Impacto del Cambio Climático en los Sectores de Infraestructura.
Implicancias de los impactos para las empresas, los usuarios de servicios públicos y para el ente regulador.
- Ejemplos de aplicación en empresas de electricidad y agua.
- Regímenes tarifarios y riesgos.
Desafíos para el marco Regulatorio.
2. 2
Estructura Lógica
Impacto del Cambio Climatico (CC) en los
Sectores de Infraestructura
Implicancias de dichos impactos para las
empresas y para el regulador
Desafíos para el marco regulatorio
3. 3
Impacto del CC en los sectores
de Infraestructura
Tres “dimensiones” del cambio climático (Vagliasindi):
Cambios en los promedios:
Los mayores promedios dan cuenta de mayores lluvias, mayores
temperaturas, faltantes de agua, y otros factores.
Incremento de varianzas:
menores posibilidades de predecir lluvias
mayor variabilidad de la temperatura
Mayores extremos:
surgimiento de tormentas, lluvias o sequías.
La economía es vulnerable a los impactos físicos del CC,
incluyendo el aumento en la intensidad y frecuencia de severos
eventos climáticos (como: sequías prolongadas, inundaciones,
tormentas y aumento del nivel del mar).
4. 4
Estudio de Caso - Australia:
análisis de riesgo
Sector Agua
Potencial para un incremento
en la frequencia de lluvias
extremas que afecten la
capacidad y mantenimiento de
la infraestructura de drenaje y
cloacas
Aceleración de la degradación
de los materiales y la
integridad estructural de la
oferta de agua, cloacas y las
cañerías de agua de tormenta
Las menores lluvias anuales
puede afectar el almacenaje y
la provisión de agua
Electricidad
Los aumentos en la frequencia
de tormentas extremas puede
causar daños significativos al
sector de transmisión y al
servicio.
Incrementos en los vientos y
relámpagos pueden dañar las
líneas de transmisión mientras
que las lluvias extremas puede
inuncar las estaciones
transformadoras.
Olas de calor extremas serán
más frequentes, lo que
incrementará la demanda pico
(aire acondicionado).
5. 5
Implicancias regulatorias
Los sectores de infraestructura se
caracterizan por grandes inversiones
Los sectores de infraestructura se identifican
con el largo plazo
Los riesgos mencionados anteriormente por
el CC en los sectores de infraestructura
tendrán necesariamente un impacto en el
diseño e implementación de una regulación
eficiente
6. Implicancias regulatorias
CC genera mayor riesgo e incertidumbre
Implicancias
Se profundiza el problema de la asimetría de
información
Se afectan los instrumentos regulatorios
Tarifas
Régimen Regulatorio
El regulador debe rever si los objetivos regulatorios están
siendo cumplidos considerando los trade-off entre ellos
7. 7
Implicancias e información I
Al CC al incrementar la incertidumbre incrementa la
asimetría de información entre la firma y el regulador.
Dado que el pasado no es más un buen predictor del
futuro existen menores fundamentos para la estimación
de demanda:
Las compañías se puede ver beneficiadas al tener mejores
medios que el regulador (en especial en países en
desarrollo)
La adaptación y mitigación tornan a los sectores
de infraestructura aún más capital intensivos:
El problema de asimetría de información es mayor en
los CAPEX que en los OPEX
8. 8
RU (electricidad): information
Quality Incentive Mechanism
OFGEM ha introducido, como parte de un nuevo
mecanismo de incentivos un mecanismo teniente a
incentivar la mejora en la calidad de la información
brindada por las firmas.
Mecanismo: fijar los ingresos de las firmas como un
promedio ponderado entre lo que la firme pide y lo
que el regulador considera.
El IQI incentiva a las firmas a proveer información
de buena calidad en términos de proyecciones a
través de proveer retornos más bajos a aquellas
compañías que sobre proyectan los requerimientos
de gastos.
9. 9
Implicancias e información II
Las firmas reguladas requieren de información del
regulador
con el fin de decidir e implementar su plan de
negocios.
Los reguladores requieren mayor información de
las empresas con el fin de diseñar políticas y
controlarlas.
Como importante emisores de CO2 las firmas en los
sectores de infraestructura (en especial las
energéticas) tienen el deber de informar a los
reguladores sobre sus emisiones para permitir el
diseño de planes de mitigación.
10. 10
RU (agua): información y PR09
Utilización de información climática desactualizada
para el diseño de los planes de inversión.
OFWAT acepta en la PR09 la revisión de los
requerimientos de inversión a ser reconocidos
hacia el interior del período tarifario.
11. 11
Objetivos sustantivos de la
regulación
Sostenibilidad
Retribuir adecuadamente al capital
Atraer capital a la industria
Minimizar aportes fiscales
Se requiere controlar la sustentabilidad económica y financiera
Eficiencia
Asignativa (reflejar el costo marginal del servicio para proveer
señales eficientes)
Productiva (incentivos a la minimización de Costos)
Equidad
Discriminación
Participación
12. 12
“Trade-offs” entre objetivos
Trade-offs entre objetivos Descripción
Eficiencia asignativa vs. sustentabilidad
Bajo condiciones de monopolio natural, los costos
marginales están por debajo de los costos
medios.
Eficiencia asignativa vs. eficiencia
productiva
La igualación de tarifas y costos puede reducir
incentivos a minimización de costos
Eficiencia asignativa vs. Equidad
Discriminación de precios es eficiente pero puede
ser inequitativa
14. Instrumento: nivel tarifario
Se relaciona con la capacidad de la tarifa
para generar ingresos
Su determinación es el trabajo principal del
regulador.
Sus determinantes principales son: riesgo,
niveles de eficiencia y obligaciones de
servicio.
Determina la sustentabilidad económica y
financiera de la empresa.
15. El impacto en el nivel tarifario
CC afecta la sustentabilidad de la “utility” desde el lado de la
demanda y desde el lado de la oferta
La sustentabilidad económica de la firma puede ser analizada a
través de la siguiente fórmula:
Donde:
RR: Ingresos Requeridos
O&M: Costos de O&M razonables
Tr: Impuestos
I: Inversiones
r : Costo de Capital
Ki: base de capital inicial
Kf: base de capital en el período N
0
&
)1()1(1
=+
−−−−
−
+
∑
+= r
K
r
K N
F
N
j
ji
TrITMORR
16. Implicancias desde el lado de la
oferta
Opex (O&M)
Condiciones climáticas más severas pueden causar cortes
más frecuentes en la red que requerirán su reparación.
Incremento en reparación de prevención para lograr que la
red se encuentre en óptimas condiciones y asi minimizar el
impacto de condiciones climáticas extremas
Capex (I) Sesgo hacia tecnologías más capital
intensivas
Mayor acondicionamiento a circunstancias climáticas
desfavorables (i.e. cables subterráneos)
Mayor eficiencia en mitigación del CC (i.e. generación a
partir de energías renovables que produzcan menores
emisiones de CO2).
17. RU (electricidad): CAPEX
Para mantener los niveles de alta confiabilidad de la red,
OFGEM considera se requerirá un incremento significativo en
inversión para la próxima revisión tarifaria (2010-2015).
Parte de estas inversiones son requeridas para mejorar la
adaptabilidad de la red y cumplir con los nuevos estándares:
Un conjunto de nuevos requerimientos y estándares se ha fijado
para las firmas; por ejemplo:
Cambios a las regulación de Seguridad, Calidad y Continuidad
(“Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations “-2002); y
Necesidad de invertir en defensas contra inundaciones a partir del “Pitt
Review “
En las inversiones reconocidas por el regulador, se incluyen
fondos upfront para hacer frente parte de estos CAPEX.
Estas cuentas de CAPEX abarcan aprox un 4% de los CAPEX
requeridos para toda la red ´para el período 2010 to 2015. Es
probable que dicha proporción aumente.
18. OPEX - CAPEX Trade-off
La firma posee mayores “ventajas en
informativas” que el regulador en lo que a
CAPEX respecta que respecto de OPEX.
es relativamente más sencillo evaluar la
eficienca operativa que la eficiencia en las
decisiones de inversión (tanto en términos de
volúmenes como de precios).
19. Reino Unido (electricidad):
Incentive Equalization Mechanism
Como parte de la revisión tarifaria en
distribución, OFGEM ha procurado igualar los
incentivos en lo que a declaración de OPEX y
CAPEX respecta.
Esto es logrado a partir de eliminar cualquier
distorsión que pudiera surgir a partir del
tratamiento diferente de los OPEX y CAPEX.
La propuesta de OFGEM es tratar toda
inversión en la red, los OPEX y los costos
indirectos asociados de la misma manera.
20. Costo de Capital
CC aumenta costo de capital a partir de incrementar el
riesgo no diversificable.
Acompañado esto de mayores requierimientos de CAPEX,
como se vio anteriormente, el CC entonces puede tener
un impacto importante en el costo económico de provisión
del servicio (y su financiamiento)..
Dos soluciones:
Para asegurar la viabilidad de ciertos proyectos (i.e.
expansiones) puede ser necesario asignar ciertos riesgos
fuera de la empresa y colocarlo en cabeza de los usuarios o
gobiernos (tax payers). Esto significa la implementación de
un mecanismo de seguros y garantías que puede mejorar la
asignación de riesgos.
Limitar la exposición de la empresa a ciertos riesgos a través
de cláusulas de fuerza mayor o causa fortuita también
podrían mejorar la asignación de riesgos.
21. Implicancias desde el lado de la
demanda
El sector de infraestructura es capital
intensivo (costos hundidos altos) y con
períodos de construcción prolongados
Las proyecciones de demanda son
esenciales:
Como un elemento crítico para asegurar un
“timing” eficiente en las inversiones.
Crucial para estimar la tarifa que permita
recuperar costos
La influencia del CC sobre la demanda viene
dada por:
Crecimiento de la demanda; y
Cambios en los patrones de consumo.
22. Implicancias desde el lado de la
demanda
La demanda de agua y electricidad tienen
una alta correlación con el clima.
Las altas temperatuas aumetan la demanda por
energía (aire acondicionado) y agua.
Las bajas temperaturas pueden también
incrementar la demanda de energía (para
calefacción).
Una estimación confiable de la demanda de
agua y electricidad ha sido siempre un
problema, en especial en países en
desarrollo
Este problema se ha vuelto aún más crítico como
consecuencia del CC.
23. Implicancias del CC sobre la demanda y
sus consecuencias sobre los ingresos
Bajo ciertos esquemas regulatorios, las
fluctuaciones de la demanda pueden tener
impactos significativos en los ingresos de las
firmas.
los price caps han probado ser eficientes para la
minimización de costs,
pero tienen la desventaja de incentivar a las
firmas a vender lo máximo posible:
Esto crea un potencial problema de insuficiencias de ingresos si la
demanda cae como resultado del CC.
No prove incentivos a las firmas a inducir a sus clientes a utilizar
eficientemente la energía.
24. Régimen Tarifario
Conjunto de reglas que definen cómo se
modifican y se recalculan tarifas en el tiempo.
Los principales regimenes son:
Tasa de Retorno (Cost Plus)
Price Cap
Hybridos
Determinan los incentivos de la firma
regulada para incrementar la eficiencia
productiva
25. Regímenes tarifarios y riesgo
Regímenes de altos poder para incentivar
(i.e. price caps) obtienen su fuerza a partir de
asignar más riesgos a la firma a partir de
convertirla en reclamante residual de los
beneficios.
Esta asignación es eficiente únicamente si la
firma tiene el control sobre los riesgos.
Los mayores riesgos e incertidumbres
generados por el CC conllevan a pensar que
la asignación óptima del riesgo entre las
firmas, el gobierno y los usuarios debe ser
redefinida.
26. Reino Unido (electricidad):
aumetando el poder de los incentivos
En el proyecto “RPI-X@20” se está
considerando aumentar el tiempo entre cada
revisión tarifaria de 5 a 8 años con el fin de
crear mayores incentivos a las firmas de
movilizar los recursos necesarios para los
próximos años.
Otras alternativas bajo discusión son fijar el
costo de capital de algunos activos a lo largo
de más de un período tarifario y utilizar
distintos costos de capital para distintos tipos
de activos.
27. Implicancias sobre la equidad
Los riesgos asociados al CC puede afectar de
manera desproporcionada a las poblaciones de
menores recursos:
Las zonas habitadas por personas de bajos recursos
puede ser más propensas a ser afectadas por el CC.
Los mayores costos asociados a la necesidad de la
adaptación y mitigación del CC pueden erosionar los
esfuerzos dedicados hacia el acceso de los servicios
de agua y electricidad.
En el caso de los países en desarrollo (con
restricciones financieras) la necesidad de
comprometer mayores recursos para hacer
frente al CC puede afectar la expansión del
servicio hacia zonas de menores recursos
28. Agenda regulatoria frente al CC
CC genera mayor riesgo e incertidumbre
Implicancias
Se profundiza el problema de la asimetría de
información
Se afectan los instrumentos regulatorios
Tarifas
Régimen Regulatorio
El regulador debe rever si los objetivos regulatorios están
siendo cumplidos considerando los trade-off entre ellos
29. Encuesta a empresas en países en
desarrollo
Objetivo de la encuesta
Estructura de la encuesta
Ejemplo de preguntas
Dónde estamos?
30. Bibliografía
1. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009). “A World
beyond Recession: Utility Global Service
2009”
2. Danilenko, Alexander, Eric Dickson, and
Michael Jacobsen (2009). “Climate Change
and Urban Water Utilities: Challenges &
Opportunities”, The World Bank
3. … (a ser completada)
Notas del editor
During the 2009 price review, companies’ business plans used the outdated UKCP02 scenario analysis to measure the impact of climate change and suggested a need to invest about £1.5 billion in the period up to 2015 to address the effects of climate change on water supply and demand. Using UKCP09[DB1] scenario analysis, companies’ investment requirements could be greater or less than this amount. If companies can establish clearly and robustly that they need to invest by 2015 to address the impact of climate change, Ofwat want them to be able to do so without delay in order to maintain security of supply for consumers. On that basis, Ofwat have allowed a notified item relating to changes in water supply/demand balance arising out of the use of UKCP09. As long as companies follow the requirements of the notified item, Ofwat will take into account in an interim deterioration any material expenditure they require during 2010-15 to deal with the impact of climate change on water resources [DB1]Why is important to mention the difference in business plans?
Sustainability is basically the ability of the firm to achieve full cost recovery through the revenues generated by its regulated activities plus fiscal transfers, if any. As a goal, entails tariff that generate enough revenues to cover the economic costs of the service.
Allocative efficiency is concerned, in a context of scarce resources and alternative uses for such resources, with tariffs reflecting the services’ production costs, i.e. having tariffs equal marginal costs. When tariffs reflect costs they serve as efficient signals for the allocation of resources in the economy. From the demand side promoting efficient consumption and from the supply side giving signals on investment needs.
Productive efficiency has to do with the minimization of costs at a given output level or, alternatively, the maximization of output with a given level of inputs. For a long time now, both the regulatory literature and actual experience have demonstrated that the creation of incentives for companies to be productively efficient is one of the greatest challenges faced by regulators.
Lastly, regulation must also provide for certain basic aspects of distributive efficiency or equity. This, in turn, is a two-fold aspect involving access and affordability. Access has to do with universal service goals: giving coverage to the entire population. Affordability has to do with having tariffs relate to payment capacity, particularly for the poorer strata of the population.
The weight given to each of these objectives will vary across sectors, countries and time. Typically social objectives will be more prevalent in the water sector while allocative efficiency is the main concern in telecoms. In UK the main objective of the reform of the late 80s was inducing productive efficiency leading to the adoption of RPI-X as the main regulatory regime. At present there is under way a reassessment of this regime mainly to adapt to changing weights among objectives (see Box 3). Meaning efficient costs directly related to the provision of the regulated service.
The financial sustainability of the operator is driven mainly by the average tariff level. This tariff level should allow an efficient firm to cover its cost and achieve a reasonable rate of return.
If the tariff level does not cover costs, subsidies will be a complementary option. Nevertheless, in general regulators have no power to decide subsidies for service as this are generally decided by the legislature or the executive powers.
One important task of the regulator is to isolate the tariff level discussion from short term political or social considerations. The objective is to set up tariffs based on technical considerations of efficiency levels, costs and service obligations.
This equation – which in financial terms represents the cash-flow of the firm (revenues minus expenses) reflects the equilibrium condition for a firm to be economically sustainable.
It also reflects what is known as the economic and financial equilibrium of a contract (which would be typically a concession contract in the case of a regulated company) as it equals the obligations and the rights of the different parties.
Looking at it from the point of view of a user it represents her right to have the service at a given level of quality (O&M and Investments) and her obligations (RR which involves the tariff to be paid covering the costs and a normal return on invested capital). Clearly in this simplified the bilateral relationship the rights of the users are obligation for the company and vice versa.
The service is sustainable form an economic perspective when the funds generated are enough to cover efficient costs and to allow the company to recover invested capital with a return equal to the opportunity cost of the invested funds. In other words the equilibrium is reached when the rights and obligations of both parties are equal. If the left hand side of the equation is greater than 0 the company would be earning monopolistic rents – a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital. If the left hand side is less than 0 the company would be earning less than a fair return.
In the water sector variations in rain patterns can worsen the quality of raw water imposing higher treatment costs (chemicals). In the electricity sector severe draughts or floods can limit the use of hydro power forcing the dispatch of thermal generation with higher operating costs.
[1] Renewable energy is also generally in remote locations which means there is a need for additional investment in transmission network. See Box ?? in section WW discussing the situation in Australia
Environmental concerns are not limited to ensuring reductions on utilities own carbon emissions but also include measures aimed at encouraging regulated companies to enable low carbon and energy saving developments to connect to their network. In this regard, OFGEM points out that “further investment in the electricity distribution networks is required to make the transition to a low carbon economy. The distribution networks have an important role to play in encouraging energy efficiency as smart meters are installed in customers' premises. They will need to adapt so they do not prevent the take up of low carbon technologies such as electric vehicles.”
Current regulatory arrangements may provide DNOs with a skewed incentive to solve network performance or constraint problems through further investment in transformers and cables, rather than maintaining existing assets to prolong their life or seeking to reduce or manage load, even when the latter solution is cheaper. This is because, relative to the arrangements for network investment, the DNO can currently keep a much higher proportion of under-spend against the regulatory operating cost allowance, and is not able to pass onto customers any of the overspend. The same incentive arrangements mean that DNOs may invest in high cost "fix and forget" assets that do not require much in the way of maintenance even where there are alternative solutions with lower whole life costs or which bring other benefits. These arrangements also provide DNOs with an incentive to reclassify costs from operating expenditure to network investment where the associated incentives are lower. A significant amount of our time in running the annual cost reporting process is spent on policing the boundaries between these categories.OFGEM decision is that 85 per cent of all costs (other than business support costs - management and overheads, for example) will be capitalized, and that customers will fund DNOs for this proportion of the DPCR5 investments over a 20 year period.Source: OFGEM
Box II – Insurance
To address extreme event or catastrophes risks insurance may be one of the most powerful instruments. There is some experience with weather index insurance and weather derivatives as well as from the Bank recently developed Global Index Reinsurance Facility the Ethiopia Weather Derivative used and the Turkey Insurance Pool. (Vagliasindi)
According to an Australian study: “Many of the risks identified will be covered by existing insurance arrangements. However it is to be expected that as understanding of the risks associated with climate change improves, and are more widely understood, insurers will act to reduce their potential exposure. Such action is likely to include requiring those they insure to demonstrate that controls or risk mitigation measures are in place to manage this new class of risk. Some insurance companies have already begun this process.”
In Australia the view seems to be that most effects of climate change would not fall under force majeur coverage (See Box W)
Box W – Force Majeur in Australia
According to the Infrastructure and climate change risk assessment for Victoria - Report to the Victorian Government - March 2007 (Page 2):
“The modeling underpinning this report makes it clear that climate change presents a number of risks that courts would consider to be reasonably foreseeable. As a consequence, all involved in the development, ownership and management of infrastructure face the prospect of liability for negligence in the event losses are suffered because of a failure to properly address these risks.”
Source: Infrastructure and climate change risk assessment for Victoria
It is also important to bear in mind that these clauses can be difficult to implement or enforce in practice giving way to two problems. Firstly, by exempting firms of responsibility they can exacerbate moral hazard problems. Secondly, if the application of these clauses is controversial they will not be efficient in reducing the perceived risk of the business and might not reduce the cost of capital.
Infrastructure is characterized by very high capital intensity – large sunk costs – and long construction lead periods. Demand forecasts are essential. On the one hand they are a critical element to ensure an efficient timing of investment. On the other hand demand estimates are crucial to define tariffs that allow an efficient recovery of fix costs.
Demand for water and electricity services has a close relationship with weather. Higher temperatures increase demand for energy (air conditioning) and for water. Low temperatures can also increase demand for electricity (for heating).
Reliable demand estimates for electricity and water have always been a problem particularly in developing countries. This is problem is likely to become even more critical due to climate change.
Under certain regulatory regimes demand variations can have a substantial impact on company revenues. Many developing countries, following the reform wave of the 90s, have vertically unbundled sectors with some degree of competition in generation and high incentive regulatory regimes based in some form of price cap for transmission and distribution companies.
While price caps have proved effective in providing incentives for cost reductions, they have some disadvantages that have led regulators to consider alternative mechanisms. In particular, they provide an incentive for companies to sell as much as possible at the maximum allowed price—perhaps more than would be efficient in the absence of such a cap. This is of particular concern when supply-demand balances are relatively small and when environmental considerations are important.
One way to correct the incentive to sell large quantities is to cap revenue rather than price—allowing companies to earn a particular allowed revenue and compensating them should they sell too few and removing revenue arising from excess sales. There are two main disadvantages. First, the company will have to set its prices in advance, but can only check the revenue that they yield afterwards. This means that the company may, quite innocently, earn more than the price control allows.
For example, if the company has a fixed charge for each consumer and a unit rate, the average revenue per unit falls as demand increases. If demand is lower than expected, then the company’s average revenue per unit will be higher, leading it to breach the price control.
The control therefore has to include a correction factor, so that the company’s allowable revenues in one year are reduced if it over-recovers in the previous year. (The correction factor also allows the company to recover the revenue forgone if its prices turn out to be lower than the control would have allowed).
Second, the cap is likely to be more complicated to specify. If the cap simply specifies the revenue per unit of sales, the company can effectively `ease’ the cap by expanding sales to low-price customers, since this will increase its volume by a greater proportion than its revenue.
More generally a combination of price and revenue cap mirroring the cost structure of the company (revenue cap to cover fix costs and price cap for variable costs) could result in the same incentives for productive efficiency while eliminating the incentives to sell as much as possible.
An alternative regulatory approach is to reopen the price review if demand departs from the values estimated at the last price review (see Box Z).
Identifying utilities concerns regarding climate change
The objective of this phase is to identify the main challenges faced by utilities in relation to climate change. For this, a survey will be designed and conducted among electricity and water utilities to ascertain the main challenges posed by climate change policies and how they are embedded in the economic and financial regulation. The survey will be aimed at senior management (CEO, COO, General Manager) in order to capture the strategic views of the company.
The PwC (2009) report focuses on concerns about the development of power markets whereas the World Bank (2009) report surveys measures applied at the water sector to cope with climate change effects. This new survey will move one step further by looking at the economic and financial regulation. In particular, the survey will cover four main areas:
Impact of climate change on supply
Production inputs (raw water, water for hydro generators)
Availability, reliability, and prices (carbon taxes, fuel prices)
Costs: capex to increase/maintain reliability and to reduce emissions
Opex (volatility, changes in pattern)
Quality of supply (reliability)
New technologies
Impact of climate change on demand
Changes in demand patterns (peak shifting, growth rates variability, and regional patterns)
Changes in demand for quality (firm´s perception of users willignes to pay for maintaining or improving quality of service)
Crisis Management
Crisis management plans (mandatory /voluntary)
Have there been major natural crisis during the last 10 years (source, duration, solutions). Have these prompted any changes in the company
Relation with regulator/policy maker during crisis
Constraints affecting optimal responses to climate change
Regulatory. Need of regulatory adaptation of:
Rules, contracts
Regulatory process
Technical issues by regulator
Tariff rules
Risk sharing
Policy
Need for policy definitions and long term strategies by sector policy makers
Financial (access to finance, terms of finance, insurance and guarantees )
For each topic questions aimed at identifying the problems associated to each type of climate change event (increase in extreme conditions, increase in variability, increase in average temperature), the measures which should be taken, the measures that have been taken, constraints faced to take optimal action.
The information will be collected through a web-based survey followed by phone calls to the interviews. The consultant will also visit some companies and perform some interviews in situ.
Regulatory instruments to deal with the problems identified in the survey
This last section will discuss potential solutions to the concerns indentified in the survey vis-à-vis the regulatory capacity in developing countries. The discussion will serve as an input for the discussion during the workshop that will be organized in Washington DC in June 2010.
We have decided to not include Chile given the recent earthquake.