The European lobbying regulatory system is based on a pragmatic, participatory and cooperative dialogue between interest groups and EU decision-makers.

1. REGULATING LOBBYING.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
APPROACH AT A GLANCE
November 2018

2. AN OPEN DIALOGUE BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS
AND GROUPS OF INTERESTS
The European lobbying regulatory system is based on a pragmatic,
participatory and cooperative dialogue between interest groups and
EU decision-makers, and represents an alternative to the traditional
top-down binding model that regulates lobbying in USA and Canada.
Intheacademicpaper“Codesofconductandpracticalrecommendation
as tools for self-regulation and soft regulation in EU public affairs”,
from which we have drawn the contents of this slide share, the authors
Maria Cristina Antonucci, professor and researcher at the National
Research Council, and Nicola Scocchi of FTI Consulting, guide us
through the principles, nature and functions of this model of regulation.

3. INCENTIVES, NOT BINDING RULES
The EU regulatory model is a special combination of
self-regulation: professional associations’ codes of ethics and codes
of conducts;
nonbinding regulation: promoted by the European Institutions and
based on selective incentives mechanisms.
A model allowing a participatory, cooperative, and pragmatic dialogue
between European policy makers and interest groups.
Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., Codes of conduct and practical recommendations as a tool for self-regulation and
soft regulation in EU public affairs, in Journal of Public Affairs, 6 August 2018

4. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The proper functioning of the
soft regulation model de-
pends on the interest groups’
ability to elaborate autono-
mous self-regulation tools such
as ethical codes and codes of
conduct, that play a key role
in the enhancement of profes-
sional responsibility and ethics.
CODES OF ETHICS AND CODES OF CONDUCTS
Code of ethics: is a set of general
principles on moral values associa-
ted with a professional activity whose
function is to provide a guide to the
correct choice of behaviours in situa-
tions lacking normative predictions.
Code of conducts: is an inventory
of concrete and definite behaviours,
operational procedures expected by
any individual who is consciously in-
volved in a professional context, as
well as a specific list of bans and re-
strictions.

5. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
The adoption of an ethical
dimension in lobbying led
to specific provisions and
prohibitions in conducts and
defined a set of noncompli-
ance procedures.
In performing this task, codes of eth-
ics and codes of conducts display
the functions of promoting profession-
al awareness and enhancing a culture
based on the pillars of accountabil-
ity, transparency and professional
correctness.

6. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
CODES OF CONDUCTS IN EU PUBLIC AFFAIRS
There are two different types of codes of conducts in the European
Union:
codes adopted by professional Lobbying and Public Affairs
associations to provide their members with clear and concrete
guidelines on how to interact with EU policy makers (bottom-up
model);
the code of conduct the European Parliament and the European
Commission introduced for the interest groups registering to the
EU Transparency Register, defining the standards of behaviour
for all interest groups representatives interacting with the European
Institutions (top-down model).

7. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
A HYBRID AND EFFECTIVE FORM OF REGULATION
The two different codes are
strictly linked in a specific
lobbying regulation model,
precisely developed for the
EU policy-making process
where policies are shaped
by the constant interaction
between policy makers and
interest groups.
Public Affairs professionals do not
adopt a certain behaviour because of
a set of binding provisions, but due to
a mixture of self-regulation, and a
set of selective incentives.

8. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The participation of organised interests in the EU decision-making
process is mainly regulated by:
the codes of conducts for EU professionals’ associations SEAP and
EPACA;
the EU Transparency Register (TR);
EU Interest Groups Code of Conduct;
European Commissioners and MEPs codes of conducts;
the procedures of the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat
(JTRS);
the EU Ombudsman list of ‘Dos & Don’ts’.
TOOLS & PRACTICES

9. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The European Public Affairs Consultancies’ Association (EPACA), and
the Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) are two of the
most important professional lobbying association.
The codes of conducts adopted by EPACA and SEAP share three
main features:
general principles: integrity, transparency, professionalism,
confidentiality, and correctness;
specific requirements and forecasts of concrete behaviour:
respect of institutional role of EC and EP personnel, reputation, and
avoidance of conflict of interests;
enforcement mechanisms and sanction procedures for
noncompliance.
SEAP AND EPACA CODES

10. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
SEAP AND EPACA CODES AND
THE EU TRANSPARENCY REGISTER (TR)
Inbothcodesofconducts,we
can find several references to
the rules and procedures of
conduct envisaged by the EU
TR.
A convergence highlighting the ability
of the two associations to consider
the institutional dimension of regula-
tion and to reformulate the internal
codes of conducts accordingly.

11. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
Adopted in 2008 by the European Commission, it was accompanied in
2011 by a code of conduct drafted within the framework of an inter-
institutional agreement (IIAA3) between the European Commission and
the European Parliament.
Its focus and intent are:
to promote active and responsible participation of stakeholders to
the EU policy making process;
to provide with selective incentives the interest groups voluntarily
registering to the TR and subscribing the related code of conduct.
At the same time:
EU officials are provided with a crucial set of transparency norms for
their interactions with interest groups.
THE EU TRANSPARENCY REGISTER

12. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
PARTECIPATORY GOVERNANCE
The model adopted by the TR, which combines rules for the activities
of EU officials transparency with selective incentive mechanisms for
interest groups
it is grounded on a participatory governance approach;
it is typical in supranational Institutions;
it is different compared with the Nation State regulatory model,
which consists in a top-down approach based on binding rules,
controls, and sanctions.

13. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The IIAA3 code of conduct has been developed to link the voluntary
registration to the TR to the subscription of the code of conduct IIAA3.
Atthesametime,severalselectiveincentivesareprovidedtotheinterest
groups that decide to register to TR. Among others:
tomeetwithCommissioners,Cabinetmembers,andDirector-General
in the European Commission;
automatic reception of alerts from the European Commission about
public consultations and other activities from the Commission;
the access to the European Parliament premises;
eligibility as speakers for the public hearings of the different
Committees of the European Parliament.
RULES AND INCENTIVES

14. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
THE TRANSPARENCY REGISTER EFFECTS
Encouraged by selective incentives, an increasing number of interest
groups over the years have chosen to enroll in the Transparency
Register (+26% in 2016).
Thelinkbetweenvoluntaryregistrationmechanismandtheconsequent
mandatory subscription to the code of conduct increased, among
interest groups, the awareness of the behaviours that are accepted
and the ones that are prohibited.

15. On one hand, the IIAA3 Code of Conduct, linked to TR, provides
interests groups for behavioural rules:
disclosure in the institutional relation;
impartiality in providing information;
respect for institutional norms;
recognition of institutional rules about former institutional staff;
fairness in contacting staff members;
respect for the rights and duties of Commissioners, staff and
personnel and MEPs.
THE IIAA3 CODE OF CONDUCT

16. Exercising pressures or improper behaviour to get access to
information.
Pretending with third parties to have influence on EU Institutions.
Selling EU documents to third parties.
Violating EU rules and practices with institutional subjects and staff
from European Institutions.
… AND ON THE OTHER HAND,
EXPLICIT PROHIBITIONS

17. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
TARGETS AND TOOLS
The EU JTRS is a mechanism of con-
trol that monitors any incorrect data
uploaded on the TR and any com-
plains related to improper behaviours
of registered entities.
The cases identified by the JTRS are
then reported in the JTRS annual re-
port, which can be consulted on the
website of the TR.
Pointing out common rules
and prohibitions in the con-
duct of interest groups is the
first and probably the most
important objective of the
IIAA3 Code of Conduct.
As it is built on an important
system of reporting, checks,
alerts, and complaints, imple-
mented by EU Joint Trans-
parency Register Secretar-
iat (JTRS).

18. Quality check: it carries out quality checks on the data supplied
by the registered entities on a regular basis and can require to
registered entities to correct or update the information submitted.
Alerts:itreceivesthird-partyalertsonthequalityofthedataprovided
by the subscribers to the Register.
Complaints: receives third-party complaints when interest groups
do not respect the rules and the prohibitions listed by the IIAA3
Code of Conduct.
THE THREE JTRS PROCEDURES…

19. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
Any of the three procedures may lead to the removal of the
noncompliant interest group from the TR. This circumstance can
have a strong impact for the targeted interest group and its advocacy
activities.
For instance, interest groups that are removed from the TR do not
have access to the European Parliament, cannot participate to the
hearings, and cannot meet Commissioners, their staff, and European
Commission’s Directors General.
Additionally,aremovalfromtheTRthatfollowsanoncompliantbehaviour
also has a negative impact on the reputation of the targeted interest
group.
… AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

20. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The mechanism for managing and controlling the correct application
of the IIAA3 Code of Conduct foresees an institutional framework for
guaranteeing its enforcement.
Theinvolvementofthirdpartiesinthealertsandcomplaintsmechanism
appears in line with a participatory model of complex governance: it
offers to all types of stakeholders and third parties the opportunity of
activating the control system.
In this way, the control mechanism distributes responsibilities to the
whole system: the registered entities, the Institutions, any interested
third parties, the public, and the JTRS, in charge for the system of
reporting, checks, and alerts.
The increase of registrations and the use of alerts and complaints
demonstratethatthemechanismworks,eveninabsenceofcompulsory
registration and subscription of the code of conduct.
THE MODEL’S EFFECTIVENES

21. The European Ombudsman is a body established by the Maastricht
Treaty that investigates distinct types of poor administration (including
unfair conduct, discrimination, abuse of power, lack of information or
refusal to provide it, unnecessary delays, and incorrect procedures) by
EU institutions or other EU bodies.
It launches investigations either in response to complaints or on its
own initiative.
Whenitcomestotransparency-relatedissuesatEUlevel,theEuropean
Ombudsman plays a key role.
The current Ombudsman is Emily O’Reilly.
THE EU OMBUDSMAN

22. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
On May 24, 2017, the Ombudsman published a list of practical
recommendations for EU officials interacting with interest groups’
representatives and viceversa: the so-called “Dos and Don’ts list”, it
aims at
ensuring that public officials do not inadvertently breach ethical
norms;
providing interest groups’ representatives with concrete examples
on which kind of interaction is appropriate and which one is not.
THE DOS AND DON’TS LIST

23. Antonucci M.C., Scocchi N., ibidem
The Ombudsman invites EU officials
not to meet interest representatives that are not registered in the
TR;
to ask representatives to register if their activities fall within its scope.
FOR INSTANCE

24. THE REPUTATION AS A MOTIVATION
An interest group with a negative
reputation will
face difficulties in interacting with
other stakeholders and building al-
liances, which is a key factor to
have a say in the EU policy making
process;
be in a disadvantaged position
compared to the one of the sta-
keholders that can count on a so-
lid and well-established reputation.
Violating the behavioural
rules laid down in the codes,
in addition to the formal sanc-
tions provided for, would has
also a negative impact nei-
ther on the reputation of the
lobbyists and on of the inter-
est group they represent.

25. Regulating lobbying is a mantra of the Italian political debate.
However just a few “registers for lobbyists” are the only tangible
outcome of such timid efforts, a rather disappointing one.
Moreover, Italian politicians try to look at what other countries, or the
EU, do to regulate this activity, without considering that the decision-
making process, and the access to it, differs dramatically from one
country/system to the other.
If the Italy’s decision-making process is not made more and equally
accessible to everyone, at least as much as it is in the EU, any attempt
to regulate it will be useless. If not detrimental.
WHAT ABOUT ITALY? THE OPINION OF TELOS A&S

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