Este documento resume la situación económica de Venezuela en 2010. Las exportaciones petroleras y no petroleras cayeron significativamente en 2009 debido a la caída de los precios del petróleo. A pesar de esto, el PIB solo cayó un 3.3% gracias a políticas como el uso de reservas internacionales y fondos del gobierno para apoyar las importaciones y mantener estable la tasa de cambio paralela. Sin embargo, se produjo una gran fuga de capitales privados.
Esta presentación resume el estado actual de la economía venezolana y sus perspectivas, cerrado el año 2012 y cuatro meses (estadísticamente reportados) del 2013. Está dividida para fines didácticos en 1) Sector real, 2) Restricción fiscal, 3) Restricción de divisas, y 4) Perspectivas
The literature on external default has stressed the existence of the so-called debt-intolerance puzzle: developing nations tend to default at debt-to-GDP ratios well bellow those of developed countries. The underestimation or plain omission of domestic debt may account for a fraction of that puzzle. We calculate fiscal revenues coming from financial repression using different methodologies for the case of Venezuela, and look at their correspondence with comprehensive measures of capital flight. In particular, we add to the standard measure of capital flight the over-invoicing of imports, rife in periods of exchange controls. We find that financial repression accounts for public revenues similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of the latter having much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. We also find that financial repression and capital flight is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and interest rate caps. We interpret this as significant evidence suggesting a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via capital flight.
Much of the achievements in poverty and inequality reduction do not respond to Hugo Chavez social programs, but rather to higher public expenditure, fueling an import consumption boom. OIl was not enough, foreign debt increased fourfold. This presentation evaluates current state of Venezuelan economy under Maduro and draft some guidelines to achieving equitable growth
Un diagnóstico de la grave situación económica de Venezuela y algunos lineamientos de política para el diseño de un programa de reconstrucción nacional
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
Esta presentación resume el estado actual de la economía venezolana y sus perspectivas, cerrado el año 2012 y cuatro meses (estadísticamente reportados) del 2013. Está dividida para fines didácticos en 1) Sector real, 2) Restricción fiscal, 3) Restricción de divisas, y 4) Perspectivas
The literature on external default has stressed the existence of the so-called debt-intolerance puzzle: developing nations tend to default at debt-to-GDP ratios well bellow those of developed countries. The underestimation or plain omission of domestic debt may account for a fraction of that puzzle. We calculate fiscal revenues coming from financial repression using different methodologies for the case of Venezuela, and look at their correspondence with comprehensive measures of capital flight. In particular, we add to the standard measure of capital flight the over-invoicing of imports, rife in periods of exchange controls. We find that financial repression accounts for public revenues similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of the latter having much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. We also find that financial repression and capital flight is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and interest rate caps. We interpret this as significant evidence suggesting a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via capital flight.
Much of the achievements in poverty and inequality reduction do not respond to Hugo Chavez social programs, but rather to higher public expenditure, fueling an import consumption boom. OIl was not enough, foreign debt increased fourfold. This presentation evaluates current state of Venezuelan economy under Maduro and draft some guidelines to achieving equitable growth
Un diagnóstico de la grave situación económica de Venezuela y algunos lineamientos de política para el diseño de un programa de reconstrucción nacional
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
The Growth Lab at Harvard CID prepared this presentation to be shared with Namibia's High Panel for Economic Growth, established by President Hage Geingob.
In the decade 1999-2009, Jordan experienced an impressive growth acceleration, tripling its exports and increasing income per capita by 38%. Since then, a number of external shocks that include the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009), the Arab Spring (2011), the Syrian Civil War (2011), and the emergence of the Islamic State (2014) have affected Jordan in significant ways and thrown its economy out of balance. Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has ballooned from 55% (2009) to 94% (2018). The economy has continued to grow amidst massive fiscal adjustment and balance of payments constraints, but the large increase in population – by 50% between 2008 and 2017 – driven by massive waves of refugees has resulted in a 12% cumulative loss in income per capita (2010-2017). Moving forward, debt sustainability will require not only continued fiscal consolidation but also faster growth and international support to keep interest payments on the debt contained. We have developed an innovative framework to align Jordan’s growth strategy with its changing factor endowments. The framework incorporates service industries into an Economic Complexity analysis, utilizing the Dun and Bradstreet database, together with an evaluation of the evolution of Jordan’s comparative advantages over time. Combining several tools to identify critical constraints faced by sectors with the greatest potential, we have produced a roadmap with key elements of a strategy for Jordan to return to faster, more sustainable and more inclusive growth that is consistent with its emerging comparative advantages.
The literature on income gaps between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico revolves around individual factors, such as education and ethnicity. Yet, twenty years after the Zapatista rebellion, the schooling gap between Chiapas and the other Mexican entities has shrunk while the income gap has widened, and we find no evidence indicating that Chiapas indigenes are worse-off than their likes elsewhere in Mexico. We explore a different hypothesis. Based on census data, we calculate the economic complexity index, a measure of the knowledge agglomeration embedded in the economic activities at a municipal level in Mexico. Economic complexity explains a larger fraction of the income gap than any individual factor. Our results suggest that chiapanecos are not the problem, the problem is Chiapas. These results hold when we extend our analysis to Mexico’s thirty-one federal entities, suggesting that place-specific determinants that have been overlooked in both the literature and policy, have a key role in the determination of income gaps.
For three years Harvard CID has been working on a plan to rescue Venezuela and get the country on a path of sustainable, inclusive growth, and development. We have teamed with Venezuelan experts at home and abroad, worked with international institutions, and have started the process of building consensus around the plan among the opposition parties that control the Venezuelan National Assembly. The Venezuelan Caucus at the Kennedy School will be hosting a series of talks on Venezuela: The morning after, by different members of our team and on different topics. You can follow on their Facebook webpage. More coming soon, stay tuned!
El colapso económico de Venezuela no tiene precedentes en la historia económica posterior a la segunda guerra mundial. La caída paralela de la producción (49%) e importación per cápita (84%), conjuntamente con la hiper-inflación más alta registrada en doce meses consecutivos (200.005% en los doce meses previos a Agosto 2018), conforman un cuadro único de la catástrofe que le ha caído al país tras veinte años de socialismo.
Esta es una presentación compartida con el Frente Amplio de Venezuela en Julio de 2018, resultado del trabajo de un conjunto de investigadores del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard.
¿Cómo ha llegado Venezuela a la situación actual, y qué tan grave es el colapso que ha sufrido en función de otras catástrofes económicas registradas en el mundo?
On March 5th I had the privilege to host Lant Pritchett in my econometrics class at @Kennedy_School, sharing his work: "The RCT debate is over. We won. They lost." Nothing substitutes for listening to Lant, but here is a link to his compelling presentation".
Panama has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the previous decade. In that short but vibrant time span, the country managed to double its income per capita. Growth has been spearheaded by the development of a modern service sector on the activities surrounding the Canal, and non-residential construction. Large public infrastructure projects and the private provision for infrastructure demanded by the service sector, have fueled growth and expanded job opportunities for non-skilled workers.
Two warning signals hover over Panama’s stellar performance. The construction sector has been growing at a rate equivalent to doubling its stock of structures every four years. The demand for non-residential construction cannot grow indefinitely at a higher rate than the rest of the economy. Once the stock of infrastructure required by the service sector is set and large infrastructure projects are completed, the rate of growth will recede and other sectors shall take the leading role. The deceleration of construction, characterized by a lower demand of non-skilled labor, will feed into the second warning signal: Income inequality. In spite of the minor improvements registered over the accelerated-growth spell, Panama remains amongst the world's top five most unequal countries. Both warning signals point to the need of further diversifying the Panamanian economy, and promoting economic activity in the provinces so as to deconcentrate growth and make it more inclusive.
¿Cuánto tiempo le tomará a Venezuela recuperarse la catástrofe económica sufrida? Tomando en cuenta la propia experiencia de Venezuela y la del resto del mundo, establecemos la probabilidad de recuperación para diferentes escenarios y plazos.
Bajo el patrocinio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo y en el marco del programa de Ciudades Emergentes y Sostenibles, un equipo de Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard pasó la segunda parte del 2017 trabajando en Hermosillo, Sonora. Nuestra meta es analizar el desempeño económico reciente del lugar y su potencial económico, e identificar las restricciones más importantes al crecimiento.
Venezuela ha sufrido entre 2013-2017 el colapso más grande que haya registrado cualquier economía de América Latina en su historia, en época de paz o guerra. La caída de los precios y la producción petrolero, en combinación con el endeudamiento salvaje de la República en los tiempos de bonanza, ha dejado a la República exangüe y forzado una caída en las importaciones que ha llevado al país al borde de una crisis humanitaria. Aquí se simulan los impactos de algunos reformas económicas en el evento de una transición, desde el punto de vista de la balanza de pagos. En conclusión, aún haciendo supuestos muy optimistas, se hace imposible sacar al país adelante sin una combinación de ayuda internacional (asistencia extraordinaria del Fondo Monetario Internacional) Y una reestructuración de deuda muy agresiva.
We know diversification, extending production into more complex and higher value added goods and services, is they key to the process and development. And yet diversification implies doing things you currently don´t know how to do. Countries need to add new capabilities, which they cannot possibly have. We also know that it is easier to “move brains” to new locations, than to move knowhow into brains, i.e. moving experienced workers into a new location is faster than building experienced workers. Is this easier or even feasible to do? We find this is highly contingent on the “Sense of Us” as it regards policy areas like immigration and business travel. The "Sense of Us" is the collective illusion defining a place sense of who they are. Here we present three examples of three different policy engagements in Panama, Saudi Arabia and Chiapas (México), to show how did we stumble into the sense of us enthuse places, and how understanding it and be able to shape in a more inclusive way is cornerstone in the efforts to develop and grow out of poverty.
Un recorrido por los 50 casos de desastres económicos que se han registrado desde 1960: ¿En cuánto tiempo se recuperaron? ¿Buscaron asistencia internacional? ¿Los petroleros salieron más rápido? Algunas notas sobre los retos adaptativos que nos plantea la recuperación de la economía venezolana.
Una recorrido por la economía venezolana durante la revolución bolivariana: La fase de expansión basada en el boom petrolero y el acelerado endeudamiento externo, y el colapso. Una hoja de ruta para salir adelante entres fases: Emergencia, estabilización, y reforma estructural.
Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst economic losses ever registered by any country in a three-year period, either by Latin American or world standards. Poverty rates have skyrocketed and stand today beyond 80%. We define two landmarks for recovery, and revise how much would Venezuela need to grow - oil and non-oil sectors - and how likely are those rates from the Venezuela and the world´s experience. We end up by outlining some of the adaptive challenges Venezuela would need to tackle to engine a sustainable recovery.
Un grupo de profesores e investigadores de Harvard, con el auspicio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo, ha pasado 8 meses analizando el extraordinario período de crecimiento acelerado de Panamá, sus principales motores, los principales desequilibrios que se han ido creando y las potenciales restricciones al crecimiento sostenido de Panamá.
Antes de iniciar el contenido técnico de lo acontecido en materia tributaria estos últimos días de mayo; quisiera referirme a la importancia de una expresión tan sabia aplicable a tantas situaciones de la vida, y hoy, meritoria de considerar en el prefacio del presente análisis -
"no se extraña lo que nunca se ha tenido".
Con esta frase me quiero referir a las empresas que funcionan en las zonas de Iquique y Punta Arenas, acogidas a los beneficios de las zonas francas, y que, por ende, no pagan impuesto de primera categoría. En palabras técnicas estas empresas no mantienen saldos en sus registros SAC, y por ello, este nuevo Impuesto Sustitutivo, sin duda, es una tremenda y gran noticia.
Lo mismo se puede extender a las empresas que por haber aplicado beneficios de reinversión sumado a las ventajas transitorias de la menor tasa de primera categoría pagada; me refiero a las pymes en su mayoría. Han acumulado un monto de créditos menor en su registro SAC.
En estos casos, no es mucho lo que se tiene que perder.
Lo interesante, es que este ISRAI nace desde un pago efectivo de recursos, lo que exigirá a las empresas evaluar muy bien desde su posición financiera actual, y la planificación de esta, en un horizonte de corto plazo, considerar las alternativas que se disponen.
El 15 de mayo de 2024, el Congreso aprobó el proyecto de ley que “crea un Fondo de Emergencia Transitorio por incendios y establece otras medidas para la reconstrucción”, el cual se encuentra en las últimas etapas previo a su publicación y posterior entrada en vigencia.
Este proyecto tiene por objetivo establecer un marco institucional para organizar los esfuerzos públicos, con miras a solventar los gastos de reconstrucción y otras medidas de recuperación que se implementarán en la Región de Valparaíso a raíz de los incendios ocurridos en febrero de 2024.
Dentro del marco de “otras medidas de reconstrucción”, el proyecto crea un régimen opcional de impuesto sustitutivo de los impuestos finales (denominado también ISRAI), con distintas modalidades para sociedades bajo el régimen general de tributación (artículo 14 A de la ley sobre Impuesto a la Renta) y bajo el Régimen Pyme (artículo 14 D N° 3 de la ley sobre Impuesto a la Renta).
Para conocer detalles revisa nuestro artículo completo aquí BBSC® Impuesto Sustitutivo 2024.
Por Claudia Valdés Muñoz cvaldes@bbsc.cl +56981393599
El crédito y los seguros como parte de la educación financieraMarcoMolina87
El crédito y los seguros, son temas importantes para desarrollar en la ciudadanía capacidades que le permita identificar su capacidad de endeudamiento, los derechos y las obligaciones que adquiere al obtener un crédito y conocer cuáles son las formas de asegurar su inversión.
pablo LAMINAS A EXPONER PROYECTO FINAL 2023 sabado 28.10.23.pptxmarisela352444
Proyecto de PNF Contaduria de Diseño de herramientas en excel para mejorar el control de los registros contables de todas las operaciones relacionadas con las empresas
PMI sector servicios España mes de mayo 2024LuisdelBarri
Estudio PMI Sector Servicios
El Índice de Actividad Comercial del Sector Servicios subió de 56.2 registrado en abril a 56.9 en mayo, indicando el crecimiento más fuerte desde abril de 2023.