolow his
position as a negotiator in the first place. Many of Weizmann’s friendships and influences cannot
be explored in such a broad work.
7

8. Reinharz, Jehuda, Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman (New York:
Oxford University Press, Inc, 1993)
Jehuda Reinharz is the current president of Brandeis University. He established
the program in Judaic studies at the University of Michigan, and has served numerous
important positions in Judaic Studies at Brandeis as well as other positions worldwide.
He has published over 90 articles and 20 books.
The biography aims to show Weizmann’s climb to the top of Zionist leadership
and his transition from a leader to a statesman among his peers. Reinharz also attempts to
show that, “…if the British did not yet have a clear policy for the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire, Weizmann had one from the very start of the war,”24 and his
commitment to that goal pushed the British government to assert support for a Jewish
state.
The value in a biography is the depth with which it can explore one man’s life and
influence on the people around him. The book benefits from extensive use of primary
sources such as letters and government memorandums25. The bibliography reveals vast
amounts of recent scholarship as well as an impressive list of primary sources.
Additionally, Reinharz critiques other historians’ analyses about Weizmann, presenting
several viewpoints. As a biography, however, there is a one-sided focus on Weizmann
and his role in the British government can become exaggerated because he is the focus of
24
Ibid., 209.
25
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 123
Even personal sources are included in the work. An entry from the diary of Weizmann’s wife,
Vera, reflects the skepticism she and her husband felt towards Sokolow as a negotiator, and helps
the reader to understand Weizmann’s attitude towards him.
8

9. the work. Additionally, there are so many smaller and often personal details that it can be
difficult to filter the relevant and factual information.26
Section D: Analysis
Almost immediately after the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, British
government opinion shifted from being predominantly pro-Arab to considerably Zionist.
Fromkin’s assessment of the path from the Sykes-Picot Agreement to the Balfour
Declaration portrays Weizmann in a much less influential manner than he is seen in
Reinharz’s work. In A Peace to End All Peace, Weizmann seems to only get involved
Middle East policy when called upon by the government, such as in the writing of the
Balfour Declaration27, rather than being a main force behind Middle East policy.
Fromkin’s assessment of Weizmann’s minimal role in Britain’s decision to assert
suzerainty of Palestine can stand logically on its own. Fromkin does accurately give
credit to the number of Zionist supporters within the government for shaping a pro-
Zionist policy. Indeed, the Zionists gained much strength from the new government with
Foreign Secretary Balfour and Prime Minister David Lloyd George,28 who was for a time
the only supporter of a British-administered Jewish homeland.29 Fromkin seemingly
attributes much of the Zionists success to Sykes and Sokolow; he points to Sokolow’s
skill and diplomacy as a negotiator and Sykes’ ability to put Sokolow in touch with the
necessary leaders as the factor that shifted French opinion in favor of British
26
Details such as the aforementioned diary entry, which only show opinions, can distract form and even
distort the truth with mere bias.
27
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 293.
28
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 108.
29
Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 267.
9

10. administration.30 While Sokolow’s negotiations with the French were critical to Britain’s
ability to commit to Zionist statehood, the importance of Weizmann’s leadership among
the Zionists is overlooked. It was Weizmann who suggested that Rothschild – a very
powerful and influential man – recommend that Sokolow be sent as the negotiator.31
Without that recommendation, it is likely that Dr. Gaster, who preferred an international
administration of Palestine,32 would have been sent. It is imperative to remember that
Weizmann desired a British-administered Palestine from the start, and Sokolow’s was a
willing proponent of Weizmann’s ideas. That February 1917 meeting is just one of many
meetings that demonstrated Weizmann’s influence with not only the Zionists, but also the
British government, and Fromkin’s work is simply too broad of a work to go into the
details of those meetings.
When compared to Reinharz’s biography of Weizmann, Fromkin’s argument
loses strength because of new facts that come to light in a more in-depth analysis of
Weizmann’s role in shaping Palestinian policy. Weizmann is credited with creating
among British leaders, “…an identity between the Zionist movement and “world
Jewry.”33 The sheer number of meetings that Weizmann attended, particularly with top
British officials such as Lloyd George and Balfour, show his influence in the government
and dedication to a Jewish state administered by Britain. He not only had to gain favor
with the Zionists, who had no united opinion, but also had to gain the trust of Mark Sykes
and others in the Foreign Office. Weizmann’s name carried weight abroad, as it did in his
30
Ibid., 292.
31
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 117.
32
Ibid., 111.
33
Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 42.
10

11. letter to Louis Brandies concerning American Jewish support for a British-administered
Palestine.34 It was only after that time that Lord Balfour was comfortable with a public
declaration.35 These facts, which required more depth to find but are very significant,
only came to light in Reinharz’s biography. He discredits the conclusions of scholars
such as Mayir Vereté, who, like Fromkin, give credit to Sokolow’s diplomatic skills
rather than Weizmann’s36 because, “...the factors leading to the Balfour Declaration are
so complex and intertwined that a decisive, one-sided evaluation at either end of the
spectrum is clearly inaccurate.”37 Yet he states that Weizmann was the one person to
have a definite plan for Palestine, and his leadership within the Zionists and influence
with British officials allowed him to turn that goal into British policy.
Section E: Conclusion
Ultimately, it was a combination of two elements that shifted British policy from
pro-Arab to singularly pro-Zionist: Weizmann’s dedication to achieving a British-
administered Palestine and his influence with both Zionists and the British government
that enabled him to carry out that goal, and the change in the British government to
include more pro-Zionist leaders such as Lloyd George and Balfour. While Fromkin’s
work provides an accurate broad overview of the situation, it is Reinharz’s biography that
has the necessary depth to show how Weizmann’s goals steered both Zionist and British
government opinion. Thus, Fromkin’s work would be more valuable in a fairly detailed
34
Weizmann, Trial and Error, 193-194.
35
Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, 150.
36
Ibid., 207.
37
Ibid., 208.
11

12. study of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, while the value of Reinharz’s biography
is more useful for an in-depth study of the effects of one man on British Middle East
policy. Ultimately, Reinharz’s work is more valuable in understanding the British’s
transition to a pro-Zionist commitment in Palestine.
12

13. Works Cited
Primary Sources
1. The Avalon Project: The Balfour Declaration. Comp. William C. Fray. 1996. The
Yale Law School. 2 Dec 2006.
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm>
2. The Avalon Project: The Sykes-Picot Agreement. Comp. William C. Fray. 1996.
The Yale Law School. 2 Dec 2006.
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm>
3. Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann.
(New York:Harper Brothers, 1949)
4. Rehovot, Israel. Weizman Archives (Sledmere Papers. August 14, 1917)
Secondary Sources
1. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. (New York: Henry Holt, 1989)
2. Reinharz, Jehuda, Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman (New York:
Oxford University Press, Inc, 1993)
3. Sanders, Ronald. The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour
Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1983)
4. Segev, Tom. One Palestine, Complete. (New York: Henry Holt, 1999)
Word Count: 1,960
13