The mimetic virus A vector for cyberterrorism

The mimetic virus:
A vector for cyberterrorism
By
Nicholas Ayres
MSc Cyber Security 2015

The mimetic virus: A vector for cyber terrorism
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Abstract
Current literature suggests that critical national infrastructure is the main focus of
attack for cyberterrorism but this research will address the issue of whether a
mimetic virus is a viable cyberterrorist attack against a target population. Statistical
data was obtained from questionnaires with 100 random participants regarding
their understanding and current levels of fear of a cyberterrorist attack against
them; responses indicated that there was a good level of understanding as to what
cyberterrorism was and that participants’ fear levels of an impending attack were
low. The participants were then introduced using a fabricated video clip to what
they were led to believe was a real weaponised computer virus which attacked
laptop batteries causing them to explode. The data showed that not only had
participants’ fear levels increased but they would also modify future habits and
behaviour. This research highlighted that the general public could indeed be a
target of cyberterrorism and a mimetic virus could be an effective method of
attack. The issue was supported by the research but there were inconsistencies
whether the mimetic virus would spread through the use of social media.

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Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Table of Figures 5
Introduction 6
1 Chapter One - Literature Review 9
1.1 Conventional Terrorism 9
1.2 Cyberterrorism 12
1.3 The Problem with Cyberterrorism 16
1.4 Cyberterrorism: A virtual myth or an impending apocalypse? 17
1.5 Critical National Infrastructure and the Cyberterrorist 20
1.6 From Mimetic to Memetic 22
1.7 The mimetic virus: A vector for cyber terrorism 24
1.8 Summary 26
2 Chapter Two - The Mimetic Virus 28
2.1 Background 28
2.2 Defining a Cyberterrorist Attack 28
2.3 The MimeticVirus in a Memetic World 31
2.4 Creating the Mimetic Virus 34
3 Chapter Three – Methodology 35
3.1 Aims and Objectives 35
3.2 Data Collection 35
3.3 Sampling 38
3.4 Ethics 39
3.5 Reliability andValidity 40
3.6 Data Analysis 41
4 Chapter Four – Results 42

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4.1 Introduction 42
4.2 Key aims andobjectives of the research 42
4.3 Frequency and useof social media by each participant 43
4.4 Current understanding and level of fear from cyberterrorism 47
4.5 Couldapopulationbeplacedina state of fearthroughwitnessinga
cyberterrorist attack 50
4.6 Couldapopulationbeinfluencedto actin a particularwaydue to the
threat of cyberterrorist attack 52
4.7 Couldattitudestowardscyberterrorismbeinfluencedby
unsubstantiated claims 54
4.8 Could a mimetic virus be easily spread via social media 55
4.9 Summary 56
5 Conclusion 57
6 References 60
7 Appendix 70
7.1 Appendix A Questionnaire 70

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Table of Figures
Figure 1: Cyberterrorism scenario framework ....................................................... 13
Figure 2: The four attributes of the cyber phenomenon......................................... 29
Figure 3: The potential economic cost of a hoax virus........................................... 32
Figure 4: Participant gender.................................................................................... 43
Figure 5: Participant age group............................................................................... 44
Figure 6: Participant and family laptop use ............................................................ 45
Figure 7: Frequency of social media use ................................................................ 46
Figure 8: Prior knowledge of cyberterrorism ......................................................... 47
Figure 9: Current fear levels of cyberterrorist attack.............................................. 49
Figure 10: Modified fear levels of cyberterrorist attack ......................................... 51
Figure 11: Modified use of laptop .......................................................................... 52
Figure 12: Targeted manufacturer .......................................................................... 54
Figure 13: Circulate a threat through social media................................................. 55

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Introduction
This research will explore whether a mimetic virus is a viable method of attack
against a population with respect to cyberterrorism. In today’s society, terrorism is
a criminal act which can influence an audience far beyond the direct victims of a
terrorist attack. The main strategy of the terrorist is to draw global attention to their
cause, usually through acts of violence, with the effectiveness measured not in the
act itself but a public or government’s reaction to it.
In 1990 the National Security Council envisaged that computers could in the future
be used to not only facilitate crime but also as the main tool for criminal acts; ‘The
modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow's terrorist
may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb’ (National
Research Council, 1990). The term ‘cyberterrorism’ was first used by Barry Collin
in the 1980s (Gordon & Ford, 2002) and has many different connotations
depending on where in the world it is being defined and by whom; very similar to
traditional terrorism.
The majority of past and current research into cyberterrorism predominately
focuses on attacks against the critical national infrastructure (CNI); if the target is
not CNI then an attack is not considered cyberterrorism. Many agree though that if
an attack comes it will probably be against CNI. From the available literature there
appears to be very few studies which have examined the general public as a
potential target of a cyberterrorist attack.
This research involved questionnaires with 100 participants picked at random
using a number of different methods including social media and a university email
list. The questionnaire included a number of questions in relation to cyberterrorism

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and asked how respondents viewed themselves as a potential target of attack. There
was a short video clip that was presented in the middle of the questionnaire which
specifically showed the viewer what they were led to believe was a weaponised
computer virus deployed to a target laptop. The video was introduced to provoke a
reaction in the subject that could then be measured by the remaining questions. It
will be shown that even though the majority of participants had some knowledge in
relation to cyberterrorism and their initial fear levels of possible attack were low,
once informed their attitudes were significantly altered as a result of the video and
supporting information.
The first chapter reviews the current literature in relation to conventional terrorism,
its targets, methods of attack and ultimate goals as well as the controversy
surrounding the definition itself. It will also show how these controversies have
carried through to how cyberterrorism is defined. In addition, it shows that
cyberterrorism may or may not exist depending on who is defining the term and
lastly, the lack of research examining other potential targets of attack such as a
population rather than CNI. The purpose of the literature review is to provide a
background to cyberterrorism and highlight the need for this research.
Chapter two looks at where cyberterrorism fits in with the four identified attributes
which are used to define the cyber phenomenon. Also included are examples of
previous mimetic viruses and the associated costs involved to businesses of a fake
or hoax virus outbreak. In addition, this chapter addresses the use of social media
and how a mimetic virus could easily spread.
Chapter three focuses on the research methods. The aims and objectives will be
presented in addition to data collection, sampling, ethical issues, reliability and
data analysis. This chapter will also detail how the sample video clip was
produced, why the particular subject matter was chosen and how this would relate

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to the issue of whether a mimetic virus is a viable cyberterrorist attack against a
population. This chapter will ensure that the reader has a clear account of how the
research was conducted.
Chapter four presents the results of the quantitative data obtained from the
questionnaire. This section addresses a number of key areas such as current levels
of understanding of cyberterrorism and how cyberterrorism affects participants’
daily lives. The results will be presented visually using graphs and charts. This
chapter will summarise all the data collected, relate it to the objectives of this
research paper and draw conclusions as to whether a mimetic virus could be used
to effectively target a population and to what end. Finally, this chapter will explore
and discuss the limitations of this research and how this may have affected the
data.

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1 Chapter One - Literature Review
1.1 Conventional Terrorism
Terrorism is a controversial subject, yet it is a term that has been in popular use
since the French Revolution coming from the French word terrorisme (Online
Etymology Dictionary, n.d.), which derives from the Latin verb terreō meaning ‘I
frighten’ (Campbell, 2010). There is a lack of a globally accepted academic or
legal agreement on the definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2011), largely because the
act is a highly political and emotionally charged one and governments are reluctant
to agree on a legally binding definition (Hoffman, 2013). The term terrorism ‘has
been well studied and documented’ (Collin, 1997:pp 15-18) and there is a general
global consensus that terrorism is an act which is perpetrated by individuals,
groups or governments to instil fear and terror in non-combatants through the use
of violence, in order to pursue a political, ideological or religious goal.
In 1972 during the Munich Olympics the terrorist group Black September killed 11
Israeli athletes who were the direct targets of the attack but the indirect or actual
target was the estimated 1 billion people who were watching the televised event
around the world who were ‘introduced to fear - which is terrorisms ultimate goal’
(Anon, 2015). The quote "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"
(Seymour, 1975) has been cited many times in relation to Middle East conflicts
and uprisings in Africa and Central America (National Research Council, 1990) to
name but a few. Terrorists believe they are ‘legitimate combatants’ fighting for
their beliefs using whatever means possible in order to ‘attain their goals’
(International Terrorism and Security Research, 2015).

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Conventional terrorism has had a huge impact on global society and since the 2001
terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, Pentagon and the London
bombings in 2005, the fear of terrorism has been elevated to new heights (Jones,
2005). Almost every country has its own definition of terrorism, which is often
further defined, in order to fit within a particular government department or
organisation.
The United States Department of Defence defines terrorism as ‘The unlawful use
of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of
goals that are usually political’ (Gordon and Ford, 2002:pp 636-647). The Federal
Bureau of Investigations and United States Department of State reinforce this
definition but with terminology that fits in with their particular role within
government and society.
The United Nations Security Council in 2004 condemned terrorism as ‘criminal
acts, against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public. Based on
this definition terrorism acts are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
other similar nature’.

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The United Kingdom’s definition of terrorism is laid out in Section 1 of the
Terrorism Act 2000; terrorism means the use or threat of action where: the action
falls within subsection (2)
a) the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an
international governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public
or a section of the public
b) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious[, racial] or ideological cause
Action falls within this subsection (2) if it:
a) involves serious violence against a person
b) involves serious damage to property
c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing
the action
d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section
of the public
or
e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an
electronic system
To fully understand the issue of cyberterrorism it is important to understand what
constitutes conventional terrorism. The main theme running through some of the
quoted definitions of terrorism is the use or threat of violence or damage to life and
property with the intention of influencing a government or society through a
political, religious or ideological cause.
Cyberterrorism is an evolved extension of terrorism using computer systems and
networks to attack target computer systems and networks in cyberspace.
Conventional terrorism occurs in the physical space (Matusitz, 2008) using kinetic

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weapons to terrorise victims. Just as crime has exploited the digital arena so has
cyberterrorism and as a consequence weapons have moved from the analogue to
the digital (Reyes, Brittson, O'Shea, and Steele, 2011) where one of the notorious
digital weapons used by the cyberterrorist is the virus (Matusitz, 2008).
Conventional terrorism requires the terrorist to be local to a particular location in
order to carry out an attack possibly limiting the impact of any potential attack
compared to the cyberterrorist. A cyberterrorist can launch an attack anywhere in
the world making the act truly global. In order to conduct an attack the
conventional terrorist requires a number of prerequisites such as target
reconnaissance, weapons and access that may require a considerable support
network to complete their mission. The cyberterrorist in contrast can remotely
gather information freely available from the Internet or use standard hacking
techniques to acquire vital information about the target.
1.2 Cyberterrorism
Dorothy Denning’s testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism in
2000 is one of the most cited papers on the issue of cyberterrorism. She stated that
‘Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally
understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers,
networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a
government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives’ (Denning,
2000). This statement generally falls in line with the accepted definition of
terrorism but with the terrorist act occurring within cyberspace with computers,
networks or stored information being the initial direct targets of an attack.
Ahmad and Yunos (2012) developed a framework of dependencies whereby when
comparing this framework to a particular scenario it would provide a baseline in

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determining whether the scenario was an act of cyberterrorism or not. Figure 1
details the key components of the framework:
Figure 1: Cyberterrorism scenario framework (Ahmad & Yunos, 2012, pp. 149-158)
 Target – who is the target of attack?
 Motivation – why is the target the focus of attack?
 Method of attack – how is the target being attacked?
 Domain – what is the specific area of attack?
 Action by perpetrator – what steps are being taken by the attackers?
 Impact – what influence does the attack have on the target?

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Since the term cyberterrorism has been introduced to the world there have been
hundreds of definitions as to its exact nature and purpose (Gordon and Ford, 2002,
pp. 636-647). Most definitions agree that for an act to qualify as cyberterrorism it
must be instigated from an IT system through cyberspace with the direct target
being another IT system1. Since the term was first coined by Barry Collin, many
experts, professionals and politicians have stated that the threat from
cyberterrorism could be as catastrophic as real world events and the alarmist buzz
words such as electronic Pearl Harbour, digital Armageddon and electronic
Chernobyl have been used to stoke the fears of cyberterrorism and maintain a high
level of public anxiety (Green, 2002). However, similar to terrorism,
cyberterrorism appears to lack a solid, unified definition (Gordon and Ford, 2002,
pp. 636-647). Some of the popular definitions state that only an attack on a
country’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) would quantify it as a
cyberterrorism attack. Others opt for an opposite and more diluted definition where
‘any application of terrorism on the Internet, including posting videos of attacks
online and building websites to attract supporters, should be considered as
cyberterrorism’ (Kaplan, 2009). This research paper will explore the multitude of
current definitions and controversies surrounding cyberterrorism and the current
thinking as to possible targets and the potential consequences a successful attack
might have. It will also look at other possible attack vectors for cyberterrorism,
which have been overlooked. In current literature, such as the use of social media
in spreading fear around the world using a mimetic virus.
The fear and threat from cyberterrorism and the cyberterrorist have been used to
great effect by the media on an unsuspecting public with constant threats of death
and destruction at the hands of terrorists using their computers to hijack aircraft,
explode nuclear power plants and take control of military computers from
1 An IT systemin this context can be regarded as hardware or software.

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anywhere in the world (Green, 2002). The threat of terrorism and the US domestic
and foreign policy of the War on Terror has maintained high levels of fear in the
public and now with more and more news reports of cyber related crime,
cyberterrorism has become a new threat and fear in the public consciousness. The
general public when imagining cyberterrorism think along Hollywood plotlines of
a teenage Matthew Broderick in the 1983 film Wargames hacking into the
American nuclear weapons computer system through an unsecured backdoor and
almost launching World War III causing a digital Armageddon (Green, 2002).
Conventional terrorism may lack a globally recognised definition but there is a
consensus as to what constitutes terrorism, whereas cyberterrorism is a term that
has been and still is today a controversial topic of discussion both in the academic
and political world. Looking at current literature there are many different
definitions of cyberterrorism (Gordon and Ford, 2002, pp. 636-647) but to list them
all is outside the scope of this article.
Denning (2000) states that cyberterrorism is the ‘convergence of terrorism and
cyberspace utilising the computer as the weapon and the target’. Similarly Pollitt
(1998:pp. 8-10) states it is a ‘premeditated, politically motivated attack against
information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in
violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine
agents’. Dwan (2001:pp. 12-14) argues that cyberterrorism is ‘the general
destruction of critical computer systems that are vital to the smooth running of a
country’. FBI Deputy Assistant Director of the Cyber-Division defined
cyberterrorism as: ‘A criminal act perpetuated by the use of computers and
telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or
disruption of services, where the intended purpose is to create fear causing
confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a

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government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological
agenda’ (Nissenbaum, 2005).
Denning’s definition of cyberterrorism states that it is the merging of the term
cyberspace with the term terrorism. Examining the first term in this definition,
cyberspace was introduced in the sci-fi novel Neuromancer (Gibson, 1984) and is a
metaphor for describing the non-physical landscape created by computer systems
(Beal, 2015). Cyberspace solely occurs within a virtual computer environment
where users navigate their way through cyberspace using a keyboard or by moving
a mouse; cyberspace has no actual presence in the real world. Kenney reinforces
the notion that cyberterrorism occurs solely in cyberspace similar to other cyber
attacks such as cyberwarfare, hacktivism, general hacking and unauthorised access
(Kenney, 2015).
By summarising some of the popular definitions of cyberterrorism it clearly shows
that in order for an act to qualify as cyberterrorism it must occur in cyberspace, use
some form of computer system in order to carry out an attack on a target computer
system or the information it may hold. The action must cause fear through violence
or harm to persons or property and finally be politically, religiously or
ideologically motivated, the cyberterrorist commits the act of cyberterrorism using
a computer that can be considered as a weapon (Pollitt, 1998).
1.3 The Problem with Cyberterrorism
Conventional terrorism has on many occasions and through recent history resulted
in large loss of life and considerable damage to property. A key goal of terrorism is
to influence an audience beyond the immediate victim (Yonah, 2007) using
violence or the threat of violence in order to achieve this goal. The U.S. went to
war with the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan in order to dismantle the terrorist

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organisation al-Qaeda, which was using the country to train and indoctrinate
fighters, import weapons and plot terrorist actions (Zelikow, 2011). The U.S.
invasion was the principle reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Centre and Pentagon (Thruelsen, 2006) by al-Qaeda. Many have argued that the
9/11 attacks were carried out because of the support of Israel by the United States,
sanctions imposed against Iraq and the presence of US military in Saudi Arabia.
Another motive for the attacks may have been to coerce the U.S. into a war that
would incite a pan-Islamist revolution (Duran, 2002, pp. 22-42). Whatever the
ultimate motive was for the 9/11 attacks it was an unlawful use of violence,
motivated by ideological beliefs, which instilled fear and coerced a government in
pursuit of al-Qaeda’s goal.
It appears that the problem with cyberterrorism is the lack of a universally
recognised definition. Currently within the literature there appears to be three
theories on the subject. The first is a denial that there is such a thing as
cyberterrorism or that it poses such a small, insignificant risk when compared to
conventional terrorism. There is an extreme opposite viewpoint by others that
believe we are all moments away from a digital Armageddon at the hands of
cyberterrorists. Finally there are those that believe the current definition is too rigid
and that any action performed by a terrorist using a computer should constitute as
cyberterrorism.
1.4 Cyberterrorism: A virtual myth or an impending apocalypse?
The term terrorism lacks a distinctive, globally recognised definition, which has
had a knock on effect for an accurate definition of cyberterrorism. The two words
have come together and although there is no doubt as to the meaning of cyber, by
adding terrorism it creates a great deal of controversy.

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Green (2002) argues that ‘There is no such thing as cyberterrorism… nor is their
compelling evidence that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organisation has resorted
to computers for any serious destructive activity’. Computer security specialists
believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale
(Green, 2002). Pollitt (1998:pp. 8-10) takes this further and suggests that ‘short of
electrocuting one's self with the power supply or being so unfortunate as to walk
under a falling machine the potential victims of cyberterrorism cannot be directly
harmed or killed by a computer’. Jones (2005:pp. 4) goes on to argue what would a
cyberterrorist need to do in order to cause terror and ‘the only way that you will
scare most people with cyber capabilities is to threaten to throw the equipment at
them’. The former White House cyber security advisor Richard A. Clarke stated
‘don’t use the two words in the same sentence, we haven’t seen evidence of
cyberterrorism connected with any terrorist organization’ (Honegger, 2010). In
1995 the cult group Aum Shinrikyo carried out a terrorist attack on the Tokyo
subway using a weapon of mass destruction whereby Sarin gas was released killing
13 and injuring nearly 6,500 others (Morbi, 2011) but rather than a weapon of
mass destruction, cyberterrorism could only produce a ‘weapon of mass disruption’
(Dwan, 2001, pp. 12-14).
In 2003 there were power outages across eight states of the northeast coast of the
USA, which left 45 million people without electricity for 7 hours. This wide scale
power outage did not generate high levels of fear amongst the affected population
as it was seen as ‘one of those things that happen from time to time’ (Jones,
2005:pp. 4). The power outages were not down to a cyberterrorist attack but more
due to a general computer failure.
In stark contrast to this, in 2002 Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge stated that
‘Terrorists can sit at one computer connected to one network and can create
worldwide havoc without the need of a bomb or explosives in order to cripple a

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sector of the economy, or shut down a power grid’ (Weimann, 2004). Federal
Bureau of Investigations Chief Robert Mueller in 2010 addressed a conference of
computer security professionals and stated that ‘the cyberterrorism threat is real
and rapidly expanding’ (Hsu and Marinucci, 2013) and that the cyberterrorist is
either politically or religiously motivated in order to create fear and alarm within a
given population through disruption or destruction of critical national
infrastructure. More recently, in 2012 the former US Secretary of Defence Leon E.
Panetta gave an alarmist speech regarding cyber security to business executives for
National Security where he stated the threat from cyberterrorism ‘would paralyze
and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability’. Through
acts of cyberterrorism extremist groups could ‘derail passenger trains, contaminate
the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across large parts of
the country’ (Panetta, 2012).
Others take a more diluted approach when defining cyberterrorism to include other
factors. Evan Kohlman, an expert in terrorists’ use of the Internet, points out that
the established definition of cyberterrorism is flawed and that ‘any application of
terrorism on the Internet’ should be considered cyberterrorism (Kaplan, 2009)
including spreading of propaganda through web casts and specialist web sites or
even fund raising (Theohary, 2011). Some of the definitions of cyberterrorism
include activities that fall outside the scope of how conventional terrorism is
defined and the use of the term is being used to describe any threats and crimes
carried out either using or against computers (Gordon and Ford, 2002, pp. 636-
647). Vegh (2002) argues that due to the debate on the security of cyberspace, post
9/11 hackers and online activists are being labelled as cyberterrorists. Rather than
attempt to pigeonhole particular theories defining cyberterrorism, Gordon and Ford
(2002:pp. 636-647) came up with the notion of ‘pure and regular’. Pure
cyberterrorism is a terrorist act that is generally considered along the lines of
Denning’s definition as the convergence between cyberspace and terrorism.

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Regular cyberterrorism is then used to describe other acts by terrorists utilising a
computer to further a terrorist’s political message, raise funds or research potential
targets where the computer is not being used as a metaphorical weapon (Kenney,
2015). Gordon and Ford (2002:pp. 636-647) highlight the problem that by
including general computer use by terrorists within the definition of
cyberterrorism; the ‘loose use of the term is actually undermining the defence
capabilities of corporations and governments that may be at risk from such attack’.
It is apparent that like conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism is a controversial
subject with some believing that it can only be considered cyberterrorism if there is
some form of loss of life or damage to property. Whilst cyberterrorism may do this
indirectly the stumbling block in a cyberterrorist attack appears to be whether it is
even possible to achieve terrorism through the use of computer technologies
(Jones, 2005). From the literature it appears that there may be another rationale for
hyping up the threat of cyberterrorism. Stoking the idea of cyberterrorism
maintains the anxiety and fear levels about terrorism in general as elevated levels
of fear in politicians and the public allows a government to pass a particular agenda
whatever that may be. In 2003 a typical company devoted 0.25% of its I.T. budget
on cyber security, in contrast to this the U.S. government spent 8% of its budget
(Green, 2002).
1.5 Critical National Infrastructure and the Cyberterrorist
Another classic example of a potential cyberterrorist attack is the taking control of
an air traffic control system, whereby aircraft are then commanded to fly into one
another causing wide scale death and destruction from above. Even in the modern
air traffic control centres computers do not actually control the aircraft but just
monitor them, there is still a human element between computer and pilot since the
computer merely provides a visual aid to the controller (Pollitt, 1998).

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One other example of a cyberterrorist attack on CNI could be during the process
stage of food production. The cyberterrorist could hack into a company computer
system which manufacturers a particular food that requires a chemical supplement
to be added to the ingredients during manufacture. Depending on the type of
supplement the quantities could be altered to higher and possibly dangerous levels
for the unsuspecting consumer (Mathieu, 2007). Although this attack is potentially
possible it is doubtful whether it is a valid option for the cyberterrorist since, for
the attack to be successful, it would have to bypass any form of monitoring from
the manufacturer such as an increased depletion of stock levels and quality control,
before the tampered product was delivered to the end user (Pollitt, 1998, pp. 8-10).
There are many experts that agree that CNI needs to be more secure and robust
against attacks in general but there has been a distinct lack of cyberterrorist attacks
against CNI. This could be because the systems are currently ‘secure enough’ or
their potential to cause fear and terror in their indirect targets is limited. There is
considerable literature regarding CNI being a high priority target for
cyberterrorism attacks but now with so many people online on a national or even
global scale, the general public could prove to be an easier, more tempting target
for a cyberterrorist attack rather than the CNI. The terrorist will always choose the
easier option, the softer target to attack, as it may increase the chance of success.

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1.6 From Mimetic to Memetic
In 1994 there were just 25 million Internet users worldwide, which represented
0.4% of the global population who were online (Internet Live Stats, n.d.). The true
worth of the Internet had yet to be defined or realised in the eyes of the public and
cyberspace was seen as a new and mysterious realm. Social media was an almost
non-existent entity where the main interaction between people online was through
email. It was not until mid1995 when the Beverly Hills Internet, later to become
GeoCities, became a mainstream method for social interaction in cyberspace.
In November 1994 an email began to circulate; it was just a few lines of text
warning the recipient of a computer virus called Good Times that was floating
around cyberspace. The warning advised the recipient that if they received an
email entitled Good Times they should delete it straight away as if opened it would
have catastrophic consequences and do untold damage to the data on their
computer hard drive. The email also came with the advice requesting the reader to
‘forward the email to all your friends’. Reading this, naïve recipients did exactly
that and inboxes around the world were filled with warning emails as fear and
doubt crept into their minds.
Good Times was a hoax virus but in the early days of mass public email and
Internet use, the thought of a virus spreading from computer to computer deleting
personal data instilled a sense of fear in an unsuspecting public. The Good Times
computer virus ‘was passed from human to human the same way a virus does but
this was a virus of the human mind, known as a mimetic virus’ (Skoudis and
Zeltser, 2004). Mimetic theory popularised by ancient Greek philosophers is
defined as imitation, mimicry, the act of expression and the presentation of the self
(Gebauer and Wulf, 1995). Rather than conveying information or image about
oneself to others the Good Times virus created a level of fear that was then passed
from one person to another infecting the thoughts of the recipient and making them

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believe that the Good Times threat and consequence was real and that they must
warn others of its destructive nature. As the fear spread from user to user other
warning emails began to surface that expanded on the few lines of text from the
initial warning. The emails suggested that if activated the virus could ‘destroy the
hard drive’ or the infected computer would enter an ‘nth-complexity infinite binary
loop’, a meaningless term, but conjured thoughts of physical rather than virtual
damage to their computers. The success of any hoax is that it ‘contains pseudo-
technical babble’ as discussed in Don't fall for a virus hoax (Sophos Press Release,
1999) that sounds convincing and is capable of tapping into the fears people have
about computers and the Internet.
A meme is an idea or behaviour that spreads from person to person within a culture
and acts as a unit for carrying cultural ideas, symbols or practices that can be
transmitted from one mind to another through writing, speech, gestures, rituals or
other imitable phenomena (Graham, 2002). Supporters of the concept regard
memes as cultural analogues to genes in that they self-replicate, mutate and
respond to selective pressures. Memetics was popularised by Richard Dawkins and
according to his theory, ‘culture is transmitted through units known as memes’
(Gebauer and Wulf, 1995).
With the advent of the Internet, the meme has taken a new form; the Internet
meme, which spreads extremely rapidly from person to person through Internet
based email, blogs, forums and social networking. In the past 20 years, since the
Good Times hoax virus, the number of people who access the Internet on a regular
basis has grown to huge proportions. There are now 3 billion Internet users
representing over 40% of the global population, the UK alone has over 57 million
Internet users and globally almost one in four people are using social networks; by
2017 this will rise to one in three (Social Media, 2013). YouTube videos and

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Internet memes through the medium of social media can ‘go viral’ with the ability
to reach millions worldwide, not in days but within minutes.
1.7 The mimetic virus: A vector for cyber terrorism
As a cultural movement of the late 20th century, postmodernism embraces the idea
that we live in an era of personal freedom from imposed rules and social
limitations. We now live in the age of the computer, where electronic versions of
ourselves exist in a virtual, online realm and our lives no longer take a linear path
as our digital selves interact with others in cyberspace.
Cyberterrorism has the potential to create a state of chaos in a postmodern society;
where chaos refers to a condition of extreme confusion and disorder (Matusitz,
2008). Conventional terrorism occurs in physical space and a single terrorist
usually affects a single location as a target of attack. The cyberterrorist inhabits
cyberspace that is not restricted by boundaries or geographical locations and as
such can cause a state of chaos whereby attacking a particular target could cause a
cascading failure that could have a ripple effect throughout the rest of the network
(Matusitz, 2008).
The computer virus is well known even amongst the most un-technically minded
computer users and their effects range from minor irritation to deletion of data or
complete system failure. To the average person a computer virus could not do any
real physical harm to their computer that is of course until Stuxnet came along.
Stuxnet was the first piece of malicious software known as malware that caused
actual physical damage to hardware either connected to or being controlled by a
computer. The malware, although not being state of the art, demonstrated what was
possible through weaponising a piece of software. Discovered in June 2010
Stuxnet’s main purpose was to attack industrial programmable logic controllers

25
(PLC) which managed the operation of Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges by
modifying the software code causing the fast spinning centrifuges to tear
themselves apart (Kushner, 2013, pp. 48-53). Stuxnet demonstrated to the world
that software could be used as a cyber-weapon to cause physical damage.
This research looks at moving away from CNI as a target for cyberterrorism and
focuses on the general public whether that is a particular social, ethnic or religious
group or a population of a specific country. It has been shown that a mimetic virus
has in the past caused considerable fear in the mind of the individual who has then
exacerbated the problem by unwittingly spreading the virus to a larger audience.
The Good Times virus was a hoax that to date is still surrounded in mystery as to
who was the originator and for what purpose. It may well have been benign in
nature and intent but by putting a cyberterrorist context into the release of a
mimetic virus it could have some quite profound effects for a target audience. A
mimetic virus does not require a technically skilled expert to write line after line of
malicious code or find a zero-day exploit in a particular piece of target software or
even the need to hide its code within another program. When designing a mimetic
virus there is no limit as to what its effects are on its target audience. As long as the
mimetic virus effects are grounded in a quasi-reality using terms that many would
have heard, seen or read in the media, it moves from the realm of fantasy and into
the world of reality. Conventional terrorists use video to communicate their
particular message or ideology to the masses or to create revulsion and fear often to
great effect and notoriety. A number of carefully crafted videos and other selected
social media sites could quickly spread a mimetic virus throughout their target
audience and beyond. This weapon does not need to cause damage whether
physical or virtual as long as the fear has been instilled in the target.

26
1.8 Summary
Cyberterrorism does not have to rely on kinetic weapons and a specific location; a
cyberterrorist uses digital weapons to attack their victims. The postmodern
cyberterrorist can deploy a digital weapon such as a virus that can be programed to
‘explode’ or activate at a specified time or if a specific condition is met. Once
detonated the weapon can then hide and re-emerge at a later date and time. This is
in stark contrast to the traditional, non-digital weapon of the terrorist such as a
bomb, once it goes off, it goes off and cannot be used a second time. The
traditional terrorist weapon is considered analogue as they operate in a linear
sequential manner. Much of the current literature regarding targets of potential
cyberterrorism is focused on attacks targeting CNI. There are numerous, well
known possible attack scenarios posed by politicians, security and academic
experts, but to date there is no evidence that a terrorist organisation has either the
capability or the desire to attack these targets.
The cyberterrorist no longer uses the traditional weapons of the conventional
terrorist they now have a whole new arsenal of digital armaments, which can attack
a target that is anywhere in the world and equally be deployed from anywhere. As
this first chapter has demonstrated there is a considerable amount of literature
which details CNI as the main target of attack from cyberterrorists but by tapping
into the public consciousness and instilling fear using a mimetic virus as a possible
weapon an easier, more attractive target could be a section of the population. If a
population is in fear of its safety a government is compelled to act in order to
reassure its citizens that they are safe and everything is being done to keep them
from harm.
The mass use of Internet social media has grown to huge proportions and we live
in an age where data is instantly available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. People
are all too eager to pass information to each other through social media, as there is

27
not only a need to be seen but also a need to be the first to inform friends, relatives
and peer groups. The Good Times mimetic virus spread at a rapid pace in an
environment where the main form of communication and digital interaction was
email, but in today’s fast paced, high bandwidth world a mimetic virus would
spread much further and faster and given the right delivery the cyberterrorist could
affect a very large demographic.

28
2 Chapter Two - The Mimetic Virus
2.1 Background
The aim of this research is to determine whether a mimetic virus released by a
cyberterrorist could instil fear in a population and thus be considered an effective
attack mechanism for cyberterrorism. The popular belief in the academic and
professional world is that the cyberterrorists’ main target of attack would be on
CNI. This research looks at another angle or vector of attack that is believed to be
more vulnerable and possibly more influential; targeting a population and planting
fear in their minds of potential harm that may come to them from their computer
equipment could ultimately indirectly influence a wider audience that may then
cause a reaction from regional or national government.
2.2 Defining a Cyberterrorist Attack
From researching past and current literature there are many different interpretations
as to what constitutes a cyberterrorist attack. These differing options range from
any use of a computer to further a terrorist cause to a full-blown cyber attack where
the ultimate consequences are injury and loss of life. The mimetic virus, although
not a real virus in the real world, still has to conform to the definitions of
cyberterrorism or it risks being classed as a standard cyber attack rather than a
cyberterrorist attack.

29
Figure 2: The four attributes of the cyber phenomenon
Kenney (2015:pp. 111-128) proposed one of the most comprehensive definitions of
cyberterrorism in his paper Cyberterrorism in a Post Stuxnet World. He assigned a
number of attributes associated with the different cyber phenomena of; cyber
attack, hacktivism, cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism. When comparing these
attributes to other identified definitions of cyberterrorism, Kenney’s notion closely
represents what is considered a true cyberterrorist attack. Figure 2 below is a
graphical representation of the four attributes of the cyber phenomenon.

30
Attribute 1: Computer attack targeting other computers, computer systems,
or the information they contain.
This first attribute can be applied to any of the cyber phenomena as this attribute
shows that the attack must be directed towards a computer or computer system or
the information held on such a device.
Attribute 2: Attack in pursuit of a political, social or religious aim.
This attribute is shared with hacktivism, cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism. Each of
these phenomena will fit into one of the aims whether it is for example a hacktivist
with strong differing views of a current ruling government. Cyberterrorism usually
falls in line with either a religious or political aim.
Attribute 3: An attack threatens or produces physical violence against
persons, property or critical infrastructure.
Kenney suggests that this attribute solely fits within the arena of cyberterrorism but
it could easily be applied to cyberwarfare as well. It could be argued that the
thought of potential physical violence against a person is just as effective as the act
of violence itself.
Attribute 4: Attack causes widespread fear or physical intimidation in the
target of the attack and beyond the immediate victims.
This fourth attribute is one of the main goals of conventional terrorism and as such
must also be an attribute of cyberterrorism. This attribute does not apply to any
other cyber phenomena such as the hacktivist who is concerned with raising
awareness in relation to a topic they feel is either unjust or wrong in their opinion.
To summarise, only cyberterrorism fulfils all four attributes of the cyber
phenomena as a standard cyber attack only relates to the first attribute, hacktivism
relates to the first two attributes and cyberwarfare, although matching the first

31
three attributes, does not have the goal of causing widespread fear or intimidation
beyond the immediate victims or target of attack.
2.3 The Mimetic Virus in a Memetic World
The Good Times virus in the 1990s was one of the first widely spread mimetic
viruses back when personal computing and Internet use was in its infancy and not
as widespread as it is today. The virus was spread predominately through email
forwarding from recipient to recipient. Initially the warning emails contained a few
lines of text, which stated the destructive nature of the virus on data stored on hard
drives. As time went on the emails became more elaborate possibly from a
‘Chinese whisper’ type effect or from malicious users wanting to add fuel to the
fire and as a result the virus effects became more and more exaggerated. To date
the instigators of the Good Times virus have never come forward, some have
claimed responsibility for a number of different motives but the release is still
shrouded in mystery.
Since the early days of computers there have been numerous hoax viruses released;
although a hoax virus does not cause damage like their real counterparts they can
cause loss of money from user education, email server crashes from the flood of
warning emails from ‘concerned people’ and loss of income from damage to
reputation (Grocott, 2001, p. 4).

32
Many have tried to quantify the economic impact of a hoax virus on business2 and
below is an example of one such calculation.
Figure 3: The potential economic cost of a hoax virus (Grocott, 2001: 5)
2 1 minute = £0.53 based on an annual salary of £62,000

33
The Good Times virus spread through fear and naivety because the general
knowledge of computing was still considered by the masses as a great unknown.
Although as a society we may have become more technologically savvy, systems
have become so complex that knowledge of computing is still a great unknown to
most of the population.
Email has been surpassed as the main source of digital communication and we live
in a world where social media plays a massive part for example every minute over
300 hours of video footage is uploaded to YouTube (YouTube, 2015) and 15
million text messages (McVeigh, 2012) and 204 million emails are sent
(Knoblauch, 2014). Facebook has 1.49 billion monthly active members and on the
28th August 2015 ‘for the first time ever, one billion people used Facebook in a
single day’ (Zuckerberg, 2015) along with 500 million tweets sent per day
(Twitter, 2015). We are no longer confined to our desks in offices and homes;
information and services can be accessed using laptops, mobile phones, tablets and
a whole host of other small portable smart devices. Day to day we are bombarded
with information from peers and if something is deemed funny, outrageous,
offensive or of topical interest it has the ability to traverse the globe in seconds
with millions if not tens of millions sharing the information.
This research will look at how social media plays a part in peoples’ lives and
whether they would pass information on to others regardless of any substantiation
or verification of what has been seen, read or heard. In the 1990s the Good Times
virus spread from person to person causing fear in the recipient. The question
relevant today to this research is: in our increasingly connected world would, given
the right set of circumstances, the release of a modern mimetic virus by
cyberterrorists have the same effect as the Good Times virus?

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2.4 Creating the Mimetic Virus
In an article by Greenberg (2011) it was shown that batteries inside Apple
MacBooks could be attacked through corrupting the battery’s microcontroller
which monitors battery temperature and power levels; by directly attacking these
microcontrollers the batteries were damaged and rendered useless needing to be
replaced. The end of the article went on to suggest that more sinister actions could
be performed on the battery by bypassing other inbuilt safeguards, with the
suggestion that they could be made to explode. The idea that a laptop battery could
be compromised by a computer virus and then made to explode is not a new one as
can be seen in a rather alarmist and dubious piece of journalism from the Weekly
World News in 2000 entitled ‘Hackers can turn your home computer in to a
BOMB’.
The reports in 2010 of the release of Stuxnet showed the world that the computer
virus had evolved from something that could corrupt or delete data on a storage
device to one that had an actual physical damaging effect on computer attached
hardware in this case centrifuges in operation within Iran’s nuclear enrichment
program. This also introduced the mainstream public to the phrase cyberwarfare
and other terms such as weaponised virus and cyber attacks.
The video upload site YouTube contains hundreds of videos of people filming the
explosive nature of lithium polymer and lithium ion batteries both of which can be
found in many portable devices ranging from mobile phones to laptop computers.
With all this in mind it is not that far a stretch of the imagination that a weaponised
computer virus could attack a laptop battery in order to cause a catastrophic failure
and potential explosion. Based on this a video clip was created in order to visually
display these explosive effects on a subject laptop.

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3 Chapter Three – Methodology
3.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this research was to examine a mimetic virus and whether it was a
viable method of attack for cyberterrorism. To meet this aim six objectives were
identified:
1. To determine the frequency and use of social media by each participant
2. To explore current understanding and level of fear from cyberterrorism
3. To establish whether a population could be placed in a state of fear through
witnessing a cyberterrorist attack
4. To establish whether a population could be influenced to act in a particular
way due to the threat of cyberterrorist attack
5. To explore whether attitudes towards cyberterrorism could be influenced by
unsubstantiated claims
6. To explore whether a mimetic virus would be easily spread via social
media
3.2 Data Collection
To fulfil the objectives of this research, a quantitative research method was
adopted rather than a qualitative one (although question 8 did require respondents
to add some text explaining why they had chosen either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer).
Qualitative research is more concerned with an ‘understanding of the underlying
reasons, opinions and motivations’ (Wyse, 2011) which can provide a basis to

36
formulate a hypothesis that may then lead to further research. A quantitative
research method was better suited to this research project as it is a more scientific
method of collecting data (Churchill, 2011). It was decided that a short online
questionnaire (See Appendix A) be utilised. Although Bell (2005) suggests
utilising a pilot study to test the functionality of a questionnaire, it was not possible
due to time constraints. To create the questionnaire the website SurveyMonkey
was used. By creating an electronic questionnaire it could be distributed and
completed via mobile phone, the Internet or social media; for these reasons an
electronic questionnaire was the preferred method of data collection for this
research project.
One of the objectives of the questionnaire was to measure previous and current
attitudes of levels of fear towards cyberterrorism. At the start of the questionnaire a
short introduction was used to highlight the current research in reference to
cyberterrorism and CNI. Part of this initial text introduced the concept of
cyberterrorism to the participant, which many may not have even heard of. For
example, question 5 asked participants their current understanding of the term
cyberterrorism with a multiple choice answer ranging from no knowledge to a full
understanding. Once this question was asked information was then presented that
gave a short, clear and concise definition so participants that had little or no
understanding of cyberterrorism could then relate to the subject matter in order to
answer the remaining questions. The questions included within the questionnaire
needed to be brief in order to not just address the specific hypothesis but to keep
the participant engaged with the content. Closed questions were used in order to
limit the responses that could be made and ensure that the questionnaire was fast
flowing (Gilbert, 2001). Questions 1 – 4 were designed to gather information in
reference to gender, age, preferred computing device and social media use.
Questions 5 – 7 directly referred to cyberterrorism and how each participant
defined the term and their current and any modified levels of fear from attack after

37
the sample video clip had been viewed. Questions 8 and 9 asked the participant if
their habits or behaviour might be modified by a specific cyberterrorism threat, and
lastly question 10 looked at whether the virus could be spread via social media.
The research adopted a deductive approach in order to confirm or disprove the idea
that ‘fear can be instilled in an individual through a mimetic virus, as a form of
cyberterrorism’. The deductive approach involved asking specific research
questions with the target section of the population, analysing the answers and then
testing the hypothesis against the data collected; which may or may not confirm the
original theory (Trochim, 2006), depending on the results from the quantitative
research (Beiske, 2007).
In utilising a mimetic virus as a cyberterrorist attack, it was identified that attribute
three and four of the cyber phenomenon became the ultimate goal of such an
attack. Attribute three states that an attack produces the threat of or actual physical
violence against persons or property. In order to achieve attribute three it would be
necessary to create some form of propaganda that facilitates the thought in the
participant of physical harm or violence against an individual. Attribute four
involves the widespread fear amongst the target, which could then influence a
wider audience. To demonstrate this potential it was decided that to accompany the
questionnaire a short video clip presenting the audience with a demonstration of a
‘weaponised computer virus’ and its resulting effect on a laptop. A video clip can
be a highly effective visual medium, as the audience does not need to fully
understand any technical content presented in the video clip but as long as the
ultimate message is presented in a graphical way its message would still be
understood.
Before showing the video clip it was necessary to introduce the participant to the
notion that a computer virus could have a physical effect rather than just delete or

38
corrupt data held on a computer device. The Stuxnet virus has been widely
publicised in the media but the participant may have heard the name but not known
the effect it had. A brief few lines of text were included as reference explaining the
effect of the Stuxnet virus but more importantly this text introduced the participant
to the idea of a ‘weaponised virus’. Like any good Hollywood film where the
initial opening scenes give the viewer specific but limited information that suggest
plot lines into their subconscious, the same idea was applied with the questionnaire
where words such as ‘extremely complex’, ‘developed by the military’ and ‘kept in
a level 1 quarantine / isolation facility’ all added to the drama and participants’
expectation of what they would view in the video clip.
The video clip was specifically created to be outlandish so that it would evoke a
reaction in the participant that could be measured by the remaining questions. Once
the questionnaire was completed the participant was then informed that everything
they had seen in the video clip was fictitious and purely theoretical in order to
address the research hypothesis and determine if a mimetic virus could be an
effective cyberterrorist attack method with the aim of putting a population in fear
of their computer equipment.
3.3 Sampling
Due to time constraints it was decided that participants were to be selected through
opportunistic and volunteer sampling. These two combined methods proved
effective as the participants on receiving and reading the email chose to take part
and were available at the time of receipt (McLeod, 2014). Opportunistic methods
can sometimes be unrepresentative and biased due to the responses coming from
participants of a particular group; in this case, a DeMontfort University student
email list that may have targeted those with an interest in computer technology. It
was estimated that a sample of 100 participants would provide a good cross-section

39
of the public; this number was also the set number of maximum completed
questionnaires that could be gathered from creating a free account with the
SurveyMonkey website. It was acknowledged that if the questionnaire was
answered by predominantly young technology students the data could lead to
skewed results. In order to attract a wider range of age, gender and diverse
backgrounds social media was used. A number of different strategies to obtain
participants had already been established and it was decided that the method used
to distribute the electronic questionnaire would be through social media, namely
Facebook.
3.4 Ethics
To ensure participants were fully aware of what was required from them when
completing the questionnaire a number of strategies were used.
By utilising an online questionnaire participation was voluntary and the issue of
anonymity was easily addressed. It was not necessary to obtain any personal data
other than the participant’s age group and gender and even these two questions
were optional as to whether they were answered or not. Participants were made
aware of the purpose of the research and that their participation would be greatly
valued, although they were not required to take part if they did not wish to do so
(deVaus, 2014). If at any point they wished to end the questionnaire they could and
whatever progress they had made was deleted upon exit.
Part of the questionnaire included a video clip which was presented in such a way
as to provoke a measurable reaction in the participant; a question with regard to
participants’ levels of fear was presented before and after this video clip. In order
to forewarn the participant, a short disclaimer was placed before the video clip to
inform them that the video may cause alarm or distress and that they could end the
questionnaire if they did not wish to view the video clip.

40
Lastly, it was important to ensure that the hardware used in the production of the
video clip, in this case a laptop, was not identifiable. Wherever there was a
brand/logo, model or other identifiable feature on the laptop it was obscured with
black adhesive tape. Also covered was any information pertaining to the inbuilt
processor and preinstalled software. By obscuring any identifiable features it
ensured that there was no deformation of reputation of any hardware or software
relating to the video clip.
3.5 Reliability and Validity
A badly worded question could cause a participant to have a different
understanding of it to another person. This is especially true where the participant
may have some or no knowledge of cyberterrorism. In order to ensure that the data
collected was reliable the questions presented were worded carefully so they would
not be misinterpreted. All of the questions posed ensured that it did not matter as to
the technical knowledge or ability of each participant.
The validity of the research is defined as such if it ‘measures or describes what it is
supposed to measure or describe’ (Bell, 2005: 104). The questions asked in this
questionnaire were specificially selected to address the identified objectives
relating to the hypothesis and therefore were considered as relevant in obtaining
answers from each participant.

41
3.6 Data Analysis
The data collected from the questionnaires were recorded and interpreted in
accordance with the six identified objectives of this research. The analysis of the
data was designed to explore any similarities, differences or patterns among the
responses and any underlying relationships. The questionnaire data was largely
quantitative and provided good relationships when determining specific criteria
such as age and social media use, for example. Each multiple choice and Likert
question was weighted using the same weighting criteria so there were no
inconsistencies when analysing the data. The data was presented using pie charts
and bar charts to display participants’ responses (Bell, 2005).

42
4 Chapter Four – Results
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and discusses the quantitative data obtained from the
questionnaire, analysed in accordance with the six objectives identified in the
methodology chapter. Questionnaires were distributed through social media and
this proved highly successful with the target number of 100 participants being
reached within 24 hours.
4.2 Key aims and objectives of the research
The data was analysed by examining each objective in turn. To recap, the six
identified objectives were:
1. To determine the frequency and use of social media by each participant
2. To explore current understanding and level of fear from cyberterrorism
3. To establish whether a population could be placed in a state of fear through
witnessing a cyberterrorist attack
4. To establish whether a population could be influenced to act in a particular
way due to the threat of cyberterrorist attack
5. To explore whether attitudes towards cyberterrorism could be influenced by
6. To explore whether a mimetic virus would be easily spread via social
media

43
4.3 Frequency and use of social media by each participant
It was anticipated that the results from the questionnaire would produce an equal
amount of male and female respondents. However respondents were
predominantly male; from the total respondents, 72 were male and 28 were female
resulting in a 2.5:1 ratio of males to females. Although this result does not deter
from addressing the first objective it is a limiting factor in adding additional value
to the research in terms of comparing males’ and females’ responses.
Figure 4: Participant gender
72%
28%
Male
Female

44
The second question addressed the relevant age group of the respondent. As with
gender, it was anticipated that the data could be cross-referenced showing possible
age groups that could be an easier or more susceptible target. The age groups
defined for this question were defaults which were set within the SurveyMonkey
website software, they could have been altered if required, but it was found that the
pre-set age ranges of ten year group bands were suitable for this questionnaire. As
before, participants’ ages were skewed with the majority of participants falling into
two main age groups; 25 – 34 and 35 – 44. This meant it was not possible to cross
reference age group data.
Figure 5: Participant age group
0 10 20 30 40 50
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+
Age Group 6 40 44 3 3 3 0

45
1%
32%
13%
54%
Never
Occasionally
Only for Work/University
Main Computing Device
Question 3 was of particular importance to the proposed mimetic virus as the
method of attack was to compromise a laptop battery; if a large number of the
participants and their family members used other devices such as tablets or desktop
computers a number of the questions and sample video could have limited
responses from participants. However, as the following shows laptops were used
by all but one participant.
Figure 6: Participant and family laptop use
This research looked at the mimetic virus as an attack method for cyberterrorism,
but in order for the attack to be successful it relied on each targeted person passing
the threat on to others through social media. The literature review examined the
Good Times virus which is considered to the first mimetic computer virus and was
passed from person to person to great effect via email when social media was non-
existent. The mimetic virus chapter showed that the use of social media has
exploded to staggering proportions where users range into the hundreds of millions
and some applications even higher.

46
As the following figure demonstrates the results of this question clearly show that
over 90% of participants check their social media at least once per day. Although
these results when cross-referenced with participant’s age and gender would be
limited, this question has established that a large majority of participants frequently
use social media and clearly addresses the first identified objective. This question
answered the first objective of how many participants used social media and how
often it was used.
Figure 7: Frequency of social media use
4%
0%
5%
21%
70%
Rarely
Once per week
Few times per week
Daily
More than once per day

47
4.4 Current understanding and level of fear from cyberterrorism
Question 5 primarily looked at how much prior knowledge or understanding
participants had in relation to cyberterrorism; it could be anticipated that if the
participant had little or no knowledge of cyberterrorism their current fear levels of
a cyberterrorist attack against them would be low.
Responses to this question demonstrate there was a large proportion; a third of all
those that responded, who had little to no understanding of the term
cyberterrorism. It was anticipated that both ends of the scale would have a similar
small number of responses but the data proved this was not the case. A third of
participants believed they fully understood what the term cyberterrorism. This may
have come from an understanding of what conventional terrorism is and what the
term cyber means to them. Any future research could consider asking participants
to give their definition of cyberterrorism to explore this issue further.
Figure 8: Prior knowledge of cyberterrorism
6%
16%
45%
33%
Never heard of the term
Yes but unsure to what it is
Yes a little understanding
Fully understand what it is

48
After this question had been answered, the survey displayed a concise, popular
definition of cyberterrorism as detailed below:
In order for an act to qualify as cyberterrorism it must:
 Occur in cyberspace
 Use some form of computer system in order to carry out an attack on a
target computer system or the information it may hold
 The action must cause fear through violence or harm to persons or
property
 Be politically, religiously or ideologically motivated
A cyber terrorist commits the act of cyberterrorism using a computer that is
considered as a weapon.
This explanation ensured that participants knew exactly what cyberterrorism was,
regardless of how they had previously answered the question. With a clear
definition of cyberterrorism the subsequent question of current levels of fear could
then be measured, as the respondent had the information needed in order to
understand cyberterrorism and how they perceived themselves as a potential target.

49
Question 6 was measured using the Likert scale and was asked prior to viewing the
video clip; by utilizing this type of response a direct comparison could be made to
any increased levels of fear when compared to the same question once the sample
video clip had been viewed. As anticipated the overwhelming majority of
responses (78%) were at the lower end of the scale and the average rating per
participant was 1.86. To date there has been very little reporting regarding
cyberterrorism attacks on either CNI or the general public and as such the levels of
fear in each participant were expected to be low. The responses from question 5
and 6 both answered the second objective of knowledge and current level of fear of
cyberterrorism.
Figure 9: Current fear levels of cyberterrorist attack
0 10 20 30 40 50
1 (Low)
2
3
4
5 (High)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High)
Current Fear 40 38 18 4 0

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4.5 Could a population be placed in a state of fear through witnessing a
cyberterrorist attack
This and the previous question were directly linked to addressing the research. As
stated earlier, it was anticipated that initial fear levels of a cyberterrorist attack
would be low as there have been no previous high profile examples reported in the
media that participants could relate to. A video clip was fabricated solely for the
survey in order to make the audience believe there was a genuine weaponised virus
that could attack a laptop battery causing it to catastrophically fail with an
explosive result. To introduce the video clip, text was added to the questionnaire
that ‘set the scene’ and a number of key phrases were used to add credibility and a
sense of drama to the sample video clip.
The specific text used to accomplish this was:
The majority of computer viruses released in the wild cause damage to software
and information held on a storage device. Iran's nuclear program was attacked
by the Stuxnet virus in 2010 causing considerable damage. Stuxnet was the first
widely known virus that caused physical damage to computer attached
hardware. Since Stuxnet other viruses have been developed, Al-Qutur-458 is one
such virus.
Please note that the Al-Qutur-458 virus is an extremely complex 'weaponised'
virus developed by the military and has been kept within a Level 1 quarantine /
isolation facility and is a demonstration as to the current capability of a cyber
attack.

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If the video succeeded in making the viewer believe the illustrated threat was real,
the responses to question 7 should be different from the initial baseline responses
in question 6. The results when analysed did in fact indicate an elevated level of
fear in the audience after the video had been viewed, which showed that the video
of the weaponised virus created for this research did indeed have some effect.
Figure 10: Modified fear levels of cyberterrorist attack
It was observed that fear levels had increased and were much more distributed
throughout the Likert scale. The lowest rating had decreased by 36% with the
highest rating (4 and 5) increasing by 500%. The average weighting had increased
from 1.86 to 2.38 a rise of 28% in the average level of fear when compared across
the 100 participants. Comparing the two questions in relation to levels of fear fully
addressed and answered the third objective and showed that a population could be
placed in a state of fear from witnessing a specific and targeted cyberterrorist
attack.
0 10 20 30 40 50
1 (Low)
2
3
4
5 (High)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High)
Modified Fear 26 32 22 18 2

52
4.6 Could a population be influenced to act in a particular way due to the
threat of cyberterrorist attack
The research proved that an audience could be placed in a heightened state of fear
from a specific cyberterrorist attack, but it also wanted to explore what effect it
could have on participants’ behavior. The video clip shown was a hoax but this
was not yet revealed to participants. Question 8 asked participants whether the
effects of this virus would modify their or their family’s use of their laptop.
The responses to this question were a simple yes or no answer but the participant
was requested to add text justifying or explaining their reasoning. Although the
text was of a qualitative nature it was not analysed but instead provided a good
insight into participants’ thoughts of the virus, video and cyberterrorism.
Analysing the results of this question showed that almost three quarters of the
participants would not modify their or their family’s use of their laptop.
Figure 11: Modified use of laptop
29%
71%
Yes
No

53
Although question 7 had shown that there was an increase in levels of fear of
cyberterrorist attack it appeared that this increase would not modify participants’
behaviour. Examining a selection of the text comments from the yes responses
suggested that some of the respondents would take more precautions when using
their laptop. Comments included ‘unplug [the laptop] from the mains when not in
use’ and ‘check my computer temperature more frequently’. There were a few
participants who thought of not just their future personal use but their children’s
unsupervised use of the family laptop for example ‘may make me think twice
before children use technology in house’ and ‘I'd become fearful that an external
source could turn a device regularly used by my children into an explosive
weapon’.
Analysing the no responses, a large majority of these fell into one of two
categories; there were those that would assume their current installed antivirus
software would safeguard them from potential attack such as ‘I would make sure
my anti-virus up to date’ and ‘assume anti-virus software would afford protection’.
There were those that did not deem themselves as a potential target or of low target
value. For example a couple of responses were ‘unlikely to be a target, low value’
and ‘I don't see myself as a target’. This question addressed the fourth objective of
determining whether a population be influenced to act in a particular way due to
the threat of cyberterrorist attack. The majority of answers to this objective was no
but from examining the individual responses from participants this came with an
assumption their security and antivirus software would afford them protection
from the proposed threat.

54
4.7 Could attitudes towards cyberterrorism be influenced by
Throughout the literature review it has been shown that a common definition that is
shared by conventional terrorism and cyberterrorism is that an attack not only
affects the initial targets but can influence or affect an indirect target. A terrorist
organisation could choose a population as the direct target of attack but the indirect
target could, for example, be a particular manufacturer of computer technology.
Question 9 sought to explore the relationship between a targeted cyberterrorist
attack on a computer equipment manufacturer and whether a participant would
choose to purchase computer equipment if they knew a virus similar to the
example shown was targeting that manufacturer or the products they produced
were susceptible to this type of virus. The data answered the fifth objective and
showed that over three quarters of all those that responded could be influenced into
not purchasing products from a manufacturer that they knew was being targeted or
their products were susceptible to potential attack similar to the one posed in the
sample video.
Figure 12: Targeted manufacturer
76%
24%
Yes
No

55
4.8 Could a mimetic virus be easily spread via social media
A mimetic virus needs to be passed from person to person in order to have an
effect on the target as a whole. It has been shown how the Good Times virus
spread from person to person solely through email but in today’s society a mimetic
virus has many more opportunities to spread through the prevalent use of social
media. This final question asked participants whether they would circulate the
video threat through social media without having verified its originality. There
were three possible answers to this question: yes, yes after verification and no.
It was anticipated that the majority of the answers would fall into the yes after
verification category with a few responses within the yes and no categories. This
question answered the sixth and final objective, however, the results to this
question were surprising and showed that 59% of respondents stating they would
not pass the information on regardless of whether it was verified or not.
Figure 13: Circulate a threat through social media
2%
39%
59%
Yes
Yes/verified
No

56
4.9 Summary
The responses gathered from the questionnaire suggest that a mimetic virus used as
an attack method for cyberterrorism could have an effect on a population. The data
was drawn from predominately males aged 25 – 44 years; although this limited the
data that could be cross-referenced, the results still address the idea of whether a
mimetic virus is a viable cyberterrorist attack against a target population. Social
media was shown to play a large part of respondents’ computer interaction where
over 90% check their social media at least once a day. Responses from other
questions clearly show that the video had an impact on viewers resulting in an
increased level of fear of cyberterrorist attack. There was evidence that although
laptop use would not necessarily change, the overall attitude was that more caution
would be taken when using equipment and that security and protective measures
such as up-to-date antivirus software is maintained. There was also confirmation
that the majority of respondents witnessing this particular attack would not
purchase products from a manufacturer that was either being targeted or produced
equipment that was susceptible to this particular virus. As to the spread of a
mimetic virus, the results suggest it would not be passed from person to person
which was a surprising result considering how other hoax viruses have spread for
example the Good Times virus.

57
5 Conclusion
This research has examined whether a mimetic virus would be a viable method of
attack against a population with respect to cyberterrorism. The literature review has
shown that, like conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism is a controversial subject
without a clear concise definition, resulting in different meanings and
consequences depending on who it is being defined by and what their motivations
are.
There is a lot of confusion as to what constitutes a cyberterrorist attack. There is
evidence which demonstrates there are three main theories on the subject of
cyberterrorism ranging from the belief that it does not exist due to the lack of terror
or destruction it could cause to those who believe it is an impending apocalypse,
which could have not just regional but global consequences. Finally there are those
that consider the term too rigid and any act which links to terrorism such as fund-
raising, posting online videos and other propaganda should be considered
cyberterrorism. A great deal of literature and research involves CNI as the main
focus of potential attack from cyberterrorists, but little has been done to address
other targets, for example, the general public such as this research has done.
The research showed that although people are aware of cyberterrorism their current
level of fear of being a potential target of attack is relatively low. However, when
presented with what participants believed was a genuine weaponised computer
virus, their levels of fear increased; it is suggested that the video clip led them to
the possibility that if such a weapon got into the hands of a cyberterrorist they
could in fact be the target of attack and that their laptop could be used to cause
them or their family physical harm. Once the threat of potential attack had been
instilled in the individual the research then explored whether behavior could be
influenced or indeed changed. The data showed that even though the majority of

58
participants would not change their laptop use almost all of the participants stated
they would be more cautious with their laptop activities and ensure that anti-virus
and security software was up-to-date.
The results chapter has highlighted that a targeted mimetic virus can indeed have
an effect on a population and is a potential attack method for cyberterrorism.
Cyberterrorism like conventional terrorism not only influences the direct target of
attack but can in turn influence others. A population as the focus of attack can lead
to consciously or unconsciously directing the target to act in a particular way.
Three quarters of the research participants stated they would boycott purchasing
from a particular manufacturer if they knew that manufacturer was being targeted
or its products were susceptible to an attack like the one presented in the video
clip. In the past, companies which have suffered cyber attacks by cyber criminals
have lost considerable amounts of revenue, credibility and customers. It has been
shown that a cyberterrorist attack that directly targets a population could have the
objective in influencing a population to act or behave in a certain way and by
influencing a population could indirectly affect another target, the real target of the
cyberterrorist.
The data obtained from this research shows that over 90% of all those who
responded check social media at least once a day. Social media plays an important
role in our day-to-day lives such as connections to friends and family, news,
advertising and current trends. A mimetic virus requires a vessel in order to
propagate itself. The Good Times virus did this to great effect using just email as
its method of propagation. The idea that a mimetic virus could be transmitted
through Memetics utilizing social media as its vessel; this did not appear to be the
case as the majority of participants stated they would not circulate the virus threat
regardless of the whether its originality was verified. It is suggested that
participants who responded ‘no’ to this question may have answered it as to how

59
they believed they should answer as when asking for help in obtaining participants
for this research, many friends were more than happy to share the Facebook post
without question or requiring more detail as to its purpose or authenticity.
To summarise, the current literature and research regarding cyberterrorism needs to
be more clearly defined. Conventional terrorism although a controversial subject,
exists and has a generally recognised definition when applied to specific acts of
violence and destruction of property. Cyberterrorism on the other hand does not.
Although this particular research looked at an alternative target of cyberterrorist
attack using a mimetic virus as an attack method it was noted that more research
needs to be made in defining cyberterrorism.
A number of anticipated results were obtained from this research, but there were
some unexpected findings. Firstly, as to whether a mimetic virus could spread
through the use of Memetics, lessons in history demonstrate it has been done to
great effect although this research suggests the opposite in this case. Secondly,
more people than anticipated had an understanding of what constitutes
cyberterrorism. Even with a good understanding the audience could be influenced
to act in a specific manner to a specific threat against them or a particular
manufacturer and that the level of fear from cyberterrorist attack could be
increased given the right set of circumstances. This research has implications for
business if manufacturers of laptops or anti-virus software were ever targeted in
such a manner. There is also the possibility for additional research to further
explore participants understanding of cyberterrorism and whether people do
actually forward unverified information through social media. To conclude, this
research has provided a unique opportunity to explore cyberterrorism through a
mimetic virus; for a brief period of time participants were led to believe that they
could come to physical harm from their use of a laptop and which increased their
levels of fear of such an attack.

60
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