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T H E N E T I S D A R K A N D
F U L L O F T E R R O R S
J A M E S B E N N E T T · D J A N G O C O N E U R O P E · 3 R D J U N E 2 0 1 5
W H O I A M
Working with Django 9 years, 5 at Lawrence Journal-
World
Commit bit since 2007
Involved in Django’s release and security process ~8
years
W H AT T H I S I S
History of Django and security
How Django tries to protect you
Some ways we’ve screwed up and what you can learn
from that
S E C U R I T Y I S H A R D
I N T H E B E G I N N I N G …
D J A N G O ’ S
F I R S T
V U L N E R A B I L I T Y
1 6 T H A U G U S T 2 0 0 6
C V E - 2 0 0 7 - 0 4 0 4
N I N E Y E A R S A N D 4 8 M O R E
S E C U R I T Y I S S U E S L AT E R …
D J A N G O ’ S
L AT E S T
V U L N E R A B I L I T Y
2 0 T H M A Y 2 0 1 5
C V E - 2 0 1 5 - 3 9 8 2
Security issues are archived in the documentation:
https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/
releases/security/
2 0 0 7 · P R E - 1 . 0
I N F O R M A L S E C U R I T Y P R O C E S S
2 0 0 8 · D J A N G O 1 . 0
T E M P L AT E A U T O E S C A P I N G
2 0 1 0 · D J A N G O 1 . 2
M O D E R N C S R F P R O T E C T I O N
2 0 1 2 · D J A N G O 1 . 4
H A S H I N G , C RY P T O , S I G N E D
C O O K I E S , C L I C K J A C K I N G ,
S E N S I T I V E E R R O R S , F O R M A L
S E C U R I T Y P R O C E S S
2 0 1 3 · D J A N G O 1 . 5 · D J A N G O 1 . 6
H O S T H E A D E R H A R D E N I N G ,
I N C R E A S E D H A S H I T E R AT I O N S ,
H A S H T R U N C AT I O N
2 0 1 4 · D J A N G O 1 . 7
S Y S T E M C H E C K F R A M E W O R K
2 0 1 5 · D J A N G O 1 . 8
S E C U R I T Y M I D D L E WA R E ,
D E P L O Y M E N T C H E C K
D J A N G O ’ S S E C U R I T Y
P R O C E S S
TL;DR: email security@djangoproject.com if you
think you’ve found a security issue in Django.
Full security policy always accessible at
https://www.djangoproject.com/security/
S E C U R I T Y I S S U E V E R I F I C AT I O N
Try out a proof-of-concept, if provided
Coordinate with reporter for more info if needed
Once verified, begin tracking issue (privately)
S E C U R I T Y PAT C H I N G P R O C E S S
Patches submitted in private tracker (only core team has
access)
Reviewed and, if needed, ported to multiple versions of
Django
S E C U R I T Y N O T I F I C AT I O N P R O C E S S
Request a CVE identifier for the issue
One week prior to release, send to our security
notification list
Pre-notification can be abbreviated for issues already
public/exploited
S E C U R I T Y R E L E A S E P R O C E S S
Patches merged from private security branches to public
GitHub repository
Releases issued with blog post containing details of
issue(s) and CVE identifier(s)
Spam ALL the social media sites!
The goals of our process are to ensure responsible
reporting and disclosure of security issues.
D J A N G O V S . T H E O WA S P
T O P T E N
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
Injection attacks ✅
Authentication and session management ✅
Cross-site scripting (XSS) ✅
Direct object references ✅
Misconfiguration ✅
Sensitive data exposure ✅
Function level access control ✅
Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) ✅
Components with known vulnerabilities ✅
Unvalidated redirects and forwards ✅
A B O V E A N D B E Y O N D
Django tries very hard to be secure-by-default, and
to offer the tools you need to harden your
applications beyond the common cases.
However…
W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
W H Y D O W E FA I L ?
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 7
“Parsing the Accept-Language header is
expensive to do every time, let’s do it once per
unique value and cache the results!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0
“Let’s use a one-time base36 token to do password
resets!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3
“Formsets need to dynamically grow the number
of forms they use!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3
“Restrictions on password length are dumb! Long
passwords are better!”
CVE-2007-5712
Denial-of-service via arbitrarily-large
Accept-Language header
CVE-2010-4535
Denial-of-service in password-reset mechanism
CVE-2013-0306
Denial-of-service via formset max_num bypass
CVE-2013-1443
Denial-of-service via large passwords
CVE-2007-5712
Denial-of-service via arbitrarily-large
Accept-Language header
CVE-2010-4535
Denial-of-service in password-reset mechanism
CVE-2013-0306
Denial-of-service via formset max_num bypass
CVE-2013-1443
Denial-of-service via large passwords
P Y T H O N I S
G R E AT
No buffer overflows
But you can still DoS yourself
if you’re not careful
We learned this the hard way
so you shouldn’t have to
S T O P D O S ’ I N G Y O U R S E L F
Sanity-check your inputs for length before you start
processing them
Yes, even passwords (when appropriate)!
Configure your web server to cap the length of HTTP
headers and request bodies
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6
“URLField should really check whether the URL
exists before accepting the value!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6
“URLField should accept anything that matches
the format of a valid URL!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6
“EmailField should accept anything that matches
the format of a valid email address!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 2
“Checking for corrupt image files is easy, we can
just use PIL’s routines for that!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 2
“Most image formats store metadata in a header,
let’s find it by only reading a few bytes at a time!”
CVE-2011-4137
Denial-of-service via URLField.verify_exists
CVE-2009-3965
Denial-of-service via pathological regular-expression
performance
CVE-2012-3443
Denial-of-service via compressed image files
CVE-2012-3444
Denial-of-service via large image files
CVE-2011-4137
Denial-of-service via URLField.verify_exists
CVE-2009-3965
Denial-of-service via pathological regular-expression
performance
CVE-2012-3443
Denial-of-service via compressed image files
CVE-2012-3444
Denial-of-service via large image files
T H E B I G O
Expresses upper bound on
your algorithm
Also, apparently, an anime
But more important is the
“upper bound” bit
– A C T U A L LY A V E RY U S E F U L Q U E S T I O N
“What’s the worst that could happen?”
N O R E A L LY, S T O P D O S ’ I N G Y O U R S E L F !
Figure out how much work your code should do
Then figure out whether you can make it do more
Then figure out ways to ensure it does less
Some issues (compressed formats, incremental reads,
pathological regex, etc.) have been around forever —
read up on them!
(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:(?:(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:
".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:
[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|
(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:r
n)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^
[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*|(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?
=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)*<(?:(?:rn)?
[ t])*(?:@(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^
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(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*(?:,@(?:(?:
rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|
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(?:rn)?[ t])*)?(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:
[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|
(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:r
n)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^
[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*>(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)|(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?
[ t])*)*:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:(?:(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[
["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?
[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^
"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-
031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)
(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*|(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[
t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)*<(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:@(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-
031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?
[ t])*))*(?:,@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[
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n)?[ t])*))*)*:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)?(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[
["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?
[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^
"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-
031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)
(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*>(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:,s*(?:(?:[^()<>@,;:".
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[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[
t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|
[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:
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(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.
(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*(?:,@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-
031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)
(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".
[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*)*:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)?(?:[^()<>@,;:".[]
000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?
[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[
t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:
(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|
[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:
(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*>(?:(?:
rn)?[ t])*))*)?;s*)
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0
“Values of cookies we’ve set can be trusted!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0
“Admin users can be trusted with a bit of the
lookup API!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 1
“We can trust the browser same-origin sandbox!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3
“We can trust admin users with the history log!”
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3
“Once we’ve validated a value and stored it, we
can trust it!”
CVE-2010-3082
XSS via trusting unsafe cookie value
CVE-2010-4534
Information leakage in administrative interface
CVE-2011-0696
CSRF via forged HTTP headers
CVE-2013-0305
Information leakage via admin history log
NO CVE, DISCLOSED 2013-08-13
XSS via admin trusting URLField values
– T H E D J A N G O T E A M , O V E R A N D O V E R A G A I N …
“We can trust the HTTP Host header now!”
CVE-2011-4139
Host header cache poisoning
CVE-2011-4140
Potential CSRF via Host header
CVE-2012-4520
Host header poisoning
ADVISORY, 2012-12-10
Additional hardening of Host header handling
ADVISORY, 2013-02-19
Additional hardening of Host header handling
“I did warn you not to trust me.”
T H E R E I S N O S U C H
T H I N G A S “ S E C U R E ”
W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
❓
Q U O T E S / I M A G E S
http://www.marriedtothesea.com/index.php?date=012710
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Selfmade_Big_O.png
http://www.ex-parrot.com/pdw/Mail-RFC822-Address.html
http://highlighthollywood.com/2015/02/game-of-thrones-actor-aidan-
gillen-lord-petyr-baelish-talks-season-5-sansa-and-little-finger-
highlight-hollywood-news/
http://x-files.wikia.com/wiki/File:Trust_No_One_tagline.jpg
http://www.slideshare.net/ChristofHammel/process-iceberg-21703547

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The net is dark and full of terrors - James Bennett

  • 1. T H E N E T I S D A R K A N D F U L L O F T E R R O R S J A M E S B E N N E T T · D J A N G O C O N E U R O P E · 3 R D J U N E 2 0 1 5
  • 2. W H O I A M Working with Django 9 years, 5 at Lawrence Journal- World Commit bit since 2007 Involved in Django’s release and security process ~8 years
  • 3. W H AT T H I S I S History of Django and security How Django tries to protect you Some ways we’ve screwed up and what you can learn from that
  • 4. S E C U R I T Y I S H A R D
  • 5. I N T H E B E G I N N I N G …
  • 6. D J A N G O ’ S F I R S T V U L N E R A B I L I T Y 1 6 T H A U G U S T 2 0 0 6 C V E - 2 0 0 7 - 0 4 0 4
  • 7. N I N E Y E A R S A N D 4 8 M O R E S E C U R I T Y I S S U E S L AT E R …
  • 8. D J A N G O ’ S L AT E S T V U L N E R A B I L I T Y 2 0 T H M A Y 2 0 1 5 C V E - 2 0 1 5 - 3 9 8 2
  • 9. Security issues are archived in the documentation: https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/ releases/security/
  • 10. 2 0 0 7 · P R E - 1 . 0 I N F O R M A L S E C U R I T Y P R O C E S S 2 0 0 8 · D J A N G O 1 . 0 T E M P L AT E A U T O E S C A P I N G 2 0 1 0 · D J A N G O 1 . 2 M O D E R N C S R F P R O T E C T I O N 2 0 1 2 · D J A N G O 1 . 4 H A S H I N G , C RY P T O , S I G N E D C O O K I E S , C L I C K J A C K I N G , S E N S I T I V E E R R O R S , F O R M A L S E C U R I T Y P R O C E S S
  • 11. 2 0 1 3 · D J A N G O 1 . 5 · D J A N G O 1 . 6 H O S T H E A D E R H A R D E N I N G , I N C R E A S E D H A S H I T E R AT I O N S , H A S H T R U N C AT I O N 2 0 1 4 · D J A N G O 1 . 7 S Y S T E M C H E C K F R A M E W O R K 2 0 1 5 · D J A N G O 1 . 8 S E C U R I T Y M I D D L E WA R E , D E P L O Y M E N T C H E C K
  • 12. D J A N G O ’ S S E C U R I T Y P R O C E S S
  • 13. TL;DR: email security@djangoproject.com if you think you’ve found a security issue in Django. Full security policy always accessible at https://www.djangoproject.com/security/
  • 14. S E C U R I T Y I S S U E V E R I F I C AT I O N Try out a proof-of-concept, if provided Coordinate with reporter for more info if needed Once verified, begin tracking issue (privately)
  • 15. S E C U R I T Y PAT C H I N G P R O C E S S Patches submitted in private tracker (only core team has access) Reviewed and, if needed, ported to multiple versions of Django
  • 16. S E C U R I T Y N O T I F I C AT I O N P R O C E S S Request a CVE identifier for the issue One week prior to release, send to our security notification list Pre-notification can be abbreviated for issues already public/exploited
  • 17. S E C U R I T Y R E L E A S E P R O C E S S Patches merged from private security branches to public GitHub repository Releases issued with blog post containing details of issue(s) and CVE identifier(s) Spam ALL the social media sites!
  • 18. The goals of our process are to ensure responsible reporting and disclosure of security issues.
  • 19. D J A N G O V S . T H E O WA S P T O P T E N
  • 21. Injection attacks ✅ Authentication and session management ✅ Cross-site scripting (XSS) ✅ Direct object references ✅ Misconfiguration ✅
  • 22. Sensitive data exposure ✅ Function level access control ✅ Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) ✅ Components with known vulnerabilities ✅ Unvalidated redirects and forwards ✅
  • 23. A B O V E A N D B E Y O N D
  • 24. Django tries very hard to be secure-by-default, and to offer the tools you need to harden your applications beyond the common cases.
  • 26.
  • 27. W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
  • 28. W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
  • 29. W H Y D O W E FA I L ?
  • 30. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 7 “Parsing the Accept-Language header is expensive to do every time, let’s do it once per unique value and cache the results!”
  • 31. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0 “Let’s use a one-time base36 token to do password resets!”
  • 32. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3 “Formsets need to dynamically grow the number of forms they use!”
  • 33. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3 “Restrictions on password length are dumb! Long passwords are better!”
  • 34. CVE-2007-5712 Denial-of-service via arbitrarily-large Accept-Language header CVE-2010-4535 Denial-of-service in password-reset mechanism CVE-2013-0306 Denial-of-service via formset max_num bypass CVE-2013-1443 Denial-of-service via large passwords
  • 35.
  • 36. CVE-2007-5712 Denial-of-service via arbitrarily-large Accept-Language header CVE-2010-4535 Denial-of-service in password-reset mechanism CVE-2013-0306 Denial-of-service via formset max_num bypass CVE-2013-1443 Denial-of-service via large passwords
  • 37. P Y T H O N I S G R E AT No buffer overflows But you can still DoS yourself if you’re not careful We learned this the hard way so you shouldn’t have to
  • 38. S T O P D O S ’ I N G Y O U R S E L F Sanity-check your inputs for length before you start processing them Yes, even passwords (when appropriate)! Configure your web server to cap the length of HTTP headers and request bodies
  • 39. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6 “URLField should really check whether the URL exists before accepting the value!”
  • 40. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6 “URLField should accept anything that matches the format of a valid URL!”
  • 41. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 0 6 “EmailField should accept anything that matches the format of a valid email address!”
  • 42. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 2 “Checking for corrupt image files is easy, we can just use PIL’s routines for that!”
  • 43. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 2 “Most image formats store metadata in a header, let’s find it by only reading a few bytes at a time!”
  • 44. CVE-2011-4137 Denial-of-service via URLField.verify_exists CVE-2009-3965 Denial-of-service via pathological regular-expression performance CVE-2012-3443 Denial-of-service via compressed image files CVE-2012-3444 Denial-of-service via large image files
  • 45.
  • 46. CVE-2011-4137 Denial-of-service via URLField.verify_exists CVE-2009-3965 Denial-of-service via pathological regular-expression performance CVE-2012-3443 Denial-of-service via compressed image files CVE-2012-3444 Denial-of-service via large image files
  • 47. T H E B I G O Expresses upper bound on your algorithm Also, apparently, an anime But more important is the “upper bound” bit
  • 48. – A C T U A L LY A V E RY U S E F U L Q U E S T I O N “What’s the worst that could happen?”
  • 49. N O R E A L LY, S T O P D O S ’ I N G Y O U R S E L F ! Figure out how much work your code should do Then figure out whether you can make it do more Then figure out ways to ensure it does less Some issues (compressed formats, incremental reads, pathological regex, etc.) have been around forever — read up on them!
  • 50. (?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:(?:(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;: ".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?: [^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.| (?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?: (?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:r n)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^ []r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*|(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(? =[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)*<(?:(?:rn)? 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[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.|(?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*@(?: (?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))| [([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?: (?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*|(?: [^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|"(?:[^"r]|.| (?:(?:rn)?[ t]))*"(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)*<(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:@(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+ (?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*)(?:. (?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:". []]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*))*(?:,@(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000- 031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:".[]]))|[([^[]r]|.)*](?:(?:rn)?[ t])*) (?:.(?:(?:rn)?[ t])*(?:[^()<>@,;:".[] 000-031]+(?:(?:(?:rn)?[ t])+|Z|(?=[["()<>@,;:". 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  • 51. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0 “Values of cookies we’ve set can be trusted!”
  • 52. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 0 “Admin users can be trusted with a bit of the lookup API!”
  • 53. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 1 “We can trust the browser same-origin sandbox!”
  • 54. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3 “We can trust admin users with the history log!”
  • 55. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , C I R C A 2 0 1 3 “Once we’ve validated a value and stored it, we can trust it!”
  • 56. CVE-2010-3082 XSS via trusting unsafe cookie value CVE-2010-4534 Information leakage in administrative interface CVE-2011-0696 CSRF via forged HTTP headers CVE-2013-0305 Information leakage via admin history log NO CVE, DISCLOSED 2013-08-13 XSS via admin trusting URLField values
  • 57. – T H E D J A N G O T E A M , O V E R A N D O V E R A G A I N … “We can trust the HTTP Host header now!”
  • 58. CVE-2011-4139 Host header cache poisoning CVE-2011-4140 Potential CSRF via Host header CVE-2012-4520 Host header poisoning ADVISORY, 2012-12-10 Additional hardening of Host header handling ADVISORY, 2013-02-19 Additional hardening of Host header handling
  • 59. “I did warn you not to trust me.”
  • 60.
  • 61. T H E R E I S N O S U C H T H I N G A S “ S E C U R E ”
  • 62. W H Y D O W E FA L L ?
  • 63.
  • 64.
  • 65. Q U O T E S / I M A G E S http://www.marriedtothesea.com/index.php?date=012710 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Selfmade_Big_O.png http://www.ex-parrot.com/pdw/Mail-RFC822-Address.html http://highlighthollywood.com/2015/02/game-of-thrones-actor-aidan- gillen-lord-petyr-baelish-talks-season-5-sansa-and-little-finger- highlight-hollywood-news/ http://x-files.wikia.com/wiki/File:Trust_No_One_tagline.jpg http://www.slideshare.net/ChristofHammel/process-iceberg-21703547