Chile miembro 31 de la OCDE
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Retos de la Economía Chilena y cómo aprovechar la membrecía en la OCDE para superarlos
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Chile miembro 31 de la OCDE
- 1. Chile miembro 31 de la OCDE Retos de la Economía Chilena y cómo aprovechar la membrecía en la OCDE para superarlos José Antonio Ardavín, OCDE Director del Centro de la OCDE en México para América Latina Universidad Miguel de Cervantes Santiago de Chile | 17 de mayo de 2010
- 2. (1) Perspectivas Económicas Contexto internacional Contexto nacional (2) Retos en el mediano y largo plazos (3) Chile + la OCDE Desigualdad, productividad, innovación y capital humano
- 3. La recuperación en camino… (1) mejoramiento de las condiciones financieras contexto internacional Note: A unit decline in the index implies a tightening in financial conditions sufficient to produce an average reduction in the level of GDP by 1/2 to 1% after four to six quarters. See details in Guichard et al. (2009). Source: Datastream; and OECD calculations.
- 4. (2) la producción industrial en fuerte recuperación en los BRICS… contexto internacional Note: Data for China are OECD estimates. Seasonally adjusted series for Brazil and China. Source: Datastream. Year-on-year percentage changes
- 5. … cuyo canal de transmisión al resto de la economía mundial es una franca recuperación del comercio internacional contexto internacional 1. Balance of respondents reporting an increase and a decrease in export orders. Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicator database; and OECD calculations.
- 6. (3) En la OCDE hay también signos claros de recuperación de la producción industrial contexto internacional Source: Datastream. Year-on-year percentage changes
- 7. … y mas importante aún, una recuperación de la confianza del consumidor contexto internacional Note: Purchasing Managers' Index: summary composite index based on the seasonally adjusted diffusion indices for five of the manufacturing survey indicators. Source: Markit Economics Limited; and OECD, Quarterly National Accounts database. Purchasing Managers’ Index
- 8. En suma: con diversas velocidades e intensidades, un panorama de recuperación (Abril 2010) contexto internacional Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth 1 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 United States -6.4 -0.7 2.2 5.6 2.4 (+/-1.6) 2.3 (+/-1.4) Japan -13.6 6.1 -0.5 3.8 1.1 (+/-2.5) 2.3 (+/-2.7) Euro 3 2 -10.1 0.7 2.0 0.4 0.9 (+/-1.4) 1.9 (+/-1.5) Germany -13.4 1.8 2.9 0.0 -0.4 (+/-1.8) 2.8 (+/-1.8) France -5.3 1.4 0.7 2.4 2.3 (+/-0.9) 1.7 (+/-1.1) Italy -10.4 -1.9 2.1 -1.3 1.2 (+/-1.4) 0.5 (+/-1.6) UK -10.0 -2.7 -1.1 1.8 2.0 (+/-1.1) 3.1 (+/-1.2) Canada -7.0 -3.5 0.9 5.0 6.2 (+/-1.0) 4.5 (+/-2.0) G7 -8.8 0.4 1.4 3.7 1.9 (+/-1.5) 2.3 (+/-1.7) 1. Based on GDP releases and high-frequency indicators published by 2 April 2010. Seasonally and in some cases also working-day adjusted. The error ranges (in parentheses) associated with the point estimates reflect the differences between model-based projections and outcomes during 2003-07 using the latest available vintage of GDP and indicator data. 2. The average of the three largest countries in the euro area (Germany, France and Italy).
- 9. … sin embargo también hay riesgos y retos, (1) ¿estamos ante el inicio de un nuevo patrón de desequilibrios de cuenta corriente? contexto internacional Source: OECD, Quarterly National Accounts database; and OECD, Main Economic Indicators database. Current account balance, in per cent of GDP
- 10. … (2) sumados a desequilibrios fiscales contexto internacional Note: Government balance for 2009 is an estimate for some countries. Countries are ranked according to the government balance in 2009. 1. Mainland Norway only. Source: OECD, System of National Accounts database; and OECD Economic Outlook 86 database. General government balance, in per cent of GDP
- 11. … y (3) sumados los efectos sociales de la crisis, que serán más perdurables contexto internacional Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators database; and OECD Economic Outlook 86 database. Actual unemployment rate, in per cent of the labour force
- 12. Para Chile, como para América Latina, la principal vía de afectación fue por la economía real Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009 Contexto nacional
- 13. A pesar de que la caída en el volumen del comercio de Chile no fue tan pronunciada, los términos de intercambio se deterioraron más que en el resto de la OCDE, por la caída en los precios de las materias primas Contexto nacional Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile Producción en Manufactura y Servicios La transmisión de la crisis económica a Chjle
- 14. La respuesta de la política monetaria y fiscal fue apropiada. Chile tuvo mayor capacidad que el resto de los países de América Latina para llevar a cabo estas medidas. Su retirada deberá ser gradual. Contexto nacional Estímulo Fiscal en Chile Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 15. Las perspectivas de crecimiento van acompañadas de algunos riesgos: posible menor crecimiento de la productividad, de la inversión y persistencia del desempleo Contexto nacional Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile Escenarios de crecimeinto del Producto
- 17. En la urgencia de atender el corto plazo, no debe perderse de vista el largo plazo… Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Desigualdad de Ingreso en Países de la OCDE Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 18. La productividad es el impulso al crecimiento económico de las economías Source: OECD Mexico Economic Survey 2007 Source: OECD Economic Surveys Mexico 2009 Fuentes del crecimiento 1987-2007 Retos en el mediano y largo plazos
- 19. … sin embargo en los últimos años el crecimiento de la productividad en Chile ha sido cercano a cero desde 1998 Source: OECD Mexico Economic Survey 2007 Fuentes del crecimiento 1987-2007 Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 20. … las causas son varias, entre otras, falta de competencia, regulación que inhibe diversivicación hacia sectores más productivos Source: OECD Mexico Economic Survey 2007 Composición de las Exportaciones en 2006 Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Sofisticación de las Exportaciones 2006 Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 21. … una baja propensión del sector privado a innovar en comparación con otros países de la OCDE Source: OECD Mexico Economic Survey 2007 Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 22. La solución de fondo a la desigualdad, productividad e innovación está en la educación Hace una generación, el 9% de la población de 25-34 años en Corea tenía educación terciaria, hoy, casi el 60% de la población en ese grupo de edad la tiene. Pasó así del lugar 19° al 2° de la OCDE Retos en el mediano y largo plazos
- 23. La fuente de talentos es fundamentalmente la población joven, de la AL tiene en abundancia… Porcentaje de la población de 0 - 15 años, 2007 Retos en el mediano y largo plazos
- 24. … pero aún hay que reforzar la calidad Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Education at a Glance 2009: OECD Indicators - OECD © 2009 - ISBN 9789264024755 Indicator A4 Indicator A4: What is the profile of 15-year-old top performers in science? Version 1 - Last updated: 19-Aug-2009
- 25. … de una forma homogenea en todos los sistemas escolares Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 26. … pues Chile es uno de los países donde el contexto socio económico determina más el desempeño educativo Retos en el mediano y largo plazos Source:OECD 2010 Economic Surveys: Chile
- 28. … asesora experta en muy diversos ámbitos y un receptáculo de mejores prácticas (3) Chile + la OCDE
- 29. … asesora experta en muy diversos ámbitos y un receptáculo de mejores prácticas (3) Chile + la OCDE
- 30. Chile miembro 31 de la OCDE Retos de la Economía Chilena y cómo aprovechar la membrecía en la OCDE para superarlos www.oecd.org/americalatina www.oecd.org/chile Esta presentación disponible en www.oecd.org/centrodemexico
Notas del editor
- Mexico was somewhat better prepared in 2008 than in the past to face external shocks . Sound macroeconomic policies had reduced inflation, domestic and foreign debt, and increased policy credibility. The low current account deficits implied lower foreign financing needs, and the build-up of foreign reserves provided cushion for turmoil. The financial sector is relatively sound and small with limited exposure to foreign assets or liabilities, and credit growth was contained by positive real interest rates, conservative lending policies and attractive investment opportunities in less risky government paper. Strict prudential regulations limited banks’ exposure to currency risk and risky products. Highest risks are with consumer credit, which had the most rapid growth. Main financial vulnerabilities stemmed from dependence on portfolio capital and reliance on direct foreign credit by enterprises . Foreign equity holdings have risen from 8 to 15% of GDP and foreigners have financed a steady one tenth of GDP of domestic bonds between 2001-08. The inflows into domestic bond markets had intensified during 2008 with the rise in the interest rate differential with the US and an appreciating peso. Mexican enterprises have relied on foreign banks abroad for close to half of their credit needs, which increases their vulnerability to currency risks and changes in lending conditions abroad. Therefore, the turmoil first hit Mexican capital markets as risk-aversion among foreign investors intensified in September 2008. The peso became under pressure as foreign portfolio investors pulled out from Mexico and other emerging economies (EM). The pressure on the currency was intensified by demand for dollars by large domestic enterprises to cover their long hedges on peso appreciation. Interventions by the central bank and the announcement of a swap facility with the US Fed and potential for a credit line with the IMF helped stabilize the markets which however remain volatile. The stock exchange also fell, and foreign bond spreads shot up as perceptions of risk changed. The search for short-term liquidity disrupted interbank and domestic bond markets causing a large spike in spreads, which were only stabilized after interventions by the government at the long end of the market.
- Mexico was somewhat better prepared in 2008 than in the past to face external shocks . Sound macroeconomic policies had reduced inflation, domestic and foreign debt, and increased policy credibility. The low current account deficits implied lower foreign financing needs, and the build-up of foreign reserves provided cushion for turmoil. The financial sector is relatively sound and small with limited exposure to foreign assets or liabilities, and credit growth was contained by positive real interest rates, conservative lending policies and attractive investment opportunities in less risky government paper. Strict prudential regulations limited banks’ exposure to currency risk and risky products. Highest risks are with consumer credit, which had the most rapid growth. Main financial vulnerabilities stemmed from dependence on portfolio capital and reliance on direct foreign credit by enterprises . Foreign equity holdings have risen from 8 to 15% of GDP and foreigners have financed a steady one tenth of GDP of domestic bonds between 2001-08. The inflows into domestic bond markets had intensified during 2008 with the rise in the interest rate differential with the US and an appreciating peso. Mexican enterprises have relied on foreign banks abroad for close to half of their credit needs, which increases their vulnerability to currency risks and changes in lending conditions abroad. Therefore, the turmoil first hit Mexican capital markets as risk-aversion among foreign investors intensified in September 2008. The peso became under pressure as foreign portfolio investors pulled out from Mexico and other emerging economies (EM). The pressure on the currency was intensified by demand for dollars by large domestic enterprises to cover their long hedges on peso appreciation. Interventions by the central bank and the announcement of a swap facility with the US Fed and potential for a credit line with the IMF helped stabilize the markets which however remain volatile. The stock exchange also fell, and foreign bond spreads shot up as perceptions of risk changed. The search for short-term liquidity disrupted interbank and domestic bond markets causing a large spike in spreads, which were only stabilized after interventions by the government at the long end of the market.
- Mexico was somewhat better prepared in 2008 than in the past to face external shocks . Sound macroeconomic policies had reduced inflation, domestic and foreign debt, and increased policy credibility. The low current account deficits implied lower foreign financing needs, and the build-up of foreign reserves provided cushion for turmoil. The financial sector is relatively sound and small with limited exposure to foreign assets or liabilities, and credit growth was contained by positive real interest rates, conservative lending policies and attractive investment opportunities in less risky government paper. Strict prudential regulations limited banks’ exposure to currency risk and risky products. Highest risks are with consumer credit, which had the most rapid growth. Main financial vulnerabilities stemmed from dependence on portfolio capital and reliance on direct foreign credit by enterprises . Foreign equity holdings have risen from 8 to 15% of GDP and foreigners have financed a steady one tenth of GDP of domestic bonds between 2001-08. The inflows into domestic bond markets had intensified during 2008 with the rise in the interest rate differential with the US and an appreciating peso. Mexican enterprises have relied on foreign banks abroad for close to half of their credit needs, which increases their vulnerability to currency risks and changes in lending conditions abroad. Therefore, the turmoil first hit Mexican capital markets as risk-aversion among foreign investors intensified in September 2008. The peso became under pressure as foreign portfolio investors pulled out from Mexico and other emerging economies (EM). The pressure on the currency was intensified by demand for dollars by large domestic enterprises to cover their long hedges on peso appreciation. Interventions by the central bank and the announcement of a swap facility with the US Fed and potential for a credit line with the IMF helped stabilize the markets which however remain volatile. The stock exchange also fell, and foreign bond spreads shot up as perceptions of risk changed. The search for short-term liquidity disrupted interbank and domestic bond markets causing a large spike in spreads, which were only stabilized after interventions by the government at the long end of the market.
- En México 16% de los jóvenes entre 25-34 años tienen educación superior (lugar 22 de 30) y sólo el 7% de aquellos entre 55 y 64 años.